[{"date_created":"2026-02-20T14:35:34Z","file":[{"content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"64568","access_level":"open_access","file_size":775133,"file_name":"foci-2026-0001.pdf","date_updated":"2026-02-21T10:20:16Z","relation":"main_file","date_created":"2026-02-20T14:34:05Z","creator":"nniklas"}],"oa":"1","type":"conference","citation":{"bibtex":"@inproceedings{Lange_Niere_Somorovsky_2026, title={Towards Automated DNS Censorship Circumvention}, author={Lange, Felix and Niere, Niklas and Somorovsky, Juraj}, year={2026} }","ama":"Lange F, Niere N, Somorovsky J. Towards Automated DNS Censorship Circumvention. In: ; 2026.","short":"F. Lange, N. Niere, J. Somorovsky, in: 2026.","chicago":"Lange, Felix, Niklas Niere, and Juraj Somorovsky. “Towards Automated DNS Censorship Circumvention,” 2026.","ieee":"F. Lange, N. Niere, and J. Somorovsky, “Towards Automated DNS Censorship Circumvention,” presented at the Free and Open Communications on the Internet, Virtual, 2026.","mla":"Lange, Felix, et al. <i>Towards Automated DNS Censorship Circumvention</i>. 2026.","apa":"Lange, F., Niere, N., &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2026). <i>Towards Automated DNS Censorship Circumvention</i>. Free and Open Communications on the Internet, Virtual."},"file_date_updated":"2026-02-21T10:20:16Z","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Censorship is employed by many governments and ISPs worldwide, with an increasing trend in recent years. One of the most censored protocols is DNS: censors target unencrypted and encrypted DNS to prevent clients from resolving the domain name of unwanted websites. Despite much research on DNS censorship, only a few tools can circumvent it.To support users affected by DNS censorship, we present DPYProxy-DNS, a DNS resolver that automatically detects and employs a working DNS censorship circumvention. We demonstrate the effectiveness of DPYProxy-DNS by automatically circumventing DNS censorship in China and Iran and analyzing DNS censorship mechanisms in these countries. Our analyses re veal that DNS censorship in Iran is ineffective against encrypted DNS. In China, DPYProxy-DNS revealed two consistently working circumvention techniques for unencrypted DNS: TCP segmentation for DNS over TCP and ignoring DNS responses injected by the Great Firewall of China (GFW). Our findings reveal varying levels of DNS censorship across different countries, underscoring the importance of the automated circumvention approach we provide with DPYProxy-DNS."}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"64566","main_file_link":[{"open_access":"1","url":"https://www.petsymposium.org/foci/2026/foci-2026-0001.pdf"}],"ddc":["006"],"user_id":"63563","conference":{"name":"Free and Open Communications on the Internet","start_date":"2026-02-19","location":"Virtual","end_date":"2026-02-19"},"author":[{"id":"67893","last_name":"Lange","first_name":"Felix","full_name":"Lange, Felix"},{"id":"63563","full_name":"Niere, Niklas","last_name":"Niere","first_name":"Niklas"},{"full_name":"Somorovsky, Juraj","first_name":"Juraj","orcid":"0000-0002-3593-7720","last_name":"Somorovsky","id":"83504"}],"year":"2026","status":"public","title":"Towards Automated DNS Censorship Circumvention","has_accepted_license":"1","date_updated":"2026-02-21T10:20:16Z"},{"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"In June 2025, Iran enacted a nationwide Internet shutdown, culminating its already strict censorship apparatus. While Internet shutdowns happen regularly, insights into these shutdowns are notoriously difficult to obtain: their timing is hard to predict, and measurements are often impossible. In this paper, we present unique measurements surrounding Iran’s 2025 Internet shutdown in June, which we acquired during a regular analysis of Iran’s censorship apparatus. We contextualize our findings of Iranian DNS, HTTP, TLS, and QUIC censorship during the shutdown with measurements from platforms such as Cloudflare Radar and user reports. Our measurements show that Iranian censorship changed before and after the shutdown, marking preparation and recovery periods. For instance, QUIC censorship went into effect before and stayed in effect after the shutdown, while DNS over TCP censorship was only present briefly before the shutdown and resumed working afterwards. We also measured general network instabilities, especially for UDP, after the shutdown and the disabling of certain middleboxes. Our findings indicate that the Iranian censor enforced its shutdown using fine-grained techniques instead of relying on an all-or-nothing blackout. We advertise for continued measurements of the Iranian censor and hypothesize that future shutdowns in censoring countries could be detected during their preparation phase."}],"file_date_updated":"2026-07-05T20:08:45Z","citation":{"short":"A. Anonymous, N. Niere, F. Graf Lange, J. Somorovsky, in: 2026.","chicago":"Anonymous, Anonymous, Niklas Niere, Felix Graf Lange, and Juraj Somorovsky. “Insights into an Iranian Internet Shutdown,” 2026.","apa":"Anonymous, A., Niere, N., Graf Lange, F., &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2026). <i>Insights into an Iranian Internet Shutdown</i>. Free and Open Communications on the Internet, Calgary.","ieee":"A. Anonymous, N. Niere, F. Graf Lange, and J. Somorovsky, “Insights into an Iranian Internet Shutdown,” presented at the Free and Open Communications on the Internet, Calgary, 2026.","ama":"Anonymous A, Niere N, Graf Lange F, Somorovsky J. Insights into an Iranian Internet Shutdown. In: ; 2026.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Anonymous_Niere_Graf Lange_Somorovsky_2026, title={Insights into an Iranian Internet Shutdown}, author={Anonymous, Anonymous and Niere, Niklas and Graf Lange, Felix and Somorovsky, Juraj}, year={2026} }","mla":"Anonymous, Anonymous, et al. <i>Insights into an Iranian Internet Shutdown</i>. 2026."