---
_id: '47845'
author:
- first_name: Fatma
  full_name: Aslan, Fatma
  last_name: Aslan
- first_name: Papatya
  full_name: Duman, Papatya
  id: '72752'
  last_name: Duman
- first_name: Walter
  full_name: Trockel, Walter
  last_name: Trockel
citation:
  ama: 'Aslan F, Duman P, Trockel W. PEA: core-analogue for non-cohesive games. <i>Economics
    Bulletin</i>. 43(3):1279-1285.'
  apa: 'Aslan, F., Duman, P., &#38; Trockel, W. (n.d.). PEA: core-analogue for non-cohesive
    games. <i>Economics Bulletin</i>, <i>43</i>(3), 1279–1285.'
  bibtex: '@article{Aslan_Duman_Trockel, title={PEA: core-analogue for non-cohesive
    games}, volume={43}, number={3}, journal={Economics Bulletin}, author={Aslan,
    Fatma and Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter}, pages={1279–1285} }'
  chicago: 'Aslan, Fatma, Papatya Duman, and Walter Trockel. “PEA: Core-Analogue for
    Non-Cohesive Games.” <i>Economics Bulletin</i> 43, no. 3 (n.d.): 1279–85.'
  ieee: 'F. Aslan, P. Duman, and W. Trockel, “PEA: core-analogue for non-cohesive
    games,” <i>Economics Bulletin</i>, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 1279–1285.'
  mla: 'Aslan, Fatma, et al. “PEA: Core-Analogue for Non-Cohesive Games.” <i>Economics
    Bulletin</i>, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 1279–85.'
  short: F. Aslan, P. Duman, W. Trockel, Economics Bulletin 43 (n.d.) 1279–1285.
date_created: 2023-10-06T18:58:54Z
date_updated: 2024-06-05T11:43:03Z
intvolume: '        43'
issue: '3'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2023/Volume43/EB-23-V43-I3-P109.pdf
oa: '1'
page: 1279-1285
publication: Economics Bulletin
publication_status: accepted
status: public
title: 'PEA: core-analogue for non-cohesive games'
type: journal_article
user_id: '72752'
volume: 43
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '30940'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying\r\nthe
    standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).\r\nWe
    show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two\r\none-dimensional
    problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution\r\nof the
    two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied.  The axiom of\r\nIndependence of
    Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type\r\nof decomposability.
    \ This result has significant implications for actual\r\nnegotiations because
    it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining\r\nproblem into
    one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world\r\nnegotiations."
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
  full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
  id: '20801'
  last_name: Haake
- first_name: Thorsten
  full_name: Upmann, Thorsten
  last_name: Upmann
- first_name: Papatya
  full_name: Duman, Papatya
  id: '72752'
  last_name: Duman
citation:
  ama: 'Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability
    and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i>.
    2022;125(2):403-440. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>'
  apa: 'Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., &#38; Duman, P. (2022). Wage Bargaining and Employment
    Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining. <i>Scandinavian
    Journal of Economics</i>, <i>125</i>(2), 403–440. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>'
  bibtex: '@article{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2022, title={Wage Bargaining and Employment
    Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}, volume={125},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>},
    number={2}, journal={Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Haake,
    Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2022}, pages={403–440}
    }'
  chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. “Wage Bargaining
    and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.”
    <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i> 125, no. 2 (2022): 403–40. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>.'
  ieee: 'C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited:
    Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining,” <i>Scandinavian Journal
    of Economics</i>, vol. 125, no. 2, pp. 403–440, 2022, doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>.'
  mla: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability
    and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining.” <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i>,
    vol. 125, no. 2, Wiley, 2022, pp. 403–40, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518</a>.'
  short: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125 (2022)
    403–440.
