---
_id: '64566'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'Censorship is employed by many governments and ISPs worldwide, with an increasing
    trend in recent years. One of the most censored protocols is DNS: censors target
    unencrypted and encrypted DNS to prevent clients from resolving the domain name
    of unwanted websites. Despite much research on DNS censorship, only a few tools
    can circumvent it.To support users affected by DNS censorship, we present DPYProxy-DNS,
    a DNS resolver that automatically detects and employs a working DNS censorship
    circumvention. We demonstrate the effectiveness of DPYProxy-DNS by automatically
    circumventing DNS censorship in China and Iran and analyzing DNS censorship mechanisms
    in these countries. Our analyses re veal that DNS censorship in Iran is ineffective
    against encrypted DNS. In China, DPYProxy-DNS revealed two consistently working
    circumvention techniques for unencrypted DNS: TCP segmentation for DNS over TCP
    and ignoring DNS responses injected by the Great Firewall of China (GFW). Our
    findings reveal varying levels of DNS censorship across different countries, underscoring
    the importance of the automated circumvention approach we provide with DPYProxy-DNS.'
author:
- first_name: Felix
  full_name: Lange, Felix
  id: '67893'
  last_name: Lange
- first_name: Niklas
  full_name: Niere, Niklas
  id: '63563'
  last_name: Niere
- first_name: Juraj
  full_name: Somorovsky, Juraj
  id: '83504'
  last_name: Somorovsky
  orcid: 0000-0002-3593-7720
citation:
  ama: 'Lange F, Niere N, Somorovsky J. Towards Automated DNS Censorship Circumvention.
    In: ; 2026.'
  apa: Lange, F., Niere, N., &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2026). <i>Towards Automated DNS
    Censorship Circumvention</i>. Free and Open Communications on the Internet, Virtual.
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Lange_Niere_Somorovsky_2026, title={Towards Automated DNS
    Censorship Circumvention}, author={Lange, Felix and Niere, Niklas and Somorovsky,
    Juraj}, year={2026} }'
  chicago: Lange, Felix, Niklas Niere, and Juraj Somorovsky. “Towards Automated DNS
    Censorship Circumvention,” 2026.
  ieee: F. Lange, N. Niere, and J. Somorovsky, “Towards Automated DNS Censorship Circumvention,”
    presented at the Free and Open Communications on the Internet, Virtual, 2026.
  mla: Lange, Felix, et al. <i>Towards Automated DNS Censorship Circumvention</i>.
    2026.
  short: 'F. Lange, N. Niere, J. Somorovsky, in: 2026.'
conference:
  end_date: 2026-02-19
  location: Virtual
  name: Free and Open Communications on the Internet
  start_date: 2026-02-19
date_created: 2026-02-20T14:35:34Z
date_updated: 2026-02-21T10:20:16Z
ddc:
- '006'
file:
- access_level: open_access
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: nniklas
  date_created: 2026-02-20T14:34:05Z
  date_updated: 2026-02-21T10:20:16Z
  file_id: '64568'
  file_name: foci-2026-0001.pdf
  file_size: 775133
  relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2026-02-21T10:20:16Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://www.petsymposium.org/foci/2026/foci-2026-0001.pdf
oa: '1'
status: public
title: Towards Automated DNS Censorship Circumvention
type: conference
user_id: '63563'
year: '2026'
...
---
_id: '58801'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Iran employs one of the most prominent Internet censors in the world. An important
    part of Iran’s censorship apparatus is its analysis of unencrypted protocols such
    as HTTP and DNS. During routine evaluations of Iran’s HTTP and DNS censorship,
    we noticed several properties we believe to be unknown today. For instance, we
    found injections of correct static IPs for some domains such as google.com on
    the DNS level, unclear HTTP version parsing, and correlations between DNS and
    HTTP censorship. In this paper, we present our findings to the community and discuss
    possible takeaways for affected people and the censorship circumvention community.