},"type":"conference","oa":"1","file":[{"date_created":"2026-07-05T20:08:45Z","creator":"nniklas","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"66271","access_level":"closed","file_size":539622,"file_name":"foci-2026-0016.pdf","date_updated":"2026-07-05T20:08:45Z","relation":"main_file"}],"date_created":"2026-07-05T20:10:58Z","date_updated":"2026-07-05T20:11:03Z","has_accepted_license":"1","year":"2026","status":"public","title":"Insights into an Iranian Internet Shutdown","author":[{"full_name":"Anonymous, Anonymous","last_name":"Anonymous","first_name":"Anonymous"},{"full_name":"Niere, Niklas","last_name":"Niere","first_name":"Niklas","id":"63563"},{"last_name":"Graf Lange","first_name":"Felix","full_name":"Graf Lange, Felix","id":"67893"},{"full_name":"Somorovsky, Juraj","orcid":"0000-0002-3593-7720","first_name":"Juraj","last_name":"Somorovsky","id":"83504"}],"conference":{"end_date":"2026-07-24","location":"Calgary","start_date":"2026-07-20","name":"Free and Open Communications on the Internet"},"user_id":"63563","ddc":["006"],"main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.petsymposium.org/foci/2026/foci-2026-0016.pdf","open_access":"1"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"66270"},{"_id":"66726","user_id":"63563","ddc":["006"],"conference":{"location":"Baltimore","start_date":"2026-08-12","name":"35th USENIX Security Symposium","end_date":"2026-08-14"},"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","oa":"1","citation":{"ama":"Ablove A, Walker J, Wolin B, et al. Technical Analysis of the Geedge Networks Firewall Source Code Leak. In: ; 2026.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Ablove_Walker_Wolin_Niere_Graf Lange_Ortwein_Huremagic_Priyanka_Zohaib_Sheffey_et al._2026, title={Technical Analysis of the Geedge Networks Firewall Source Code Leak}, author={Ablove, Anna and Walker, Johnnie and Wolin, Ben and Niere, Niklas and Graf Lange, Felix and Ortwein, Aaron and Huremagic, Armin and Priyanka, Richa and Zohaib, Ali and Sheffey, Jade and et al.}, year={2026} }","mla":"Ablove, Anna, et al. <i>Technical Analysis of the Geedge Networks Firewall Source Code Leak</i>. 2026.","chicago":"Ablove, Anna, Johnnie Walker, Ben Wolin, Niklas Niere, Felix Graf Lange, Aaron Ortwein, Armin Huremagic, et al. “Technical Analysis of the Geedge Networks Firewall Source Code Leak,” 2026.","short":"A. Ablove, J. Walker, B. Wolin, N. Niere, F. Graf Lange, A. Ortwein, A. Huremagic, R. Priyanka, A. Zohaib, J. Sheffey, N. Heitmann, J.A. Halderman, J. Somorovsky, A. Houmansadr, R. Ensafi, M. Wu, E. Wustrow, in: 2026.","apa":"Ablove, A., Walker, J., Wolin, B., Niere, N., Graf Lange, F., Ortwein, A., Huremagic, A., Priyanka, R., Zohaib, A., Sheffey, J., Heitmann, N., Halderman, J. A., Somorovsky, J., Houmansadr, A., Ensafi, R., Wu, M., &#38; Wustrow, E. (2026). <i>Technical Analysis of the Geedge Networks Firewall Source Code Leak</i>. 35th USENIX Security Symposium, Baltimore.","ieee":"A. Ablove <i>et al.</i>, “Technical Analysis of the Geedge Networks Firewall Source Code Leak,” presented at the 35th USENIX Security Symposium, Baltimore, 2026."},"file_date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:39:32Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity26-ablove.pdf","open_access":"1"}],"author":[{"last_name":"Ablove","first_name":"Anna","full_name":"Ablove, Anna"},{"last_name":"Walker","first_name":"Johnnie","full_name":"Walker, Johnnie"},{"last_name":"Wolin","first_name":"Ben","full_name":"Wolin, Ben"},{"id":"63563","last_name":"Niere","first_name":"Niklas","full_name":"Niere, Niklas"},{"id":"67893","full_name":"Graf Lange, Felix","first_name":"Felix","last_name":"Graf Lange"},{"full_name":"Ortwein, Aaron","first_name":"Aaron","last_name":"Ortwein"},{"last_name":"Huremagic","first_name":"Armin","full_name":"Huremagic, Armin"},{"full_name":"Priyanka, Richa","first_name":"Richa","last_name":"Priyanka"},{"first_name":"Ali","last_name":"Zohaib","full_name":"Zohaib, Ali"},{"full_name":"Sheffey, Jade","last_name":"Sheffey","first_name":"Jade"},{"orcid":"0009-0003-7687-7044","last_name":"Heitmann","first_name":"Nico","full_name":"Heitmann, Nico","id":"74619"},{"full_name":"Halderman, J. Alex","last_name":"Halderman","first_name":"J. Alex"},{"id":"83504","first_name":"Juraj","last_name":"Somorovsky","orcid":"0000-0002-3593-7720","full_name":"Somorovsky, Juraj"},{"last_name":"Houmansadr","first_name":"Amir","full_name":"Houmansadr, Amir"},{"last_name":"Ensafi","first_name":"Roya","full_name":"Ensafi, Roya"},{"first_name":"Mingshi","last_name":"Wu","full_name":"Wu, Mingshi"},{"first_name":"Eric","last_name":"Wustrow","full_name":"Wustrow, Eric"}],"publication_identifier":{"isbn":["978-1-939133-58-8"]},"title":"Technical Analysis of the Geedge Networks Firewall Source Code Leak","year":"2026","publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:39:32Z","date_created":"2026-08-17T07:33:15Z","file":[{"date_created":"2026-08-17T07:31:02Z","creator":"nniklas","file_id":"66727","content_type":"application/pdf","file_name":"usenixsecurity26-ablove.pdf","file_size":1838094,"access_level":"local","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:39:32Z"}],"type":"conference","abstract":[{"text":"In September 2025, over 100K internal documents (including code, communications, etc.) from Geedge Networks, a Chinese DPI company with ties to the Great Firewall of China, were leaked to the public. In this paper, we analyze the source code from this leak, focusing on Geedge Networks’ flagship product, the Tiangou Secure Gateway (TSG) firewall. Working across multiple repositories, we successfully build and run a local copy of TSG—revealing key aspects of its architecture, including the protocols it is capable of parsing and the format of blocking rules used to censor sites, proxies, and other resources. Finally, we extract several fingerprints from TSG, including custom random number generators and parsing idiosyncrasies that allow us to identify its use and similar deployments in the Great Firewall of China. This is the first time that the source code of a commercial DPI has been leaked, and our work is the first code analysis of a core firewall component used in national censorship infrastructure. This unprecedented investigation offers insights that can assist circumvention developers and Internet security researchers in further understanding the capabilities and limitations of modern censorship