@article{14905,
  abstract     = {{A key premise underlying most of the economic literature is that rational decision-makers will choose dominant strategies over dominated alternatives. However, prior literature in various disciplines including business, psychology, and economics document a series of phenomena associated with violations of the dominance principle in decision-making. In this comprehensive review, we discuss conditions under which people violate the dominance principle in decision-making. When presenting violations of dominance in empirical and experimental studies, we differentiate between absolute, statewise, and stochastic (first- and second-order) violations of dominance. Furthermore, we categorize the literature by the leading causes for dominance violations: framing, reference points, certainty effects, bounded rationality, and emotional responses.}},
  author       = {{Kourouxous, Thomas and Bauer, Thomas}},
  issn         = {{2198-3402}},
  journal      = {{Business Research}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{209--239}},
  title        = {{{Violations of Dominance in Decision-Making}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s40685-019-0093-7}},
  volume       = {{12}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@article{5009,
  abstract     = {{When analyzing the influence of taxation on agency conflicts between firm owners and managers, one can draw on theoretical principal–agent literature from various research fields. In recent years, this interdisciplinary research has grown significantly covering research with regards to optimal compensation, investment decisions, tax avoidance and transfer pricing while analyzing the effects of corporate income taxes, wage taxes, bonus taxes and shareholder taxes. Our paper provides a comprehensive review of analytical literature that studies the influence of taxation on agency conflicts between firm owners and managers. Above and beyond summarizing research findings, we discuss how taxes are commonly implemented in agency models, derive empirical predictions, and identify research gaps for future tax research.}},
  author       = {{Bauer, Thomas and Kourouxous, Thomas and Krenn, Peter}},
  journal      = {{Business Research}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{33--76}},
  title        = {{{Taxation and Agency Conflicts between Firm Owners and Managers: A Review}}},
  volume       = {{11}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@article{5014,
  abstract     = {{This paper studies the impact of personal and corporate income taxation on capital charge rates in a delegation setting with a risk-averse manager. If the investment level influences the riskiness of the investment project, the capital charge rate deviates from the firm's cost of capital and depends crucially on the manager's personal income tax rate. Contradicting conventional wisdom, we find that a higher personal income tax rate induces higher investment expenditures and, surprisingly, increases the capital charge rate. The countervailing effect that a higher capital charge rate induces higher and not lower investment expenditures persists for pre-tax and after-tax performance measures as well as when the tax deductibility of managerial compensation is limited. Corporate income tax causes a similar effect only in the case of limited tax deductibility of compensation. Our insights remain valid regardless of the financing structure and the risk attitude of the investors.}},
  author       = {{Bauer, Thomas and Kourouxous, Thomas}},
  issn         = {{0963-8180}},
  journal      = {{European Accounting Review}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{419--440}},
  publisher    = {{Informa UK Limited}},
  title        = {{{Capital Charge Rates, Investment Incentives and Taxation}}},
  doi          = {{10.1080/09638180.2016.1169938}},
  volume       = {{26}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}