    As some of our findings left us bewildered, we hope to ignite a discussion about
    Iran’s censorship behavior. We aim to use the discussion of our work to execute
    a thorough analysis and explanation of Iran’s censorship behavior in the future.
author:
- first_name: Felix
  full_name: Lange, Felix
  id: '67893'
  last_name: Lange
- first_name: Niklas
  full_name: Niere, Niklas
  id: '63563'
  last_name: Niere
- first_name: Jonathan
  full_name: von Niessen, Jonathan
  last_name: von Niessen
- first_name: Dennis
  full_name: Suermann, Dennis
  last_name: Suermann
- first_name: Nico
  full_name: Heitmann, Nico
  id: '74619'
  last_name: Heitmann
  orcid: 0009-0003-7687-7044
- first_name: Juraj
  full_name: Somorovsky, Juraj
  id: '83504'
  last_name: Somorovsky
  orcid: 0000-0002-3593-7720
citation:
  ama: 'Lange F, Niere N, von Niessen J, Suermann D, Heitmann N, Somorovsky J. I(ra)nconsistencies:
    Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship. In: <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing
    Technologies</i>. ; 2025.'
  apa: 'Lange, F., Niere, N., von Niessen, J., Suermann, D., Heitmann, N., &#38; Somorovsky,
    J. (2025). I(ra)nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship. <i>Proceedings
    on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>. Free and Open Communications on the Internet,
    Virtual.'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Lange_Niere_von Niessen_Suermann_Heitmann_Somorovsky_2025,
    title={I(ra)nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship}, booktitle={Proceedings
    on Privacy Enhancing Technologies}, author={Lange, Felix and Niere, Niklas and
    von Niessen, Jonathan and Suermann, Dennis and Heitmann, Nico and Somorovsky,
    Juraj}, year={2025} }'
  chicago: 'Lange, Felix, Niklas Niere, Jonathan von Niessen, Dennis Suermann, Nico
    Heitmann, and Juraj Somorovsky. “I(Ra)Nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s
    Censorship.” In <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>, 2025.'
  ieee: 'F. Lange, N. Niere, J. von Niessen, D. Suermann, N. Heitmann, and J. Somorovsky,
    “I(ra)nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship,” presented at the
    Free and Open Communications on the Internet, Virtual, 2025.'
  mla: 'Lange, Felix, et al. “I(Ra)Nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship.”
    <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>, 2025.'
  short: 'F. Lange, N. Niere, J. von Niessen, D. Suermann, N. Heitmann, J. Somorovsky,
    in: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2025.'
conference:
  end_date: 2025-02-20
  location: Virtual
  name: Free and Open Communications on the Internet
  start_date: 2025-02-20
date_created: 2025-02-24T08:09:56Z
date_updated: 2025-05-06T13:48:32Z
ddc:
- '006'
department:
- _id: '632'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: flange
  date_created: 2025-02-24T08:07:59Z
  date_updated: 2025-02-24T08:07:59Z
  file_id: '58802'
  file_name: foci-2025-0002.pdf
  file_size: 535700
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2025-02-24T08:07:59Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://www.petsymposium.org/foci/2025/foci-2025-0002.pdf
oa: '1'
publication: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: 'I(ra)nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship'
type: conference
user_id: '63563'
year: '2025'
...
---
_id: '59824'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "HTTPS composes large parts of today’s Internet traffic and has long been
    subject to censorship efforts in different countries. While censors analyze the
    Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to block encrypted HTTP traffic, censorship
    circumvention efforts have primarily focused on other protocols such as TCP. In
    this paper, we hypothesize that the TLS protocol offers previously unseen opportunities
    for censorship circumvention techniques. We tested our hypothesis by proposing
    possible censorship circumvention techniques that act on the TLS protocol. To
    validate the effectiveness of these techniques, we evaluate their acceptance by
    popular TLS servers and successfully demonstrate that these techniques can circumvent
    censors in China and Iran. In our evaluations, we discovered 38—partially standard-compliant—distinct
    censorship circumvention techniques, which we could group into 11 unique categories.