technology.","lang":"eng"}]},{"oa":"1","type":"conference","date_created":"2026-07-05T20:06:35Z","file":[{"creator":"nniklas","date_created":"2026-07-05T20:04:24Z","access_level":"local","file_size":559028,"file_name":"foci-2026-0010.pdf","date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:40:14Z","relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"66269"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Governments around the world limit free access to information through Internet censorship. With the rising adoption of the QUIC protocol, these censors have been forced to evolve their systems. Russia introduced sweeping changes to its censorship after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including completely blocking international QUIC connections. However, after this broad filter was identified in 2022, Russian QUIC censorship received little attention: The current state of QUIC censorship by TSPU devices is largely unknown. In this paper, we provide a timeline of Russian QUIC censorship and detail its current state. We identify that Russian TSPU devices switched to SNI-dependent QUIC censorship on a large scale between May 2022 and July 2023, a fact that went largely unnoticed for three years. While the GFW was previously thought to be the first censor with broad SNI-dependent QUIC censorship, we highlight that Russian TSPU devices broadly adopted SNI-dependent QUIC censorship at least nine months before the GFW. We consider this an indicator of the TSPU devices’ flexibility and of Russia’s willingness to invest in strict and up-to-date censorship."}],"citation":{"bibtex":"@inproceedings{Heitmann_Niere_Graf Lange_Somorovsky_2026, title={On Russia’s Early Introduction of QUIC SNI Censorship}, author={Heitmann, Nico and Niere, Niklas and Graf Lange, Felix and Somorovsky, Juraj}, year={2026} }","ama":"Heitmann N, Niere N, Graf Lange F, Somorovsky J. On Russia’s Early Introduction of QUIC SNI Censorship. In: ; 2026.","mla":"Heitmann, Nico, et al. <i>On Russia’s Early Introduction of QUIC SNI Censorship</i>. 2026.","chicago":"Heitmann, Nico, Niklas Niere, Felix Graf Lange, and Juraj Somorovsky. “On Russia’s Early Introduction of QUIC SNI Censorship,” 2026.","short":"N. Heitmann, N. Niere, F. Graf Lange, J. Somorovsky, in: 2026.","ieee":"N. Heitmann, N. Niere, F. Graf Lange, and J. Somorovsky, “On Russia’s Early Introduction of QUIC SNI Censorship,” presented at the Free and Open Communications on the Internet, Calgary, 2026.","apa":"Heitmann, N., Niere, N., Graf Lange, F., &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2026). <i>On Russia’s Early Introduction of QUIC SNI Censorship</i>. Free and Open Communications on the Internet, Calgary."},"file_date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:40:14Z","user_id":"63563","ddc":["006"],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"66268","main_file_link":[{"open_access":"1","url":"https://www.petsymposium.org/foci/2026/foci-2026-0010.pdf"}],"has_accepted_license":"1","date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:40:14Z","author":[{"orcid":"0009-0003-7687-7044","first_name":"Nico","last_name":"Heitmann","full_name":"Heitmann, Nico","id":"74619"},{"full_name":"Niere, Niklas","last_name":"Niere","first_name":"Niklas","id":"63563"},{"id":"67893","full_name":"Graf Lange, Felix","first_name":"Felix","last_name":"Graf Lange"},{"full_name":"Somorovsky, Juraj","first_name":"Juraj","last_name":"Somorovsky","orcid":"0000-0002-3593-7720","id":"83504"}],"conference":{"location":"Calgary","name":"Free and Open Communications on the Internet","start_date":"2026-07-20","end_date":"2026-07-20"},"title":"On Russia’s Early Introduction of QUIC SNI Censorship","year":"2026","status":"public"},{"conference":{"end_date":"2025-05-14","location":"San Francisco","name":"46th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","start_date":"2025-05-12"},"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","_id":"59824","user_id":"63563","ddc":["006"],"citation":{"ieee":"N. Niere, F. Lange, R. Merget, and J. Somorovsky, “Transport Layer Obscurity: Circumventing SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer,” presented at the 46th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, San Francisco, 2025, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151\">10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>.","apa":"Niere, N., Lange, F., Merget, R., &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2025). Transport Layer Obscurity: Circumventing SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer. <i>2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)</i>. 46th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, San Francisco. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151\">https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>","short":"N. Niere, F. Lange, R. Merget, J. Somorovsky, in: 2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2025.","chicago":"Niere, Niklas, Felix Lange, Robert Merget, and Juraj Somorovsky. “Transport Layer Obscurity: Circumventing SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer.” In <i>2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)</i>, 2025. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151\">https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>.","mla":"Niere, Niklas, et al. “Transport Layer Obscurity: Circumventing SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer.” <i>2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)</i>, 2025, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151\">10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Niere_Lange_Merget_Somorovsky_2025, title={Transport Layer Obscurity: Circumventing SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151\">10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>}, booktitle={2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)}, author={Niere, Niklas and Lange, Felix and Merget, Robert and Somorovsky, Juraj}, year={2025} }","ama":"Niere N, Lange F, Merget R, Somorovsky J. Transport Layer Obscurity: Circumventing SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer. In: <i>2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)</i>. ; 2025. