[{"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2023","type":"journal_article","citation":{"chicago":"Aslan, Fatma, Papatya Duman, and Walter Trockel. “PEA: Core-Analogue for Non-Cohesive Games.” Economics Bulletin, n.d.","apa":"Aslan, F., Duman, P., & Trockel, W. (n.d.). PEA: core-analogue for non-cohesive games. Economics Bulletin.","ama":"Aslan F, Duman P, Trockel W. PEA: core-analogue for non-cohesive games. Economics Bulletin.","mla":"Aslan, Fatma, et al. “PEA: Core-Analogue for Non-Cohesive Games.” Economics Bulletin.","bibtex":"@article{Aslan_Duman_Trockel, title={PEA: core-analogue for non-cohesive games}, journal={Economics Bulletin}, author={Aslan, Fatma and Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter} }","short":"F. Aslan, P. Duman, W. Trockel, Economics Bulletin (n.d.).","ieee":"F. Aslan, P. Duman, and W. Trockel, “PEA: core-analogue for non-cohesive games,” Economics Bulletin."},"_id":"47845","date_updated":"2023-10-06T19:00:10Z","publication":"Economics Bulletin","author":[{"first_name":"Fatma","full_name":"Aslan, Fatma","last_name":"Aslan"},{"id":"72752","last_name":"Duman","full_name":"Duman, Papatya","first_name":"Papatya"},{"full_name":"Trockel, Walter","first_name":"Walter","last_name":"Trockel"}],"date_created":"2023-10-06T18:58:54Z","status":"public","publication_status":"accepted","user_id":"72752","title":"PEA: core-analogue for non-cohesive games"},{"date_updated":"2023-06-08T16:42:31Z","doi":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"_id":"7","grant_number":"160364472","name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"1","grant_number":"160364472","name":"SFB 901: SFB 901"}],"publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"eissn":["0347-0520"]},"intvolume":" 125","_id":"30940","issue":"2","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12518"}],"funded_apc":"1","type":"journal_article","year":"2022","citation":{"chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125, no. 2 (2022): 403–40. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518.","ama":"Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2022;125(2):403-440. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518","apa":"Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., & Duman, P. (2022). Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 125(2), 403–440. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2022, title={Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}, volume={125}, DOI={https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518}, number={2}, journal={Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2022}, pages={403–440} }","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 125, no. 2, Wiley, 2022, pp. 403–40, doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518.","short":"C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125 (2022) 403–440.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 125, no. 2, pp. 403–440, 2022, doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518."},"page":"403-440","article_type":"original","abstract":[{"text":"We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying\r\nthe standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).\r\nWe show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two\r\none-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution\r\nof the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of\r\nIndependence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type\r\nof decomposability. This result has significant implications for actual\r\nnegotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining\r\nproblem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world\r\nnegotiations.","lang":"eng"}],"user_id":"20801","ddc":["330"],"author":[{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","id":"20801","last_name":"Haake"},{"last_name":"Upmann","full_name":"Upmann, Thorsten","first_name":"Thorsten"},{"id":"72752","last_name":"Duman","full_name":"Duman, Papatya","first_name":"Papatya"}],"quality_controlled":"1","publisher":"Wiley","publication":"Scandinavian Journal of Economics","keyword":["Labour market negotiations","efficient bargains","Nash bargaining solution","sequential bargaining","restricted bargaining games"],"has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","date_created":"2022-04-22T14:10:44Z","jel":["J52","J41","C78"],"volume":125},{"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.3390/g11010009","date_updated":"2023-06-09T15:33:34Z","publication_identifier":{"issn":["2073-4336"]},"publication_status":"published","title":"Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story","year":"2020","citation":{"chicago":"Duman, Papatya. “Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story.” Games 11, no. 1 (2020). https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010009.","ama":"Duman P. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story. Games. 2020;11(1). doi:10.3390/g11010009","apa":"Duman, P. (2020). Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story. Games, 11(1), Article 9. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010009","mla":"Duman, Papatya. “Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story.” Games, vol. 11, no. 1, 9, MDPI AG, 2020, doi:10.3390/g11010009.","bibtex":"@article{Duman_2020, title={Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story}, volume={11}, DOI={10.3390/g11010009}, number={19}, journal={Games}, publisher={MDPI AG}, author={Duman, Papatya}, year={2020} }","short":"P. Duman, Games 11 (2020).","ieee":"P. Duman, “Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story,” Games, vol. 11, no. 1, Art. no. 9, 2020, doi: 10.3390/g11010009."},"type":"journal_article","issue":"1","article_number":"9","intvolume":" 11","_id":"45561","date_created":"2023-06-09T15:31:17Z","status":"public","volume":11,"publication":"Games","keyword":["Applied Mathematics","Statistics","Probability and Uncertainty","Statistics and Probability"],"author":[{"full_name":"Duman, Papatya","first_name":"Papatya","id":"72752","last_name":"Duman"}],"publisher":"MDPI AG","user_id":"72752","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"The purpose of this study is to experimentally test Trockel’s game, which is a modelling of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG), and determine whether one of the two theories of Equality and Deterrence may better account for the observed behavior. The CSG is an example of a simple game in extensive form where the actual behavior of well-informed players cannot be expected to agree with the clear results of game theoretical reasoning. To explain the disagreement between the theory and the expected behavior, Trockel’s game is proposed as an alternative modelling of the scenario. The existence of more than one equilibrium in Trockel’s game opens a door for reputation building. This study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose. According to my data, there is some evidence in favor of both Equality and Deterrence Hypotheses. However, since the strategies compatible with the Equality Hypothesis are played more frequently, I observe some patterns which share the same intuition with the Deterrence Hypothesis."