    Additionally, we provide novel insights into how China censors TLS traffic by
    presenting evidence of at least three distinct censorship appliances. We suspect
    that other parts of China’s censorship apparatus and other censors exhibit similar
    structures and advocate future censorship research to anticipate them. With this
    work, we hope to aid people affected by censorship and stimulate further\r\nresearch
    into censorship circumvention using cryptographic protocols."
author:
- first_name: Niklas
  full_name: Niere, Niklas
  id: '63563'
  last_name: Niere
- first_name: Felix
  full_name: Lange, Felix
  id: '67893'
  last_name: Lange
- first_name: Robert
  full_name: Merget, Robert
  last_name: Merget
- first_name: Juraj
  full_name: Somorovsky, Juraj
  id: '83504'
  last_name: Somorovsky
  orcid: 0000-0002-3593-7720
citation:
  ama: 'Niere N, Lange F, Merget R, Somorovsky J. Transport Layer Obscurity: Circumventing
    SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer. In: <i>2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
    (SP)</i>. ; 2025. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151">10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>'
  apa: 'Niere, N., Lange, F., Merget, R., &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2025). Transport Layer
    Obscurity: Circumventing SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer. <i>2025 IEEE Symposium
    on Security and Privacy (SP)</i>. 46th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
    San Francisco. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151">https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Niere_Lange_Merget_Somorovsky_2025, title={Transport Layer
    Obscurity: Circumventing SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151">10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>},
    booktitle={2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)}, author={Niere, Niklas
    and Lange, Felix and Merget, Robert and Somorovsky, Juraj}, year={2025} }'
  chicago: 'Niere, Niklas, Felix Lange, Robert Merget, and Juraj Somorovsky. “Transport
    Layer Obscurity: Circumventing SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer.” In <i>2025 IEEE
    Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)</i>, 2025. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151">https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>.'
  ieee: 'N. Niere, F. Lange, R. Merget, and J. Somorovsky, “Transport Layer Obscurity:
    Circumventing SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer,” presented at the 46th IEEE Symposium
    on Security and Privacy, San Francisco, 2025, doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151">10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>.'
  mla: 'Niere, Niklas, et al. “Transport Layer Obscurity: Circumventing SNI Censorship
    on the TLS-Layer.” <i>2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)</i>, 2025,
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151">10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>.'
  short: 'N. Niere, F. Lange, R. Merget, J. Somorovsky, in: 2025 IEEE Symposium on
    Security and Privacy (SP), 2025.'
conference:
  end_date: 2025-05-14
  location: San Francisco
  name: 46th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
  start_date: 2025-05-12
date_created: 2025-05-06T13:40:50Z
date_updated: 2025-06-02T12:03:51Z
ddc:
- '006'
department:
- _id: '632'
doi: 10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151
file:
- access_level: open_access
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: nniklas
  date_created: 2025-05-06T13:49:35Z
  date_updated: 2025-05-06T13:51:45Z
  file_id: '59826'
  file_name: TLS_Obscurity.pdf
  file_size: 463431
  relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2025-05-06T13:51:45Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
oa: '1'
publication: 2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
status: public
title: 'Transport Layer Obscurity: Circumventing SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer'
type: conference
user_id: '63563'
year: '2025'
...
---
_id: '60503'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'Censors have long censored Transport Layer Security (TLS) traffic by inspecting
    the domain name in the unencrypted Server Name Indication (SNI) extension. By
    encrypting the SNI extension, the Encrypted ClientHello (ECH) prevents censors
    from blocking TLS traffic to certain domains. Despite this promising outlook,
    ECH’s current capability to contest TLS censorship is unclear; for instance, Russia
    has started censoring ECH connections successfully. This paper clarifies ECH’s
    current role for TLS censorship. To this end, we evaluate servers’ support for
    ECH and its analysis and subsequent blocking by censors. We determine Cloudflare
    as the only major provider supporting ECH. Additionally, we affirm previously
    known ECH censorship in Russia and uncover indirect censorship of ECH through
    encrypted DNS censorship in China and Iran. Our findings suggest that ECH’s contribution
    to censorship circumvention is currently limited: we consider ECH’s dependence
    on encrypted DNS especially challenging for ECH’s capability to circumvent censorship.
    We stress the importance of censorship-resistant ECH to solve the long-known problem
    of SNI-based TLS censorship.'
author:
- first_name: Niklas
  full_name: Niere, Niklas
  id: '63563'
  last_name: Niere
- first_name: Felix
  full_name: Lange, Felix
  id: '67893'
  last_name: Lange
- first_name: Nico
  full_name: Heitmann, Nico
  id: '74619'
  last_name: Heitmann
  orcid: 0009-0003-7687-7044
- first_name: Juraj
  full_name: Somorovsky, Juraj
  id: '83504'
  last_name: Somorovsky
  orcid: 0000-0002-3593-7720
citation:
  ama: 'Niere N, Lange F, Heitmann N, Somorovsky J. Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) in
    Censorship Circumvention. In: ; 2025.'
  apa: Niere, N., Lange, F., Heitmann, N., &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2025). <i>Encrypted
    Client Hello (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention</i>. Free and Open Communications
    on the Internet, Washington, D.C.