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151\">10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>"},"file_date_updated":"2025-05-06T13:51:45Z","oa":"1","author":[{"id":"63563","full_name":"Niere, Niklas","first_name":"Niklas","last_name":"Niere"},{"first_name":"Felix","last_name":"Lange","full_name":"Lange, Felix","id":"67893"},{"full_name":"Merget, Robert","last_name":"Merget","first_name":"Robert"},{"first_name":"Juraj","orcid":"0000-0002-3593-7720","last_name":"Somorovsky","full_name":"Somorovsky, Juraj","id":"83504"}],"year":"2025","title":"Transport Layer Obscurity: Circumventing SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer","date_updated":"2025-06-02T12:03:51Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151","publication":"2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"HTTPS composes large parts of today’s Internet traffic and has long been subject to censorship efforts in different countries. While censors analyze the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to block encrypted HTTP traffic, censorship circumvention efforts have primarily focused on other protocols such as TCP. In this paper, we hypothesize that the TLS protocol offers previously unseen opportunities for censorship circumvention techniques. We tested our hypothesis by proposing possible censorship circumvention techniques that act on the TLS protocol. To validate the effectiveness of these techniques, we evaluate their acceptance by popular TLS servers and successfully demonstrate that these techniques can circumvent censors in China and Iran. In our evaluations, we discovered 38—partially standard-compliant—distinct censorship circumvention techniques, which we could group into 11 unique categories. Additionally, we provide novel insights into how China censors TLS traffic by presenting evidence of at least three distinct censorship appliances. We suspect that other parts of China’s censorship apparatus and other censors exhibit similar structures and advocate future censorship research to anticipate them. With this work, we hope to aid people affected by censorship and stimulate further\r\nresearch into censorship circumvention using cryptographic protocols."}],"date_created":"2025-05-06T13:40:50Z","file":[{"file_id":"59826","content_type":"application/pdf","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2025-05-06T13:51:45Z","file_name":"TLS_Obscurity.pdf","file_size":463431,"access_level":"open_access","date_created":"2025-05-06T13:49:35Z","creator":"nniklas"}],"department":[{"_id":"632"}],"type":"conference"},{"file_date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:40:31Z","citation":{"apa":"Lange, F., Niere, N., von Niessen, J., Suermann, D., Heitmann, N., &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2025). I(ra)nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship. <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>. Free and Open Communications on the Internet, Virtual.","ieee":"F. Lange, N. Niere, J. von Niessen, D. Suermann, N. Heitmann, and J. Somorovsky, “I(ra)nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship,” presented at the Free and Open Communications on the Internet, Virtual, 2025.","chicago":"Lange, Felix, Niklas Niere, Jonathan von Niessen, Dennis Suermann, Nico Heitmann, and Juraj Somorovsky. “I(Ra)Nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship.” In <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>, 2025.","short":"F. Lange, N. Niere, J. von Niessen, D. Suermann, N. Heitmann, J. Somorovsky, in: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2025.","mla":"Lange, Felix, et al. “I(Ra)Nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship.” <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>, 2025.","ama":"Lange F, Niere N, von Niessen J, Suermann D, Heitmann N, Somorovsky J. I(ra)nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship. In: <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>. ; 2025.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Lange_Niere_von Niessen_Suermann_Heitmann_Somorovsky_2025, title={I(ra)nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship}, booktitle={Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies}, author={Lange, Felix and Niere, Niklas and von Niessen, Jonathan and Suermann, Dennis and Heitmann, Nico and Somorovsky, Juraj}, year={2025} }"},"quality_controlled":"1","oa":"1","status":"public","conference":{"end_date":"2025-02-20","location":"Virtual","name":"Free and Open Communications on the Internet","start_date":"2025-02-20"},"has_accepted_license":"1","_id":"58801","ddc":["006"],"user_id":"63563","publication":"Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies","abstract":[{"text":"Iran employs one of the most prominent Internet censors in the world. An important part of Iran’s censorship apparatus is its analysis of unencrypted protocols such as HTTP and DNS. During routine evaluations of Iran’s HTTP and DNS censorship, we noticed several properties we believe to be unknown today. For instance, we found injections of correct static IPs for some domains such as google.com on the DNS level, unclear HTTP version parsing, and correlations between DNS and HTTP censorship. In this paper, we present our findings to the community and discuss possible takeaways for affected people and the censorship circumvention community. As some of our findings left us bewildered, we hope to ignite a discussion about Iran’s censorship behavior. We aim to use the discussion of our work to execute a thorough analysis and explanation of Iran’s censorship behavior in the future.","lang":"eng"}],"file":[{"date_created":"2025-02-24T08:07:59Z","creator":"flange","content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"58802","file_size":535700,"access_level":"local","file_name":"foci-2025-0002.pdf","date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:40:31Z","relation":"main_file"}],"date_created":"2025-02-24T08:09:56Z","type":"conference","department":[{"_id":"632"}],"title":"I(ra)nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship","year":"2025","author":[{"id":"67893","full_name":"Lange, Felix","last_name":"Lange","first_name":"Felix"},{"id":"63563","first_name":"Niklas","last_name":"Niere","full_name":"Niere, Niklas"},{"first_name":"Jonathan","last_name":"von Niessen","full_name":"von