---
_id: '52686'
author:
- first_name: Qazi Arbab
full_name: Ahmed, Qazi Arbab
id: '72764'
last_name: Ahmed
orcid: 0000-0002-1837-2254
- first_name: Tobias
full_name: Wiersema, Tobias
id: '3118'
last_name: Wiersema
- first_name: Marco
full_name: Platzner, Marco
id: '398'
last_name: Platzner
citation:
ama: Ahmed QA, Wiersema T, Platzner M. Post-configuration Activation of Hardware
Trojans in FPGAs. Journal of Hardware and Systems Security. Published online
2024. doi:10.1007/s41635-024-00147-5
apa: Ahmed, Q. A., Wiersema, T., & Platzner, M. (2024). Post-configuration Activation
of Hardware Trojans in FPGAs. Journal of Hardware and Systems Security.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-024-00147-5
bibtex: '@article{Ahmed_Wiersema_Platzner_2024, title={Post-configuration Activation
of Hardware Trojans in FPGAs}, DOI={10.1007/s41635-024-00147-5},
journal={Journal of Hardware and Systems Security}, publisher={Springer Science
and Business Media LLC}, author={Ahmed, Qazi Arbab and Wiersema, Tobias and Platzner,
Marco}, year={2024} }'
chicago: Ahmed, Qazi Arbab, Tobias Wiersema, and Marco Platzner. “Post-Configuration
Activation of Hardware Trojans in FPGAs.” Journal of Hardware and Systems Security,
2024. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-024-00147-5.
ieee: 'Q. A. Ahmed, T. Wiersema, and M. Platzner, “Post-configuration Activation
of Hardware Trojans in FPGAs,” Journal of Hardware and Systems Security,
2024, doi: 10.1007/s41635-024-00147-5.'
mla: Ahmed, Qazi Arbab, et al. “Post-Configuration Activation of Hardware Trojans
in FPGAs.” Journal of Hardware and Systems Security, Springer Science and
Business Media LLC, 2024, doi:10.1007/s41635-024-00147-5.
short: Q.A. Ahmed, T. Wiersema, M. Platzner, Journal of Hardware and Systems Security
(2024).
date_created: 2024-03-20T12:24:50Z
date_updated: 2024-03-20T12:31:36Z
department:
- _id: '78'
doi: 10.1007/s41635-024-00147-5
keyword:
- General Engineering
- Energy Engineering and Power Technology
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Journal of Hardware and Systems Security
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 2509-3428
- 2509-3436
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
status: public
title: Post-configuration Activation of Hardware Trojans in FPGAs
type: journal_article
user_id: '72764'
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '44194'
author:
- first_name: Qazi Arbab
full_name: Ahmed, Qazi Arbab
id: '72764'
last_name: Ahmed
orcid: 0000-0002-1837-2254
- first_name: Muhammad
full_name: Awais, Muhammad
last_name: Awais
- first_name: Marco
full_name: Platzner, Marco
id: '398'
last_name: Platzner
citation:
ama: 'Ahmed QA, Awais M, Platzner M. MAAS: Hiding Trojans in Approximate Circuits.
In: The 24th International Symposium on Quality Electronic Design (ISQED’23),
San Francisco, Califorina USA. ; 2023.'
apa: 'Ahmed, Q. A., Awais, M., & Platzner, M. (2023). MAAS: Hiding Trojans in
Approximate Circuits. The 24th International Symposium on Quality Electronic
Design (ISQED’23), San Francisco, Califorina USA. The 24th International Symposium
on Quality Electronic Design (ISQED’23), San Fransico CA 94023-0607, USA.'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Ahmed_Awais_Platzner_2023, title={MAAS: Hiding Trojans in
Approximate Circuits}, booktitle={The 24th International Symposium on Quality
Electronic Design (ISQED’23), San Francisco, Califorina USA}, author={Ahmed, Qazi
Arbab and Awais, Muhammad and Platzner, Marco}, year={2023} }'
chicago: 'Ahmed, Qazi Arbab, Muhammad Awais, and Marco Platzner. “MAAS: Hiding Trojans
in Approximate Circuits.” In The 24th International Symposium on Quality Electronic
Design (ISQED’23), San Francisco, Califorina USA, 2023.'
ieee: 'Q. A. Ahmed, M. Awais, and M. Platzner, “MAAS: Hiding Trojans in Approximate
Circuits,” presented at the The 24th International Symposium on Quality Electronic
Design (ISQED’23), San Fransico CA 94023-0607, USA, 2023.'
mla: 'Ahmed, Qazi Arbab, et al. “MAAS: Hiding Trojans in Approximate Circuits.”