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Niere_Lange_Heitmann_Somorovsky_2025, title={Encrypted Client
    Hello (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention}, author={Niere, Niklas and Lange, Felix
    and Heitmann, Nico and Somorovsky, Juraj}, year={2025} }'
  chicago: Niere, Niklas, Felix Lange, Nico Heitmann, and Juraj Somorovsky. “Encrypted
    Client Hello (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention,” 2025.
  ieee: N. Niere, F. Lange, N. Heitmann, and J. Somorovsky, “Encrypted Client Hello
    (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention,” presented at the Free and Open Communications
    on the Internet, Washington, D.C., 2025.
  mla: Niere, Niklas, et al. <i>Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention</i>.
    2025.
  short: 'N. Niere, F. Lange, N. Heitmann, J. Somorovsky, in: 2025.'
conference:
  end_date: 2025-07-14
  location: Washington, D.C.
  name: Free and Open Communications on the Internet
  start_date: 2025-07-14
date_created: 2025-07-03T07:14:00Z
date_updated: 2025-10-23T14:26:38Z
ddc:
- '006'
file:
- access_level: open_access
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: nniklas
  date_created: 2025-07-03T07:11:14Z
  date_updated: 2025-10-23T14:26:38Z
  file_id: '60505'
  file_name: foci-2025-0016.pdf
  file_size: 755171
  relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2025-10-23T14:26:38Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- censorship
- circumvention
- ECH
- TLS
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://www.petsymposium.org/foci/2025/foci-2025-0016.pdf
oa: '1'
status: public
title: Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention
type: conference
user_id: '63563'
year: '2025'
...
---
_id: '55137'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Many countries limit their residents' access to various websites. As a substantial
    number of these websites do not support TLS encryption, censorship of unencrypted
    HTTP requests remains prevalent. Accordingly, circumvention techniques can and
    have been found for the HTTP protocol. In this paper, we infer novel circumvention
    techniques on the HTTP layer from a web security vulnerability by utilizing HTTP
    request smuggling (HRS). To demonstrate the viability of our techniques, we collected
    various test vectors from previous work about HRS and evaluated them on popular
    web servers and censors in China, Russia, and Iran. Our findings show that HRS
    can be successfully employed as a censorship circumvention technique against multiple
    censors and web servers. We also discover a standard-compliant circumvention technique
    in Russia, unusually inconsistent censorship in China, and an implementation bug
    in Iran. The results of this work imply that censorship circumvention techniques
    can successfully be constructed from existing vulnerabilities. We conjecture that
    this implication provides insights to the censorship circumvention community beyond
    the viability of specific techniques presented in this work.
author:
- first_name: Philipp
  full_name: Müller, Philipp
  last_name: Müller
- first_name: Niklas
  full_name: Niere, Niklas
  id: '63563'
  last_name: Niere
- first_name: Felix
  full_name: Lange, Felix
  id: '67893'
  last_name: Lange
- first_name: Juraj
  full_name: Somorovsky, Juraj
  id: '83504'
  last_name: Somorovsky
  orcid: 0000-0002-3593-7720
citation:
  ama: 'Müller P, Niere N, Lange F, Somorovsky J. Turning Attacks into Advantages:
    Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling. In: <i>Proceedings on Privacy
    Enhancing Technologies</i>. ; 2024.'
  apa: 'Müller, P., Niere, N., Lange, F., &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2024). Turning Attacks
    into Advantages: Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling. <i>Proceedings
    on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>. Free and Open Communications on the Internet
    2024 , Bristol.'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Müller_Niere_Lange_Somorovsky_2024, place={Bristol}, title={Turning
    Attacks into Advantages: Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling},
    booktitle={Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies}, author={Müller, Philipp
    and Niere, Niklas and Lange, Felix and Somorovsky, Juraj}, year={2024} }'
  chicago: 'Müller, Philipp, Niklas Niere, Felix Lange, and Juraj Somorovsky. “Turning
    Attacks into Advantages: Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling.”