Niessen, Jonathan"},{"full_name":"Suermann, Dennis","last_name":"Suermann","first_name":"Dennis"},{"id":"74619","full_name":"Heitmann, Nico","first_name":"Nico","orcid":"0009-0003-7687-7044","last_name":"Heitmann"},{"id":"83504","full_name":"Somorovsky, Juraj","orcid":"0000-0002-3593-7720","last_name":"Somorovsky","first_name":"Juraj"}],"date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:40:31Z","main_file_link":[{"open_access":"1","url":"https://www.petsymposium.org/foci/2025/foci-2025-0002.pdf"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}]},{"author":[{"full_name":"Niere, Niklas","last_name":"Niere","first_name":"Niklas","id":"63563"},{"first_name":"Felix","last_name":"Lange","full_name":"Lange, Felix","id":"67893"},{"id":"74619","full_name":"Heitmann, Nico","last_name":"Heitmann","first_name":"Nico","orcid":"0009-0003-7687-7044"},{"last_name":"Somorovsky","orcid":"0000-0002-3593-7720","first_name":"Juraj","full_name":"Somorovsky, Juraj","id":"83504"}],"title":"Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention","year":"2025","date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:40:46Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.petsymposium.org/foci/2025/foci-2025-0016.pdf","open_access":"1"}],"abstract":[{"text":"Censors have long censored Transport Layer Security (TLS) traffic by inspecting the domain name in the unencrypted Server Name Indication (SNI) extension. By encrypting the SNI extension, the Encrypted ClientHello (ECH) prevents censors from blocking TLS traffic to certain domains. Despite this promising outlook, ECH’s current capability to contest TLS censorship is unclear; for instance, Russia has started censoring ECH connections successfully. This paper clarifies ECH’s current role for TLS censorship. To this end, we evaluate servers’ support for ECH and its analysis and subsequent blocking by censors. We determine Cloudflare as the only major provider supporting ECH. Additionally, we affirm previously known ECH censorship in Russia and uncover indirect censorship of ECH through encrypted DNS censorship in China and Iran. Our findings suggest that ECH’s contribution to censorship circumvention is currently limited: we consider ECH’s dependence on encrypted DNS especially challenging for ECH’s capability to circumvent censorship. We stress the importance of censorship-resistant ECH to solve the long-known problem of SNI-based TLS censorship.","lang":"eng"}],"date_created":"2025-07-03T07:14:00Z","file":[{"creator":"nniklas","date_created":"2025-07-03T07:11:14Z","date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:40:46Z","relation":"main_file","file_size":755171,"access_level":"local","file_name":"foci-2025-0016.pdf","content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"60505"}],"type":"conference","keyword":["censorship","circumvention","ECH","TLS"],"conference":{"end_date":"2025-07-14","name":"Free and Open Communications on the Internet","start_date":"2025-07-14","location":"Washington, D.C."},"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","_id":"60503","user_id":"63563","ddc":["006"],"citation":{"ama":"Niere N, Lange F, Heitmann N, Somorovsky J. Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention. In: ; 2025.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Niere_Lange_Heitmann_Somorovsky_2025, title={Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention}, author={Niere, Niklas and Lange, Felix and Heitmann, Nico and Somorovsky, Juraj}, year={2025} }","mla":"Niere, Niklas, et al. <i>Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention</i>. 2025.","chicago":"Niere, Niklas, Felix Lange, Nico Heitmann, and Juraj Somorovsky. “Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention,” 2025.","short":"N. Niere, F. Lange, N. Heitmann, J. Somorovsky, in: 2025.","apa":"Niere, N., Lange, F., Heitmann, N., &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2025). <i>Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention</i>. Free and Open Communications on the Internet, Washington, D.C.","ieee":"N. Niere, F. Lange, N. Heitmann, and J. Somorovsky, “Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention,” presented at the Free and Open Communications on the Internet, Washington, D.C., 2025."},"file_date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:40:46Z","oa":"1"},{"editor":[{"last_name":"Calzolari","first_name":"Nicoletta","full_name":"Calzolari, Nicoletta"},{"full_name":"Kan, Min-Yen","last_name":"Kan","first_name":"Min-Yen"},{"first_name":"Veronique","last_name":"Hoste","full_name":"Hoste, Veronique"},{"full_name":"Lenci, Alessandro","last_name":"Lenci","first_name":"Alessandro"},{"full_name":"Sakti, Sakriani","last_name":"Sakti","first_name":"Sakriani"},{"first_name":"Nianwen","last_name":"Xue","full_name":"Xue, Nianwen"}],"user_id":"67893","_id":"55404","publisher":"ELRA and ICCL","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"page":"11523–11536","date_updated":"2024-12-17T11:30:25Z","author":[{"id":"73059","first_name":"Milad","last_name":"Alshomary","full_name":"Alshomary, Milad"},{"id":"67893","first_name":"Felix","last_name":"Lange","full_name":"Lange, Felix"},{"full_name":"Booshehri, Meisam","first_name":"Meisam","last_name":"Booshehri"},{"first_name":"Meghdut","last_name":"Sengupta","full_name":"Sengupta, Meghdut","id":"99459"},{"full_name":"Cimiano, Philipp","last_name":"Cimiano","first_name":"Philipp"},{"first_name":"Henning","last_name":"Wachsmuth","full_name":"Wachsmuth, Henning","id":"3900"}],"title":"Modeling the Quality of Dialogical Explanations","status":"public","year":"2024","department":[{"_id":"600"},{"_id":"660"}],"type":"conference","date_created":"2024-07-26T13:04:25Z","place":"Torino, Italia","project":[{"_id":"118","name":"TRR 318 - INF: TRR 318 - Project Area INF"}],"quality_controlled":"1","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Explanations are pervasive in our lives. Mostly, they occur in dialogical form where an explainer discusses a concept or phenomenon of interest with an explainee. Leaving the explainee with a clear understanding is not straightforward due to the knowledge gap between the two participants. Previous research looked at the interaction of explanation moves, dialogue acts, and topics in successful dialogues with expert explainers. However, daily-life explanations often fail, raising the question of what makes a dialogue successful. In this work, we study explanation dialogues in terms of the interactions between the explainer and explainee and how they correlate with the quality of explanations in terms of a successful understanding on the explainee{’}s side. In particular, we first construct a corpus of 399 dialogues from the Reddit forum {Explain Like I am Five} and annotate it for interaction flows and explanation quality. We then analyze the interaction flows, comparing them to those appearing in expert dialogues. Finally, we encode the interaction flows using two language models that can handle long inputs, and we provide empirical evidence for the effectiveness boost gained through the encoding in predicting the success of explanation dialogues."