date_created: 2022-04-22T14:10:44Z
date_updated: 2023-06-08T16:42:31Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518
funded_apc: '1'
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '       125'
issue: '2'
jel:
- J52
- J41
- C78
keyword:
- Labour market negotiations
- efficient bargains
- Nash bargaining solution
- sequential bargaining
- restricted bargaining games
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12518
page: 403-440
project:
- _id: '7'
  grant_number: '160364472'
  name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
- _id: '2'
  name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '1'
  grant_number: '160364472'
  name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
publication: Scandinavian Journal of Economics
publication_identifier:
  eissn:
  - 0347-0520
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: 'Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective
  Bargaining'
type: journal_article
user_id: '20801'
volume: 125
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '47846'
author:
- first_name: Papatya
  full_name: Duman, Papatya
  id: '72752'
  last_name: Duman
- first_name: Walter
  full_name: Trockel, Walter
  last_name: Trockel
citation:
  ama: 'Duman P, Trockel W. <i>Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential
    Equilibira</i>.'
  apa: 'Duman, P., &#38; Trockel, W. (n.d.). <i>Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench:
    H_alpha--Essential Equilibira</i>.'
  bibtex: '@book{Duman_Trockel, title={Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential
    Equilibira}, author={Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter} }'
  chicago: 'Duman, Papatya, and Walter Trockel. <i>Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench:
    H_alpha--Essential Equilibira</i>, n.d.'
  ieee: 'P. Duman and W. Trockel, <i>Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential
    Equilibira</i>. .'
  mla: 'Duman, Papatya, and Walter Trockel. <i>Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential
    Equilibira</i>.'
  short: 'P. Duman, W. Trockel, Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential
    Equilibira, n.d.'
date_created: 2023-10-06T19:03:43Z
date_updated: 2023-10-06T19:03:50Z
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://ideas.repec.org/p/pdn/ciepap/130.html
publication_status: draft
status: public
title: 'Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential Equilibira'
type: working_paper
user_id: '72752'
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '45561'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: <jats:p>The purpose of this study is to experimentally test Trockel’s game,
    which is a modelling of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG), and determine whether
    one of the two theories of Equality and Deterrence may better account for the
    observed behavior. The CSG is an example of a simple game in extensive form where
    the actual behavior of well-informed players cannot be expected to agree with
    the clear results of game theoretical reasoning. To explain the disagreement between
    the theory and the expected behavior, Trockel’s game is proposed as an alternative
    modelling of the scenario. The existence of more than one equilibrium in Trockel’s
    game opens a door for reputation building. This study is the first attempt to
    experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose. According to
    my data, there is some evidence in favor of both Equality and Deterrence Hypotheses.
    However, since the strategies compatible with the Equality Hypothesis are played
    more frequently, I observe some patterns which share the same intuition with the
    Deterrence Hypothesis.</jats:p>
article_number: '9'
author:
- first_name: Papatya
  full_name: Duman, Papatya
  id: '72752'
  last_name: Duman
citation:
  ama: Duman P. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental
    Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story. <i>Games</i>. 2020;11(1).
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010009">10.3390/g11010009</a>
  apa: Duman, P. (2020). Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
    Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story. <i>Games</i>,
    <i>11</i>(1), Article 9. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010009">https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010009</a>
  bibtex: '@article{Duman_2020, title={Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic
    Behavior? Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story},
    volume={11}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010009">10.3390/g11010009</a>},
    number={19}, journal={Games}, publisher={MDPI AG}, author={Duman, Papatya}, year={2020}
    }'
  chicago: Duman, Papatya. “Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
    Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story.” <i>Games</i>
    11, no. 1 (2020). <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010009">https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010009</a>.
  ieee: 'P. Duman, “Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental
    Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story,” <i>Games</i>, vol.
    11, no. 1, Art. no. 9, 2020, doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010009">10.3390/g11010009</a>.'
  mla: Duman, Papatya. “Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
    Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story.” <i>Games</i>,
    vol. 11, no. 1, 9, MDPI AG, 2020, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010009">10.3390/g11010009</a>.
  short: P. Duman, Games 11 (2020).