    In <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>. Bristol, 2024.'
  ieee: 'P. Müller, N. Niere, F. Lange, and J. Somorovsky, “Turning Attacks into Advantages:
    Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling,” presented at the Free and
    Open Communications on the Internet 2024 , Bristol, 2024.'
  mla: 'Müller, Philipp, et al. “Turning Attacks into Advantages: Evading HTTP Censorship
    with HTTP Request Smuggling.” <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>,
    2024.'
  short: 'P. Müller, N. Niere, F. Lange, J. Somorovsky, in: Proceedings on Privacy
    Enhancing Technologies, Bristol, 2024.'
conference:
  end_date: 2024-07-15
  location: Bristol
  name: 'Free and Open Communications on the Internet 2024 '
  start_date: 2024-07-15
date_created: 2024-07-09T07:49:37Z
date_updated: 2024-07-09T07:49:59Z
ddc:
- '006'
department:
- _id: '632'
file:
- access_level: open_access
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: flange
  date_created: 2024-07-09T07:42:54Z
  date_updated: 2024-07-09T07:42:54Z
  file_id: '55139'
  file_name: Turning Attacks into Advantages_ Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request
    Smuggling - foci-2024-0012.pdf
  file_size: 189676
  relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2024-07-09T07:42:54Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- censorship
- censorship circumvention
- http
- http request smuggling
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://www.petsymposium.org/foci/2024/foci-2024-0012.pdf
oa: '1'
place: Bristol
publication: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
publication_status: published
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: 'Turning Attacks into Advantages: Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request
  Smuggling'
type: conference
user_id: '67893'
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '55404'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Explanations are pervasive in our lives. Mostly, they occur in dialogical
    form where an explainer discusses a concept or phenomenon of interest with an
    explainee. Leaving the explainee with a clear understanding is not straightforward
    due to the knowledge gap between the two participants. Previous research looked
    at the interaction of explanation moves, dialogue acts, and topics in successful
    dialogues with expert explainers. However, daily-life explanations often fail,
    raising the question of what makes a dialogue successful. In this work, we study
    explanation dialogues in terms of the interactions between the explainer and explainee
    and how they correlate with the quality of explanations in terms of a successful
    understanding on the explainee{’}s side. In particular, we first construct a corpus
    of 399 dialogues from the Reddit forum {Explain Like I am Five} and annotate it
    for interaction flows and explanation quality. We then analyze the interaction
    flows, comparing them to those appearing in expert dialogues. Finally, we encode
    the interaction flows using two language models that can handle long inputs, and
    we provide empirical evidence for the effectiveness boost gained through the encoding
    in predicting the success of explanation dialogues.
author:
- first_name: Milad
  full_name: Alshomary, Milad
  id: '73059'
  last_name: Alshomary
- first_name: Felix
  full_name: Lange, Felix
  id: '67893'
  last_name: Lange
- first_name: Meisam
  full_name: Booshehri, Meisam
  last_name: Booshehri
- first_name: Meghdut
  full_name: Sengupta, Meghdut
  id: '99459'
  last_name: Sengupta
- first_name: Philipp
  full_name: Cimiano, Philipp
  last_name: Cimiano
- first_name: Henning
  full_name: Wachsmuth, Henning
  id: '3900'
  last_name: Wachsmuth
citation:
  ama: 'Alshomary M, Lange F, Booshehri M, Sengupta M, Cimiano P, Wachsmuth H. Modeling
    the Quality of Dialogical Explanations. In: Calzolari N, Kan M-Y, Hoste V, Lenci
    A, Sakti S, Xue N, eds. <i>Proceedings of the 2024 Joint International Conference
    on Computational Linguistics, Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024)</i>.
    ELRA and ICCL; 2024:11523–11536.'
  apa: Alshomary, M., Lange, F., Booshehri, M., Sengupta, M., Cimiano, P., &#38; Wachsmuth,
    H. (2024). Modeling the Quality of Dialogical Explanations. In N. Calzolari, M.-Y.
    Kan, V. Hoste, A. Lenci, S. Sakti, &#38; N. Xue (Eds.), <i>Proceedings of the
    2024 Joint International Conference on Computational Linguistics, Language Resources
    and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024)</i> (pp. 11523–11536). ELRA and ICCL.