}],"citation":{"bibtex":"@inproceedings{Alshomary_Lange_Booshehri_Sengupta_Cimiano_Wachsmuth_2024, place={Torino, Italia}, title={Modeling the Quality of Dialogical Explanations}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2024 Joint International Conference on Computational Linguistics, Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024)}, publisher={ELRA and ICCL}, author={Alshomary, Milad and Lange, Felix and Booshehri, Meisam and Sengupta, Meghdut and Cimiano, Philipp and Wachsmuth, Henning}, editor={Calzolari, Nicoletta and Kan, Min-Yen and Hoste, Veronique and Lenci, Alessandro and Sakti, Sakriani and Xue, Nianwen}, year={2024}, pages={11523–11536} }","ama":"Alshomary M, Lange F, Booshehri M, Sengupta M, Cimiano P, Wachsmuth H. Modeling the Quality of Dialogical Explanations. In: Calzolari N, Kan M-Y, Hoste V, Lenci A, Sakti S, Xue N, eds. <i>Proceedings of the 2024 Joint International Conference on Computational Linguistics, Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024)</i>. ELRA and ICCL; 2024:11523–11536.","short":"M. Alshomary, F. Lange, M. Booshehri, M. Sengupta, P. Cimiano, H. Wachsmuth, in: N. Calzolari, M.-Y. Kan, V. Hoste, A. Lenci, S. Sakti, N. Xue (Eds.), Proceedings of the 2024 Joint International Conference on Computational Linguistics, Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024), ELRA and ICCL, Torino, Italia, 2024, pp. 11523–11536.","chicago":"Alshomary, Milad, Felix Lange, Meisam Booshehri, Meghdut Sengupta, Philipp Cimiano, and Henning Wachsmuth. “Modeling the Quality of Dialogical Explanations.” In <i>Proceedings of the 2024 Joint International Conference on Computational Linguistics, Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024)</i>, edited by Nicoletta Calzolari, Min-Yen Kan, Veronique Hoste, Alessandro Lenci, Sakriani Sakti, and Nianwen Xue, 11523–11536. Torino, Italia: ELRA and ICCL, 2024.","ieee":"M. Alshomary, F. Lange, M. Booshehri, M. Sengupta, P. Cimiano, and H. Wachsmuth, “Modeling the Quality of Dialogical Explanations,” in <i>Proceedings of the 2024 Joint International Conference on Computational Linguistics, Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024)</i>, 2024, pp. 11523–11536.","apa":"Alshomary, M., Lange, F., Booshehri, M., Sengupta, M., Cimiano, P., &#38; Wachsmuth, H. (2024). Modeling the Quality of Dialogical Explanations. In N. Calzolari, M.-Y. Kan, V. Hoste, A. Lenci, S. Sakti, &#38; N. Xue (Eds.), <i>Proceedings of the 2024 Joint International Conference on Computational Linguistics, Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024)</i> (pp. 11523–11536). ELRA and ICCL.","mla":"Alshomary, Milad, et al. “Modeling the Quality of Dialogical Explanations.” <i>Proceedings of the 2024 Joint International Conference on Computational Linguistics, Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024)</i>, edited by Nicoletta Calzolari et al., ELRA and ICCL, 2024, pp. 11523–11536."},"publication":"Proceedings of the 2024 Joint International Conference on Computational Linguistics, Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024)"},{"citation":{"mla":"Bäumer, Fabian, et al. “TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing TLS Implementations.” <i>Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact Award (ACSAC ’24)</i>, 2024.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Bäumer_Brinkmann_Erinola_Hebrok_Heitmann_Lange_Maehren_Merget_Niere_Radoy_et al._2024, title={TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing TLS Implementations}, booktitle={Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact Award (ACSAC ’24)}, author={Bäumer, Fabian and Brinkmann, Marcus and Erinola, Nurullah and Hebrok, Sven Niclas and Heitmann, Nico and Lange, Felix and Maehren, Marcel and Merget, Robert and Niere, Niklas and Radoy, Maximilian Manfred and et al.}, year={2024} }","ama":"Bäumer F, Brinkmann M, Erinola N, et al. TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing TLS Implementations. In: <i>Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact Award (ACSAC ’24)</i>. ; 2024.","ieee":"F. Bäumer <i>et al.</i>, “TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing TLS Implementations,” presented at the Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, Hawaii, 2024.","apa":"Bäumer, F., Brinkmann, M., Erinola, N., Hebrok, S. N., Heitmann, N., Lange, F., Maehren, M., Merget, R., Niere, N., Radoy, M. M., Schmidt, C., Schwenk, J., &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2024). TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing TLS Implementations. <i>Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact Award (ACSAC ’24)</i>. Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, Hawaii.","chicago":"Bäumer, Fabian, Marcus Brinkmann, Nurullah Erinola, Sven Niclas Hebrok, Nico Heitmann, Felix Lange, Marcel Maehren, et al. “TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing TLS Implementations.” In <i>Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact Award (ACSAC ’24)</i>, 2024.","short":"F. Bäumer, M. Brinkmann, N. Erinola, S.N. Hebrok, N. Heitmann, F. Lange, M. Maehren, R. Merget, N. Niere, M.M. Radoy, C. Schmidt, J. Schwenk, J. Somorovsky, in: Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact Award (ACSAC ’24), 2024."