The 24th International Symposium on Quality Electronic Design (ISQED’23), San
Francisco, Califorina USA, 2023.'
short: 'Q.A. Ahmed, M. Awais, M. Platzner, in: The 24th International Symposium
on Quality Electronic Design (ISQED’23), San Francisco, Califorina USA, 2023.'
conference:
end_date: 2023-04-07
location: San Fransico CA 94023-0607, USA
name: The 24th International Symposium on Quality Electronic Design (ISQED'23)
start_date: 2023-04-05
date_created: 2023-04-26T13:04:56Z
date_updated: 2023-05-10T13:52:14Z
ddc:
- '620'
department:
- _id: '78'
file:
- access_level: open_access
content_type: application/pdf
creator: qazi
date_created: 2023-04-26T13:03:54Z
date_updated: 2023-05-10T13:52:14Z
file_id: '44196'
file_name: s4Bp4-041.pdf
file_size: 614626
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2023-05-10T13:52:14Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
oa: '1'
project:
- _id: '3'
name: 'SFB 901 - B: SFB 901 - Project Area B'
- _id: '12'
name: 'SFB 901 - B4: SFB 901 - Subproject B4'
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
publication: The 24th International Symposium on Quality Electronic Design (ISQED'23),
San Francisco, Califorina USA
status: public
title: 'MAAS: Hiding Trojans in Approximate Circuits'
type: conference
user_id: '72764'
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '29769'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Wettstreit zwischen der Entwicklung neuer Hardwaretrojaner und entsprechender
Gegenmaßnahmen beschreiten Widersacher immer raffiniertere Wege um Schaltungsentwürfe
zu infizieren und dabei selbst fortgeschrittene Test- und Verifikationsmethoden
zu überlisten. Abgesehen von den konventionellen Methoden um einen Trojaner in
eine Schaltung für ein Field-programmable Gate Array (FPGA) einzuschleusen, können
auch die Entwurfswerkzeuge heimlich kompromittiert werden um einen Angreifer dabei
zu unterstützen einen erfolgreichen Angriff durchzuführen, der zum Beispiel Fehlfunktionen
oder ungewollte Informationsabflüsse bewirken kann. Diese Dissertation beschäftigt
sich hauptsächlich mit den beiden Blickwinkeln auf Hardwaretrojaner in rekonfigurierbaren
Systemen, einerseits der Perspektive des Verteidigers mit einer Methode zur Erkennung
von Trojanern auf der Bitstromebene, und andererseits derjenigen des Angreifers
mit einer neuartigen Angriffsmethode für FPGA Trojaner. Für die Verteidigung gegen
den Trojaner ``Heimtückische LUT'''' stellen wir die allererste erfolgreiche Gegenmaßnahme
vor, die durch Verifikation mittels Proof-carrying Hardware (PCH) auf der Bitstromebene
direkt vor der Konfiguration der Hardware angewendet werden kann, und präsentieren
ein vollständiges Schema für den Entwurf und die Verifikation von Schaltungen
für iCE40 FPGAs. Für die Gegenseite führen wir einen neuen Angriff ein, welcher
bösartiges Routing im eingefügten Trojaner ausnutzt um selbst im fertigen Bitstrom
in einem inaktiven Zustand zu verbleiben: Hierdurch kann dieser neuartige Angriff
zur Zeit weder von herkömmlichen Test- und Verifikationsmethoden, noch von unserer
vorher vorgestellten Verifikation auf der Bitstromebene entdeckt werden.'