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Alshomary_Lange_Booshehri_Sengupta_Cimiano_Wachsmuth_2024,
    place={Torino, Italia}, title={Modeling the Quality of Dialogical Explanations},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 2024 Joint International Conference on Computational
    Linguistics, Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024)}, publisher={ELRA
    and ICCL}, author={Alshomary, Milad and Lange, Felix and Booshehri, Meisam and
    Sengupta, Meghdut and Cimiano, Philipp and Wachsmuth, Henning}, editor={Calzolari,
    Nicoletta and Kan, Min-Yen and Hoste, Veronique and Lenci, Alessandro and Sakti,
    Sakriani and Xue, Nianwen}, year={2024}, pages={11523–11536} }'
  chicago: 'Alshomary, Milad, Felix Lange, Meisam Booshehri, Meghdut Sengupta, Philipp
    Cimiano, and Henning Wachsmuth. “Modeling the Quality of Dialogical Explanations.”
    In <i>Proceedings of the 2024 Joint International Conference on Computational
    Linguistics, Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024)</i>, edited
    by Nicoletta Calzolari, Min-Yen Kan, Veronique Hoste, Alessandro Lenci, Sakriani
    Sakti, and Nianwen Xue, 11523–11536. Torino, Italia: ELRA and ICCL, 2024.'
  ieee: M. Alshomary, F. Lange, M. Booshehri, M. Sengupta, P. Cimiano, and H. Wachsmuth,
    “Modeling the Quality of Dialogical Explanations,” in <i>Proceedings of the 2024
    Joint International Conference on Computational Linguistics, Language Resources
    and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024)</i>, 2024, pp. 11523–11536.
  mla: Alshomary, Milad, et al. “Modeling the Quality of Dialogical Explanations.”
    <i>Proceedings of the 2024 Joint International Conference on Computational Linguistics,
    Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024)</i>, edited by Nicoletta
    Calzolari et al., ELRA and ICCL, 2024, pp. 11523–11536.
  short: 'M. Alshomary, F. Lange, M. Booshehri, M. Sengupta, P. Cimiano, H. Wachsmuth,
    in: N. Calzolari, M.-Y. Kan, V. Hoste, A. Lenci, S. Sakti, N. Xue (Eds.), Proceedings
    of the 2024 Joint International Conference on Computational Linguistics, Language
    Resources and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024), ELRA and ICCL, Torino, Italia, 2024,
    pp. 11523–11536.'
date_created: 2024-07-26T13:04:25Z
date_updated: 2024-12-17T11:30:25Z
department:
- _id: '600'
- _id: '660'
editor:
- first_name: Nicoletta
  full_name: Calzolari, Nicoletta
  last_name: Calzolari
- first_name: Min-Yen
  full_name: Kan, Min-Yen
  last_name: Kan
- first_name: Veronique
  full_name: Hoste, Veronique
  last_name: Hoste
- first_name: Alessandro
  full_name: Lenci, Alessandro
  last_name: Lenci
- first_name: Sakriani
  full_name: Sakti, Sakriani
  last_name: Sakti
- first_name: Nianwen
  full_name: Xue, Nianwen
  last_name: Xue
language:
- iso: eng
page: 11523–11536
place: Torino, Italia
project:
- _id: '118'
  name: 'TRR 318 - INF: TRR 318 - Project Area INF'
publication: Proceedings of the 2024 Joint International Conference on Computational
  Linguistics, Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024)
publisher: ELRA and ICCL
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: Modeling the Quality of Dialogical Explanations
type: conference
user_id: '67893'
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '57816'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "TLS-Attacker is an open-source framework for analyzing Transport\r\nLayer
    Security (TLS) implementations. The framework allows users\r\nto specify custom
    protocol flows and provides modification hooks to\r\nmanipulate message contents.
    Since its initial publication in 2016 by\r\nJuraj Somorovsky, TLS-Attacker has
    been used in numerous studies\r\npublished at well-established conferences and
    helped to identify\r\nvulnerabilities in well-known open-source TLS libraries.