},"file_date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:42:08Z","quality_controlled":"1","oa":"1","conference":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","start_date":"2024-12-09","location":"Hawaii","end_date":"2024-12-13"},"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","_id":"57816","user_id":"63563","ddc":["006"],"publication":"Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact Award (ACSAC ’24)","abstract":[{"text":"TLS-Attacker is an open-source framework for analyzing Transport\r\nLayer Security (TLS) implementations. The framework allows users\r\nto specify custom protocol flows and provides modification hooks to\r\nmanipulate message contents. Since its initial publication in 2016 by\r\nJuraj Somorovsky, TLS-Attacker has been used in numerous studies\r\npublished at well-established conferences and helped to identify\r\nvulnerabilities in well-known open-source TLS libraries. To enable\r\nautomated analyses, TLS-Attacker has grown into a suite of projects,\r\neach designed as a building block that can be applied to facilitate\r\nvarious analysis methodologies. The framework still undergoes\r\ncontinuous improvements with feature extensions, such as DTLS\r\n1.3 or the addition of new dialects such as QUIC, to continue its\r\neffectiveness and relevancy as a security analysis framework.","lang":"eng"}],"date_created":"2024-12-17T11:25:14Z","file":[{"file_size":530865,"access_level":"local","file_name":"comp-acsac24-final11.pdf","date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:42:08Z","relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"66728","creator":"nniklas","date_created":"2026-08-17T07:42:08Z"}],"department":[{"_id":"632"}],"type":"conference","keyword":["SSL","TLS","DTLS","Protocol State Fuzzing","Planning Based"],"author":[{"full_name":"Bäumer, Fabian","first_name":"Fabian","last_name":"Bäumer"},{"last_name":"Brinkmann","first_name":"Marcus","full_name":"Brinkmann, Marcus"},{"full_name":"Erinola, Nurullah","first_name":"Nurullah","last_name":"Erinola"},{"full_name":"Hebrok, Sven Niclas","orcid":"0009-0006-1172-1665","last_name":"Hebrok","first_name":"Sven Niclas","id":"55616"},{"id":"74619","full_name":"Heitmann, Nico","orcid":"0009-0003-7687-7044","last_name":"Heitmann","first_name":"Nico"},{"first_name":"Felix","last_name":"Lange","full_name":"Lange, Felix","id":"67893"},{"last_name":"Maehren","first_name":"Marcel","full_name":"Maehren, Marcel"},{"first_name":"Robert","last_name":"Merget","full_name":"Merget, Robert"},{"full_name":"Niere, Niklas","first_name":"Niklas","last_name":"Niere","id":"63563"},{"orcid":"0009-0005-3059-6823","first_name":"Maximilian Manfred","last_name":"Radoy","full_name":"Radoy, Maximilian Manfred","id":"68826"},{"first_name":"Conrad","last_name":"Schmidt","full_name":"Schmidt, Conrad"},{"full_name":"Schwenk, Jörg","first_name":"Jörg","last_name":"Schwenk"},{"id":"83504","full_name":"Somorovsky, Juraj","orcid":"0000-0002-3593-7720","first_name":"Juraj","last_name":"Somorovsky"}],"title":"TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing TLS Implementations","year":"2024","date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:42:41Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.acsac.org/2024/program/artifacts_competition/comp-acsac24-final11.pdf","open_access":"1"}]},{"file":[{"file_size":189676,"access_level":"local","file_name":"Turning Attacks into Advantages_ Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling - foci-2024-0012.pdf","date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:40:56Z","relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"55139","creator":"flange","date_created":"2024-07-09T07:42:54Z"}],"date_created":"2024-07-09T07:49:37Z","type":"conference","keyword":["censorship","censorship circumvention","http","http request smuggling"],"department":[{"_id":"632"}],"publication":"Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Many countries limit their residents' access to various websites. As a substantial number of these websites do not support TLS encryption, censorship of unencrypted HTTP requests remains prevalent. Accordingly, circumvention techniques can and have been found for the HTTP protocol. In this paper, we infer novel circumvention techniques on the HTTP layer from a web security vulnerability by utilizing HTTP request smuggling (HRS). To demonstrate the viability of our techniques, we collected various test vectors from previous work about HRS and evaluated them on popular web servers and censors in China, Russia, and Iran. Our findings show that HRS can be successfully employed as a censorship circumvention technique against multiple censors and web servers. We also discover a standard-compliant circumvention technique in Russia, unusually inconsistent censorship in China, and an implementation bug in Iran. The results of this work imply that censorship circumvention techniques can successfully be constructed from existing vulnerabilities. We conjecture that this implication provides insights to the censorship circumvention community beyond the viability of specific techniques presented in this work."}],"main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.petsymposium.org/foci/2024/foci-2024-0012.pdf","open_access":"1"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2024","title":"Turning Attacks into Advantages: Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling","author":[{"first_name":"Philipp","last_name":"Müller","full_name":"Müller, Philipp"},{"first_name":"Niklas","last_name":"Niere","full_name":"Niere, Niklas","id":"63563"},{"id":"67893","full_name":"Lange, Felix","first_name":"Felix","last_name":"Lange"},{"id":"83504","full_name":"Somorovsky, Juraj","last_name":"Somorovsky","orcid":"0000-0002-3593-7720","first_name":"Juraj"}],"date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:40:56Z","publication_status":"published","place":"Bristol","oa":"1","file_date_updated":"2026-08-17T07:40:56Z","citation":{"apa":"Müller, P., Niere, N., Lange, F., &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2024). Turning Attacks into Advantages: Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling. <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>. Free and Open Communications on the Internet 2024 , Bristol.","ieee":"P. Müller, N. Niere, F. Lange, and J. Somorovsky, “Turning Attacks into Advantages: Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling,” presented at the Free and Open Communications on the Internet 2024 , Bristol, 2024.","short":"P. Müller, N. Niere, F. Lange, J. Somorovsky, in: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Bristol, 2024.","chicago":"Müller, Philipp, Niklas Niere, Felix Lange, and Juraj Somorovsky. “Turning Attacks into Advantages: Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling.” In <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>. Bristol, 2024.","mla":"Müller, Philipp, et al. “Turning Attacks into Advantages: Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling.” <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>, 2024.","ama":"Müller P, Niere N, Lange F, Somorovsky J. Turning Attacks into Advantages: Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling. In: <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>. ; 2024.