- lang: eng
text: The battle of developing hardware Trojans and corresponding countermeasures
has taken adversaries towards ingenious ways of compromising hardware designs
by circumventing even advanced testing and verification methods. Besides conventional
methods of inserting Trojans into a design by a malicious entity, the design flow
for field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) can also be surreptitiously compromised
to assist the attacker to perform a successful malfunctioning or information leakage
attack. This thesis mainly focuses on the two aspects of hardware Trojans in reconfigurable
systems, the defenders perspective which corresponds to the bitstream-level Trojan
detection technique, and the attackers perspective which corresponds to a novel
FPGA Trojan attack. From the defender's perspective, we introduce a first-ever
successful pre-configuration countermeasure against the ``Malicious LUT''-hardware
Trojan, by employing bitstream-level Proof-Carrying Hardware (PCH) and present
the complete design-and-verification flow for iCE40 FPGAs. Likewise, from an attackers
perspective, we present a novel attack that leverages malicious routing of the
inserted Trojan circuit to acquire a dormant state even in the generated and transmitted
bitstream. Since the Trojan is injected in a post-synthesis step and remains unconnected
in the bitstream, the presented attack can currently neither be prevented by conventional
testing and verification methods nor by bitstream-level verification techniques.
author:
- first_name: Qazi Arbab
full_name: Ahmed, Qazi Arbab
id: '72764'
last_name: Ahmed
orcid: 0000-0002-1837-2254
citation:
ama: Ahmed QA. Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing. Paderborn University,
Paderborn, Germany; 2022. doi:10.17619/UNIPB/1-1271
apa: Ahmed, Q. A. (2022). Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing. Paderborn
University, Paderborn, Germany. https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-1271
bibtex: '@book{Ahmed_2022, place={Paderborn}, title={Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable
Computing}, DOI={10.17619/UNIPB/1-1271},
publisher={ Paderborn University, Paderborn, Germany}, author={Ahmed, Qazi Arbab},
year={2022} }'
chicago: 'Ahmed, Qazi Arbab. Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing.
Paderborn: Paderborn University, Paderborn, Germany, 2022. https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-1271.'
ieee: 'Q. A. Ahmed, Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing. Paderborn: Paderborn
University, Paderborn, Germany, 2022.'
mla: Ahmed, Qazi Arbab. Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing. Paderborn
University, Paderborn, Germany, 2022, doi:10.17619/UNIPB/1-1271.
short: Q.A. Ahmed, Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing, Paderborn University,
Paderborn, Germany, Paderborn, 2022.
date_created: 2022-02-07T14:02:36Z
date_updated: 2022-11-30T13:39:01Z
ddc:
- '004'
department:
- _id: '78'
doi: 10.17619/UNIPB/1-1271
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- FPGA Security
- Hardware Trojans
- Bitstream-level Trojans
- Bitstream Verification
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: "\turn:nbn:de:hbz:466:2-40303"
oa: '1'
place: Paderborn
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '4'
name: 'SFB 901 - C: SFB 901 - Project Area C'
- _id: '14'
name: 'SFB 901 - C2: SFB 901 - Subproject C2'
publication_status: published
publisher: ' Paderborn University, Paderborn, Germany'
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Marco
full_name: Platzner, Marco
id: '398'
last_name: Platzner
title: Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing
type: dissertation
user_id: '477'
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '32342'
author:
- first_name: Qazi Arbab
full_name: Ahmed, Qazi Arbab
id: '72764'
last_name: Ahmed
orcid: 0000-0002-1837-2254
- first_name: Marco
full_name: Platzner, Marco
id: '398'
last_name: Platzner
citation:
ama: 'Ahmed QA, Platzner M. On the Detection and Circumvention of Bitstream-Level
Trojans in FPGAs. In: IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI,2022);
2022.'
apa: Ahmed, Q. A., & Platzner, M. (2022). On the Detection and Circumvention
of Bitstream-Level Trojans in FPGAs. IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium
on VLSI Aliathon Resort, Pafos, Cyprus.