    To enable\r\nautomated analyses, TLS-Attacker has grown into a suite of projects,\r\neach
    designed as a building block that can be applied to facilitate\r\nvarious analysis
    methodologies. The framework still undergoes\r\ncontinuous improvements with feature
    extensions, such as DTLS\r\n1.3 or the addition of new dialects such as QUIC,
    to continue its\r\neffectiveness and relevancy as a security analysis framework."
author:
- first_name: Fabian
  full_name: Bäumer, Fabian
  last_name: Bäumer
- first_name: Marcus
  full_name: Brinkmann, Marcus
  last_name: Brinkmann
- first_name: Nurullah
  full_name: Erinola, Nurullah
  last_name: Erinola
- first_name: Sven Niclas
  full_name: Hebrok, Sven Niclas
  id: '55616'
  last_name: Hebrok
  orcid: 0009-0006-1172-1665
- first_name: Nico
  full_name: Heitmann, Nico
  id: '74619'
  last_name: Heitmann
  orcid: 0009-0003-7687-7044
- first_name: Felix
  full_name: Lange, Felix
  id: '67893'
  last_name: Lange
- first_name: Marcel
  full_name: Maehren, Marcel
  last_name: Maehren
- first_name: Robert
  full_name: Merget, Robert
  last_name: Merget
- first_name: Niklas
  full_name: Niere, Niklas
  id: '63563'
  last_name: Niere
- first_name: Maximilian Manfred
  full_name: Radoy, Maximilian Manfred
  id: '68826'
  last_name: Radoy
  orcid: 0009-0005-3059-6823
- first_name: Conrad
  full_name: Schmidt, Conrad
  last_name: Schmidt
- first_name: Jörg
  full_name: Schwenk, Jörg
  last_name: Schwenk
- first_name: Juraj
  full_name: Somorovsky, Juraj
  id: '83504'
  last_name: Somorovsky
  orcid: 0000-0002-3593-7720
citation:
  ama: 'Bäumer F, Brinkmann M, Erinola N, et al. TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework
    for Analyzing TLS Implementations. In: <i>Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts
    Competition and Impact Award (ACSAC ’24)</i>. ; 2024.'
  apa: 'Bäumer, F., Brinkmann, M., Erinola, N., Hebrok, S. N., Heitmann, N., Lange,
    F., Maehren, M., Merget, R., Niere, N., Radoy, M. M., Schmidt, C., Schwenk, J.,
    &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2024). TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing TLS
    Implementations. <i>Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact
    Award (ACSAC ’24)</i>. Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, Hawaii.'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Bäumer_Brinkmann_Erinola_Hebrok_Heitmann_Lange_Maehren_Merget_Niere_Radoy_et
    al._2024, title={TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing TLS Implementations},
    booktitle={Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact Award
    (ACSAC ’24)}, author={Bäumer, Fabian and Brinkmann, Marcus and Erinola, Nurullah
    and Hebrok, Sven Niclas and Heitmann, Nico and Lange, Felix and Maehren, Marcel
    and Merget, Robert and Niere, Niklas and Radoy, Maximilian Manfred and et al.},
    year={2024} }'
  chicago: 'Bäumer, Fabian, Marcus Brinkmann, Nurullah Erinola, Sven Niclas Hebrok,
    Nico Heitmann, Felix Lange, Marcel Maehren, et al. “TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework
    for Analyzing TLS Implementations.” In <i>Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts
    Competition and Impact Award (ACSAC ’24)</i>, 2024.'
  ieee: 'F. Bäumer <i>et al.</i>, “TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing
    TLS Implementations,” presented at the Annual Computer Security Applications Conference,
    Hawaii, 2024.'
  mla: 'Bäumer, Fabian, et al. “TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing TLS
    Implementations.” <i>Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact
    Award (ACSAC ’24)</i>, 2024.'
  short: 'F. Bäumer, M. Brinkmann, N. Erinola, S.N. Hebrok, N. Heitmann, F. Lange,
    M. Maehren, R. Merget, N. Niere, M.M. Radoy, C. Schmidt, J. Schwenk, J. Somorovsky,
    in: Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact Award (ACSAC
    ’24), 2024.'