date_created: 2023-06-09T15:31:17Z
date_updated: 2023-06-09T15:33:34Z
doi: 10.3390/g11010009
intvolume: '        11'
issue: '1'
keyword:
- Applied Mathematics
- Statistics
- Probability and Uncertainty
- Statistics and Probability
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Games
publication_identifier:
  issn:
  - 2073-4336
publication_status: published
publisher: MDPI AG
status: public
title: Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental Results
  on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story
type: journal_article
user_id: '72752'
volume: 11
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '15202'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS)
    deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow,
    1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining
    problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian)
    product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional
    problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution
    concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
    (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual
    negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem
    into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining
    problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor
    markets and also in other environments.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
  full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
  id: '20801'
  last_name: Haake
- first_name: Thorsten
  full_name: Upmann, Thorsten
  last_name: Upmann
- first_name: Papatya
  full_name: Duman, Papatya
  id: '72752'
  last_name: Duman
citation:
  ama: Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
    Solution in Labor Markets</i>. Vol 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University;
    2019.
  apa: Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., &#38; Duman, P. (2019). <i>The Decomposability of
    the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i> (Vol. 128). CIE Working Paper
    Series, Paderborn University.
  bibtex: '@book{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={The
    Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}, volume={128},
    publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
    and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2019}, collection={Working Papers
    CIE} }'
  chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. <i>The Decomposability
    of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets</i>. Vol. 128. Working Papers
    CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
  ieee: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
    Solution in Labor Markets</i>, vol. 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
    2019.
  mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. <i>The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution
    in Labor Markets</i>. Vol. 128, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
    2019.
  short: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
    Solution in Labor Markets, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
date_created: 2019-11-28T09:49:08Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:16Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: stela
  date_created: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
  date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
  file_id: '15203'
  file_name: WP - The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets.pdf
  file_size: 1068284
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '       128'
keyword:
- Labor market negotiations
- Efficient bargains
- Nash bargaining solution
- Sequential bargaining
- Restricted bargaining games
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets
type: working_paper
user_id: '477'
volume: 128
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '3106'
author:
- first_name: Papatya
  full_name: Duman, Papatya
  id: '72752'
  last_name: Duman
- first_name: Walter
  full_name: Trockel, Walter
  last_name: Trockel
citation:
  ama: Duman P, Trockel W. On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the
    Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein’s Game. <i>Journal
    of Mechanism and Institution Design</i>. 2016;1(1):83-106. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003">10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003</a>
  apa: Duman, P., &#38; Trockel, W. (2016). On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation
    of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein’s Game. <i>Journal
    of Mechanism and Institution Design</i>, <i>1</i>(1), 83–106. <a href="https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003">https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003</a>
  bibtex: '@article{Duman_Trockel_2016, title={On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation
    of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein’s Game}, volume={1},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003">10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003</a>},
    number={1}, journal={Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design}, publisher={The
    Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design}, author={Duman,
    Papatya and Trockel, Walter}, year={2016}, pages={83–106} }'
  chicago: 'Duman, Papatya, and Walter Trockel. “On Non-Cooperative Foundation and
    Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein’s
    Game.” <i>Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design</i> 1, no. 1 (2016): 83–106.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003">https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003</a>.'
  ieee: P. Duman and W. Trockel, “On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation
    of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein’s Game,” <i>Journal
    of Mechanism and Institution Design</i>, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 83–106, 2016.
  mla: Duman, Papatya, and Walter Trockel. “On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation
    of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein’s Game.” <i>Journal
    of Mechanism and Institution Design</i>, vol. 1, no. 1, The Society for the Promotion
    of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2016, pp. 83–106, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003">10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003</a>.
  short: P. Duman, W. Trockel, Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 1 (2016)
    83–106.
date_created: 2018-06-07T08:53:37Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:56Z
ddc:
- '040'
doi: 10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003
extern: '1'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: stela
  date_created: 2018-10-31T08:49:27Z
  date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:49:27Z
  file_id: '5138'
  file_name: On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash....pdf
  file_size: 332414
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:49:27Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '         1'
issue: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 83-106
publication: Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
publication_identifier:
  issn:
  - 2399-844X
  - 2399-8458
publication_status: published
publisher: The Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design
status: public
title: On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame
  Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein's Game
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 1
year: '2016'
...