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Ahmed_Platzner_2022, place={Pafos, Cyprus}, title={On the
Detection and Circumvention of Bitstream-Level Trojans in FPGAs}, publisher={IEEE
Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI,2022)}, author={Ahmed, Qazi
Arbab and Platzner, Marco}, year={2022} }'
chicago: 'Ahmed, Qazi Arbab, and Marco Platzner. “On the Detection and Circumvention
of Bitstream-Level Trojans in FPGAs.” Pafos, Cyprus: IEEE Computer Society Annual
Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI,2022), 2022.'
ieee: Q. A. Ahmed and M. Platzner, “On the Detection and Circumvention of Bitstream-Level
Trojans in FPGAs,” presented at the IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on
VLSI Aliathon Resort, Pafos, Cyprus, 2022.
mla: Ahmed, Qazi Arbab, and Marco Platzner. On the Detection and Circumvention
of Bitstream-Level Trojans in FPGAs. IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium
on VLSI (ISVLSI,2022), 2022.
short: 'Q.A. Ahmed, M. Platzner, in: IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI
(ISVLSI,2022), Pafos, Cyprus, 2022.'
conference:
end_date: July 6, 2022
location: Pafos, Cyprus
name: IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI Aliathon Resort,
start_date: ' July 4, 2022'
date_created: 2022-07-12T19:56:48Z
date_updated: 2023-04-19T15:04:30Z
department:
- _id: '78'
language:
- iso: eng
place: Pafos, Cyprus
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '3'
name: 'SFB 901 - B: SFB 901 - Project Area B'
- _id: '12'
name: 'SFB 901 - B4: SFB 901 - Subproject B4'
publisher: IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI,2022)
status: public
title: On the Detection and Circumvention of Bitstream-Level Trojans in FPGAs
type: conference
user_id: '72764'
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '29138'
author:
- first_name: Qazi Arbab
full_name: Ahmed, Qazi Arbab
id: '72764'
last_name: Ahmed
orcid: 0000-0002-1837-2254
citation:
ama: 'Ahmed QA. Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing. In: 2021 IFIP/IEEE
29th International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI-SoC).
; 2021. doi:10.1109/vlsi-soc53125.2021.9606974'
apa: Ahmed, Q. A. (2021). Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing. 2021
IFIP/IEEE 29th International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI-SoC).
https://doi.org/10.1109/vlsi-soc53125.2021.9606974
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Ahmed_2021, title={Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing},
DOI={10.1109/vlsi-soc53125.2021.9606974},
booktitle={2021 IFIP/IEEE 29th International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration
(VLSI-SoC)}, author={Ahmed, Qazi Arbab}, year={2021} }'
chicago: Ahmed, Qazi Arbab. “Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing.” In 2021
IFIP/IEEE 29th International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI-SoC),
2021. https://doi.org/10.1109/vlsi-soc53125.2021.9606974.
ieee: 'Q. A. Ahmed, “Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing,” 2021, doi: 10.1109/vlsi-soc53125.2021.9606974.'
mla: Ahmed, Qazi Arbab. “Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing.” 2021
IFIP/IEEE 29th International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI-SoC),
2021, doi:10.1109/vlsi-soc53125.2021.9606974.
short: 'Q.A. Ahmed, in: 2021 IFIP/IEEE 29th International Conference on Very Large
Scale Integration (VLSI-SoC), 2021.'
date_created: 2021-12-30T00:02:24Z
date_updated: 2023-04-19T15:03:45Z
department:
- _id: '78'
doi: 10.1109/vlsi-soc53125.2021.9606974
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '3'
name: 'SFB 901 - B: SFB 901 - Project Area B'
- _id: '12'
name: 'SFB 901 - B4: SFB 901 - Subproject B4'
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
publication: 2021 IFIP/IEEE 29th International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration
(VLSI-SoC)
publication_status: published
status: public
title: Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing
type: conference
user_id: '72764'
year: '2021'
...
---
_id: '20681'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: The battle of developing hardware Trojans and corresponding countermeasures
has taken adversaries towards ingenious ways of compromising hardware designs
by circumventing even advanced testing and verification methods. Besides conventional
methods of inserting Trojans into a design by a malicious entity, the design flow
for field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) can also be surreptitiously compromised
to assist the attacker to perform a successful malfunctioning or information leakage
attack. The advanced stealthy malicious look-up-table (LUT) attack activates a
Trojan only when generating the FPGA bitstream and can thus not be detected by
register transfer and gate level testing and verification. However, also this
attack was recently revealed by a bitstream-level proof-carrying hardware (PCH)
approach. In this paper, we present a novel attack that leverages malicious routing
of the inserted Trojan circuit to acquire a dormant state even in the generated
and transmitted bitstream. The Trojan's payload is connected to primary inputs/outputs
of the FPGA via a programmable interconnect point (PIP). The Trojan is detached
from inputs/outputs during place-and-route and re-connected only when the FPGA
is being programmed, thus activating the Trojan circuit without any need for a
trigger logic. Since the Trojan is injected in a post-synthesis step and remains
unconnected in the bitstream, the presented attack can currently neither be prevented
by conventional testing and verification methods nor by recent bitstream-level
verification techniques.