conference:
  end_date: 2024-12-13
  location: Hawaii
  name: Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
  start_date: 2024-12-09
date_created: 2024-12-17T11:25:14Z
date_updated: 2025-02-27T08:02:30Z
department:
- _id: '632'
keyword:
- SSL
- TLS
- DTLS
- Protocol State Fuzzing
- Planning Based
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact Award (ACSAC
  ’24)
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: 'TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing TLS Implementations'
type: conference
user_id: '67893'
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '49882'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Online discussion moderators must make ad-hoc decisions about whether the
    contributions of discussion participants are appropriate or should be removed
    to maintain civility. Existing research on offensive language and the resulting
    tools cover only one aspect among many involved in such decisions. The question
    of what is considered appropriate in a controversial discussion has not yet been
    systematically addressed. In this paper, we operationalize appropriate language
    in argumentation for the first time. In particular, we model appropriateness through
    the absence of flaws, grounded in research on argument quality assessment, especially
    in aspects from rhetoric. From these, we derive a new taxonomy of 14 dimensions
    that determine inappropriate language in online discussions. Building on three
    argument quality corpora, we then create a corpus of 2191 arguments annotated
    for the 14 dimensions. Empirical analyses support that the taxonomy covers the
    concept of appropriateness comprehensively, showing several plausible correlations
    with argument quality dimensions. Moreover, results of baseline approaches to
    assessing appropriateness suggest that all dimensions can be modeled computationally
    on the corpus.
author:
- first_name: Timon
  full_name: Ziegenbein, Timon
  last_name: Ziegenbein
- first_name: Shahbaz
  full_name: Syed, Shahbaz
  last_name: Syed
- first_name: Felix
  full_name: Lange, Felix
  id: '67893'
  last_name: Lange
- first_name: Martin
  full_name: Potthast, Martin
  last_name: Potthast
- first_name: Henning
  full_name: Wachsmuth, Henning
  last_name: Wachsmuth
citation:
  ama: 'Ziegenbein T, Syed S, Lange F, Potthast M, Wachsmuth H. Modeling Appropriate
    Language in Argumentation. In: <i>Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the
    Association for Computational Linguistics</i>. ; 2023:4344-4363. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238">https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238</a>'
  apa: Ziegenbein, T., Syed, S., Lange, F., Potthast, M., &#38; Wachsmuth, H. (2023).
    Modeling Appropriate Language in Argumentation. <i>Proceedings of the 61st Annual
    Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics</i>, 4344–4363. <a href="https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238">https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Ziegenbein_Syed_Lange_Potthast_Wachsmuth_2023, title={Modeling
    Appropriate Language in Argumentation}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238">https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational
    Linguistics}, author={Ziegenbein, Timon and Syed, Shahbaz and Lange, Felix and
    Potthast, Martin and Wachsmuth, Henning}, year={2023}, pages={4344–4363} }'
  chicago: Ziegenbein, Timon, Shahbaz Syed, Felix Lange, Martin Potthast, and Henning
    Wachsmuth. “Modeling Appropriate Language in Argumentation.” In <i>Proceedings
    of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics</i>,
    4344–63, 2023. <a href="https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238">https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238</a>.
  ieee: 'T. Ziegenbein, S. Syed, F. Lange, M. Potthast, and H. Wachsmuth, “Modeling
    Appropriate Language in Argumentation,” in <i>Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting
    of the Association for Computational Linguistics</i>, Toronto, 2023, pp. 4344–4363,
    doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238">https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238</a>.'
  mla: Ziegenbein, Timon, et al. “Modeling Appropriate Language in Argumentation.”
    <i>Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational
    Linguistics</i>, 2023, pp. 4344–63, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238">https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238</a>.
  short: 'T. Ziegenbein, S. Syed, F. Lange, M. Potthast, H. Wachsmuth, in: Proceedings
    of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, 2023,
    pp. 4344–4363.'
conference:
  end_date: 2023-07-14
  location: Toronto
  name: 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics
  start_date: 2023-07-09
date_created: 2023-12-19T14:02:20Z
date_updated: 2024-05-21T17:03:05Z
ddc:
- '004'
doi: https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.238
file:
- access_level: open_access
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: flange
  date_created: 2023-12-19T13:58:33Z
  date_updated: 2023-12-19T13:58:33Z
  file_id: '49883'
  file_name: 2023.acl-long.238.pdf
  file_size: 1061941
  relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2023-12-19T13:58:33Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
oa: '1'
page: 4344-4363
publication: Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational
  Linguistics
publication_status: published
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: Modeling Appropriate Language in Argumentation
type: conference
user_id: '67893'
year: '2023'
...