}]},{"status":"public","date_created":"2023-10-06T19:03:43Z","publication_status":"draft","author":[{"full_name":"Duman, Papatya","first_name":"Papatya","id":"72752","last_name":"Duman"},{"last_name":"Trockel","full_name":"Trockel, Walter","first_name":"Walter"}],"user_id":"72752","title":"Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential Equilibira","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"type":"working_paper","citation":{"ieee":"P. Duman and W. Trockel, Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential Equilibira. .","short":"P. Duman, W. Trockel, Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential Equilibira, n.d.","mla":"Duman, Papatya, and Walter Trockel. Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential Equilibira.","bibtex":"@book{Duman_Trockel, title={Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential Equilibira}, author={Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter} }","ama":"Duman P, Trockel W. Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential Equilibira.","apa":"Duman, P., & Trockel, W. (n.d.). Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential Equilibira.","chicago":"Duman, Papatya, and Walter Trockel. Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential Equilibira, n.d."},"year":"2020","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://ideas.repec.org/p/pdn/ciepap/130.html"}],"date_updated":"2023-10-06T19:03:50Z","_id":"47846"},{"title":"The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:16Z","series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"abstract":[{"text":"In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments.","lang":"eng"}],"ddc":["040"],"user_id":"477","keyword":["Labor market negotiations","Efficient bargains","Nash bargaining solution","Sequential bargaining","Restricted bargaining games"],"file_date_updated":"2019-11-28T09:50:10Z","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","author":[{"last_name":"Haake","id":"20801","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"},{"full_name":"Upmann, Thorsten","first_name":"Thorsten","last_name":"Upmann"},{"id":"72752","last_name":"Duman","full_name":"Duman, Papatya","first_name":"Papatya"}],"file":[{"file_size":1068284,"file_id":"15203","creator":"stela","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2019-11-28T09:50:10Z","relation":"main_file","success":1,"file_name":"WP - The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets.pdf","date_created":"2019-11-28T09:50:10Z","access_level":"closed"}],"volume":128,"date_created":"2019-11-28T09:49:08Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","intvolume":" 128","_id":"15202","type":"working_paper","citation":{"ieee":"C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets, vol. 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","short":"C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","bibtex":"@book{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}, volume={128}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2019}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol. 128, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol. 128. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","ama":"Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2019.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., & Duman, P. (2019). The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets (Vol. 128). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University."},"year":"2019"},{"extern":"1","user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"file":[{"success":1,"relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:49:27Z","file_id":"5138","creator":"stela","file_size":332414,"access_level":"closed","date_created":"2018-10-31T08:49:27Z","file_name":"On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash....pdf"}],"author":[{"first_name":"Papatya","full_name":"Duman, Papatya","last_name":"Duman","id":"72752"},{"last_name":"Trockel","full_name":"Trockel, Walter","first_name":"Walter"}],"publisher":"The Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design","file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:49:27Z","publication":"Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","date_created":"2018-06-07T08:53:37Z","volume":1,"intvolume":" 1","_id":"3106","issue":"1","type":"journal_article","citation":{"short":"P. Duman, W. Trockel, Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 1 (2016) 83–106.","ieee":"P. Duman and W. Trockel, “On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein’s Game,” Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 83–106, 2016.","ama":"Duman P, Trockel W. On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein’s Game. Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design. 2016;1(1):83-106. doi:10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003","apa":"Duman, P., & Trockel, W. (2016). On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein’s Game. Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 1(1), 83–106. https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003","chicago":"Duman, Papatya, and Walter Trockel. “On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein’s Game.” Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 1, no. 1 (2016): 83–106. https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003.","mla":"Duman, Papatya, and Walter Trockel. “On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein’s Game.” Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, vol. 1, no. 1, The Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2016, pp. 83–106, doi:10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003.","bibtex":"@article{Duman_Trockel_2016, title={On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein’s Game}, volume={1}, DOI={10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003}, number={1}, journal={Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design}, publisher={The Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design}, author={Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter}, year={2016}, pages={83–106} }"},"year":"2016","page":"83-106","title":"On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein's Game","publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"issn":["2399-844X","2399-8458"]},"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:58:56Z","doi":"10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003","language":[{"iso":"eng"}]}]