author:
- first_name: Qazi Arbab
full_name: Ahmed, Qazi Arbab
id: '72764'
last_name: Ahmed
orcid: 0000-0002-1837-2254
- first_name: Tobias
full_name: Wiersema, Tobias
id: '3118'
last_name: Wiersema
- first_name: Marco
full_name: Platzner, Marco
id: '398'
last_name: Platzner
citation:
ama: 'Ahmed QA, Wiersema T, Platzner M. Malicious Routing: Circumventing Bitstream-level
Verification for FPGAs. In: 2021 Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference
& Exhibition (DATE). 2021 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference
(DATE); 2021. doi:10.23919/DATE51398.2021.9474026'
apa: 'Ahmed, Q. A., Wiersema, T., & Platzner, M. (2021). Malicious Routing:
Circumventing Bitstream-level Verification for FPGAs. 2021 Design, Automation
& Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE). Design, Automation
and Test in Europe Conference (DATE’21), Alpexpo | Grenoble, France. https://doi.org/10.23919/DATE51398.2021.9474026'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Ahmed_Wiersema_Platzner_2021, place={Alpexpo | Grenoble,
France}, title={Malicious Routing: Circumventing Bitstream-level Verification
for FPGAs}, DOI={10.23919/DATE51398.2021.9474026},
booktitle={2021 Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition
(DATE)}, publisher={2021 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference (DATE)},
author={Ahmed, Qazi Arbab and Wiersema, Tobias and Platzner, Marco}, year={2021}
}'
chicago: 'Ahmed, Qazi Arbab, Tobias Wiersema, and Marco Platzner. “Malicious Routing:
Circumventing Bitstream-Level Verification for FPGAs.” In 2021 Design, Automation
& Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE). Alpexpo | Grenoble,
France: 2021 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference (DATE), 2021. https://doi.org/10.23919/DATE51398.2021.9474026.'
ieee: 'Q. A. Ahmed, T. Wiersema, and M. Platzner, “Malicious Routing: Circumventing
Bitstream-level Verification for FPGAs,” presented at the Design, Automation and
Test in Europe Conference (DATE’21), Alpexpo | Grenoble, France, 2021, doi: 10.23919/DATE51398.2021.9474026.'
mla: 'Ahmed, Qazi Arbab, et al. “Malicious Routing: Circumventing Bitstream-Level
Verification for FPGAs.” 2021 Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference
& Exhibition (DATE), 2021 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference
(DATE), 2021, doi:10.23919/DATE51398.2021.9474026.'
short: 'Q.A. Ahmed, T. Wiersema, M. Platzner, in: 2021 Design, Automation &
Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE), 2021 Design, Automation and
Test in Europe Conference (DATE), Alpexpo | Grenoble, France, 2021.'
conference:
end_date: 2021-02-05
location: Alpexpo | Grenoble, France
name: Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference (DATE'21)
start_date: 2021-02-01
date_created: 2020-12-07T14:03:00Z
date_updated: 2023-05-11T09:16:34Z
ddc:
- '006'
department:
- _id: '78'
doi: 10.23919/DATE51398.2021.9474026
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: qazi
date_created: 2023-05-11T09:16:15Z
date_updated: 2023-05-11T09:16:15Z
file_id: '44752'
file_name: 1812.pdf
file_size: 394011
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2023-05-11T09:16:15Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
oa: '1'
place: Alpexpo | Grenoble, France
project:
- _id: '12'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject B4
- _id: '3'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area B
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
publication: 2021 Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE)
publication_identifier:
eisbn:
- 978-3-9819263-5-4
publication_status: published
publisher: 2021 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference (DATE)
status: public
title: 'Malicious Routing: Circumventing Bitstream-level Verification for FPGAs'
type: conference
user_id: '72764'
year: '2021'
...