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Müller_Niere_Lange_Somorovsky_2024, place={Bristol}, title={Turning Attacks into Advantages: Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling}, booktitle={Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies}, author={Müller, Philipp and Niere, Niklas and Lange, Felix and Somorovsky, Juraj}, year={2024} }"},"quality_controlled":"1","_id":"55137","ddc":["006"],"user_id":"63563","status":"public","conference":{"end_date":"2024-07-15","name":"Free and Open Communications on the Internet 2024 ","start_date":"2024-07-15","location":"Bristol"},"has_accepted_license":"1"},{"publication":"Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics","abstract":[{"text":"Online discussion moderators must make ad-hoc decisions about whether the contributions of discussion participants are appropriate or should be removed to maintain civility. Existing research on offensive language and the resulting tools cover only one aspect among many involved in such decisions. The question of what is considered appropriate in a controversial discussion has not yet been systematically addressed. In this paper, we operationalize appropriate language in argumentation for the first time. In particular, we model appropriateness through the absence of flaws, grounded in research on argument quality assessment, especially in aspects from rhetoric. From these, we derive a new taxonomy of 14 dimensions that determine inappropriate language in online discussions. Building on three argument quality corpora, we then create a corpus of 2191 arguments annotated for the 14 dimensions. Empirical analyses support that the taxonomy covers the concept of appropriateness comprehensively, showing several plausible correlations with argument quality dimensions. Moreover, results of baseline approaches to assessing appropriateness suggest that all dimensions can be modeled computationally on the corpus.","lang":"eng"}],"file":[{"content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"49883","date_updated":"2023-12-19T13:58:33Z","relation":"main_file","access_level":"open_access","file_size":1061941,"file_name":"2023.acl-long.238.pdf","date_created":"2023-12-19T13:58:33Z","creator":"flange"}],"date_created":"2023-12-19T14:02:20Z","type":"conference","year":"2023","title":"Modeling Appropriate Language in Argumentation","author":[{"first_name":"Timon","last_name":"Ziegenbein","full_name":"Ziegenbein, Timon"},{"full_name":"Syed, Shahbaz","first_name":"Shahbaz","last_name":"Syed"},{"full_name":"Lange, Felix","first_name":"Felix","last_name":"Lange","id":"67893"},{"full_name":"Potthast, Martin","last_name":"Potthast","first_name":"Martin"},{"last_name":"Wachsmuth","first_name":"Henning","full_name":"Wachsmuth, Henning"}],"publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2024-05-21T17:03:05Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238","file_date_updated":"2023-12-19T13:58:33Z","citation":{"short":"T. Ziegenbein, S. Syed, F. Lange, M. Potthast, H. Wachsmuth, in: Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, 2023, pp. 4344–4363.","chicago":"Ziegenbein, Timon, Shahbaz Syed, Felix Lange, Martin Potthast, and Henning Wachsmuth. “Modeling Appropriate Language in Argumentation.” In <i>Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics</i>, 4344–63, 2023. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238\">https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238</a>.","ieee":"T. Ziegenbein, S. Syed, F. Lange, M. Potthast, and H. Wachsmuth, “Modeling Appropriate Language in Argumentation,” in <i>Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics</i>, Toronto, 2023, pp. 4344–4363, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238\">https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238</a>.","apa":"Ziegenbein, T., Syed, S., Lange, F., Potthast, M., &#38; Wachsmuth, H. (2023). Modeling Appropriate Language in Argumentation. <i>Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics</i>, 4344–4363. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238\">https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238</a>","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Ziegenbein_Syed_Lange_Potthast_Wachsmuth_2023, title={Modeling Appropriate Language in Argumentation}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238\">https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238</a>}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics}, author={Ziegenbein, Timon and Syed, Shahbaz and Lange, Felix and Potthast, Martin and Wachsmuth, Henning}, year={2023}, pages={4344–4363} }","ama":"Ziegenbein T, Syed S, Lange F, Potthast M, Wachsmuth H. Modeling Appropriate Language in Argumentation. In: <i>Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics</i>. ; 2023:4344-4363. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238\">https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238</a>","mla":"Ziegenbein, Timon, et al. “Modeling Appropriate Language in Argumentation.” <i>Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics</i>, 2023, pp. 4344–63, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238\">https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238</a>."},"quality_controlled":"1","oa":"1","status":"public","conference":{"end_date":"2023-07-14","name":"61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics","start_date":"2023-07-09","location":"Toronto"},"has_accepted_license":"1","page":"4344-4363","_id":"49882","user_id":"67893","ddc":["004"]}]