@article{47845,
  author       = {{Aslan, Fatma and Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter}},
  journal      = {{Economics Bulletin}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{1279--1285}},
  title        = {{{PEA: core-analogue for non-cohesive games}}},
  volume       = {{43}},
  year         = {{2023}},
}

@article{30940,
  abstract     = {{We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying
the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).
We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two
one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution
of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied.  The axiom of
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type
of decomposability.  This result has significant implications for actual
negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining
problem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world
negotiations.}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}},
  issn         = {{0347-0520}},
  journal      = {{Scandinavian Journal of Economics}},
  keywords     = {{Labour market negotiations, efficient bargains, Nash bargaining solution, sequential bargaining, restricted bargaining games}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{403--440}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley}},
  title        = {{{Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}}},
  doi          = {{https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518}},
  volume       = {{125}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@techreport{47846,
  author       = {{Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter}},
  title        = {{{Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential Equilibira}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{45561,
  abstract     = {{<jats:p>The purpose of this study is to experimentally test Trockel’s game, which is a modelling of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG), and determine whether one of the two theories of Equality and Deterrence may better account for the observed behavior. The CSG is an example of a simple game in extensive form where the actual behavior of well-informed players cannot be expected to agree with the clear results of game theoretical reasoning. To explain the disagreement between the theory and the expected behavior, Trockel’s game is proposed as an alternative modelling of the scenario. The existence of more than one equilibrium in Trockel’s game opens a door for reputation building. This study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose. According to my data, there is some evidence in favor of both Equality and Deterrence Hypotheses. However, since the strategies compatible with the Equality Hypothesis are played more frequently, I observe some patterns which share the same intuition with the Deterrence Hypothesis.</jats:p>}},
  author       = {{Duman, Papatya}},
  issn         = {{2073-4336}},
  journal      = {{Games}},
  keywords     = {{Applied Mathematics, Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty, Statistics and Probability}},
  number       = {{1}},
  publisher    = {{MDPI AG}},
  title        = {{{Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story}}},
  doi          = {{10.3390/g11010009}},
  volume       = {{11}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{15202,
  abstract     = {{In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments.}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}},
  keywords     = {{Labor market negotiations, Efficient bargains, Nash bargaining solution, Sequential bargaining, Restricted bargaining games}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}}},
  volume       = {{128}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@article{3106,
  author       = {{Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter}},
  issn         = {{2399-844X}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{83--106}},
  publisher    = {{The Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design}},
  title        = {{{On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein's Game}}},
  doi          = {{10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003}},
  volume       = {{1}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}