---
_id: '9913'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Reconfigurable hardware has received considerable attention as a platform
that enables dynamic hardware updates and thus is able to adapt new configurations
at runtime. However, due to their dynamic nature, e.g., field-programmable gate
arrays (FPGA) are subject to a constant possibility of attacks, since each new
configuration might be compromised. Trojans for reconfigurable hardware that evade
state-of-the-art detection techniques and even formal verification, are thus a
large threat to these devices. One such stealthy hardware Trojan, that is inserted
and activated in two stages by compromised electronic design automation (EDA)
tools, has recently been presented and shown to evade all forms of classical pre-configuration
detection techniques. This paper presents a successful pre-configuration countermeasure
against this ``Malicious Look-up-table (LUT)''-hardware Trojan, by employing bitstream-level
Proof-Carrying Hardware (PCH). We show that the method is able to alert innocent
module creators to infected EDA tools, and to prohibit malicious ones to sell
infected modules to unsuspecting customers.
author:
- first_name: Qazi Arbab
full_name: Ahmed, Qazi Arbab
id: '72764'
last_name: Ahmed
orcid: 0000-0002-1837-2254
- first_name: Tobias
full_name: Wiersema, Tobias
id: '3118'
last_name: Wiersema
- first_name: Marco
full_name: Platzner, Marco
id: '398'
last_name: Platzner
citation:
ama: 'Ahmed QA, Wiersema T, Platzner M. Proof-Carrying Hardware Versus the Stealthy
Malicious LUT Hardware Trojan. In: Hochberger C, Nelson B, Koch A, Woods R, Diniz
P, eds. Applied Reconfigurable Computing. Vol 11444. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science. Springer International Publishing; 2019:127-136. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-17227-5_10'
apa: Ahmed, Q. A., Wiersema, T., & Platzner, M. (2019). Proof-Carrying Hardware
Versus the Stealthy Malicious LUT Hardware Trojan. In C. Hochberger, B. Nelson,
A. Koch, R. Woods, & P. Diniz (Eds.), Applied Reconfigurable Computing
(Vol. 11444, pp. 127–136). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17227-5_10
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Ahmed_Wiersema_Platzner_2019, place={Cham}, series={Lecture
Notes in Computer Science}, title={Proof-Carrying Hardware Versus the Stealthy
Malicious LUT Hardware Trojan}, volume={11444}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-030-17227-5_10},
booktitle={Applied Reconfigurable Computing}, publisher={Springer International
Publishing}, author={Ahmed, Qazi Arbab and Wiersema, Tobias and Platzner, Marco},
editor={Hochberger, Christian and Nelson, Brent and Koch, Andreas and Woods, Roger
and Diniz, Pedro}, year={2019}, pages={127–136}, collection={Lecture Notes in
Computer Science} }'
chicago: 'Ahmed, Qazi Arbab, Tobias Wiersema, and Marco Platzner. “Proof-Carrying
Hardware Versus the Stealthy Malicious LUT Hardware Trojan.” In Applied Reconfigurable
Computing, edited by Christian Hochberger, Brent Nelson, Andreas Koch, Roger
Woods, and Pedro Diniz, 11444:127–36. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Cham:
Springer International Publishing, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17227-5_10.'
ieee: 'Q. A. Ahmed, T. Wiersema, and M. Platzner, “Proof-Carrying Hardware Versus
the Stealthy Malicious LUT Hardware Trojan,” in Applied Reconfigurable Computing,
Darmstadt, Germany, 2019, vol. 11444, pp. 127–136, doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-17227-5_10.'
mla: Ahmed, Qazi Arbab, et al. “Proof-Carrying Hardware Versus the Stealthy Malicious
LUT Hardware Trojan.” Applied Reconfigurable Computing, edited by Christian
Hochberger et al., vol. 11444, Springer International Publishing, 2019, pp. 127–36,
doi:10.1007/978-3-030-17227-5_10.
short: 'Q.A. Ahmed, T. Wiersema, M. Platzner, in: C. Hochberger, B. Nelson, A. Koch,
R. Woods, P. Diniz (Eds.), Applied Reconfigurable Computing, Springer International
Publishing, Cham, 2019, pp. 127–136.'
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