@techreport{60596,
  author       = {{Dyck, Daniel and Hechtner, Frank and Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{Abschreibungen als Mittel der Investitionsförderung in Deutschland – Möglichkeiten, Grenzen und Perspektiven evidenzbasierter Analysen}}},
  doi          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5337276 }},
  year         = {{2025}},
}

@techreport{61508,
  abstract     = {{We investigate how tax authorities use joint tax audits as a coordinated enforcement tool in cross-border transactions of a multinational firm. Joint tax audits aim to resolve potential tax disputes early, before such disputes escalate into costly and time-consuming resolution procedures that may not fully eliminate double taxation. Employing a game-theoretic model, we identify settings in which we expect joint audits to occur and investigate their effect on the firm's expected tax payments and tax audit efficiency. We find that the occurrence of joint audits critically depends on the double taxation risk in the absence of joint audits. Unless tax rules are consistently applied, joint audits can occur more often when this risk is higher. The reason is that the firm changes its income-shifting strategy to reduce its expected tax payments, and thereby also enables tax authorities to better target tax disputes via joint audits that would otherwise escalate. However, we identify conditions under which joint audits are then detrimental to tax audit efficiency, particularly when the firm prefers them most. Our results imply that cost-sharing arrangements for joint audits should be tailored to the level of double taxation risk, with firm involvement having the potential to improve efficiency when this risk is high.}},
  author       = {{Dyck, Daniel and Kourouxous, Thomas and Lorenz, Johannes}},
  keywords     = {{joint tax audits, double taxation, dispute prevention, income shifting}},
  pages        = {{57}},
  title        = {{{An Economic Analysis of Joint Tax Audits}}},
  doi          = {{10.2139/ssrn.5398645}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}

@techreport{61502,
  abstract     = {{This study introduces sloppiness---the inaccurate preparation of supporting information during tax disputes---as a neglected but critical factor influencing taxpayer noncompliance. We conceptualize sloppiness as arising both from imperfections in the internal information environment, exacerbated by structural uncertainty over litigation outcomes (factual dimension), and from strategic aversion to compliance effort (strategic dimension). We examine whether and to what extent improved documentation and engaging an internal monitoring expert can mitigate sloppiness and prevent litigation. Using a game-theoretic model, we derive equilibrium strategies for a tax manager's compliance effort, a monitoring expert's dispute resolution effort, and a tax authority's litigation decision. Absent a monitoring expert, we find that improved documentation consistently reduces the litigation probability. However, when a monitoring expert is present, we surprisingly find that improved documentation crowds out compliance effort and can increase the litigation probability. Overall, our results suggest that sloppiness can be overcome either through strong documentation alone or by engaging a monitoring expert when documentation is weak, with the latter approach becoming more attractive as the dispute resolution costs decline.}},
  author       = {{Dyck, Daniel and Lorenz, Johannes and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{Sloppiness in Tax Disputes: How to Prevent Litigation?}}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}

@techreport{46048,
  author       = {{Dyck, Daniel and Lorenz, Johannes and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{Tax Disputes - The Role of Technology and Controversy Expertise}}},
  doi          = {{https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4214449 }},
  year         = {{2025}},
}

@techreport{59096,
  abstract     = {{This study examines how strengthening tax enforcement by increasing human enforcement capacity and improving tax audit technology affect tax audit efficiency. I employ an economic model in which a tax manager’s tax planning effort shapes corporate tax planning and a strategic tax auditor makes a technology-based audit decision. I show that strengthening tax enforcement always increases tax revenues, but decreases the number of audits only under narrow conditions, so that its effect on tax audit efficiency is often ambiguous. Improving tax audit technology has more nuanced implications. When the strength of tax enforcement is sufficiently high, gradual improvements in tax audit technology crowd out audit incentives and, surprisingly, reduce tax revenues, while sufficiently large improvements can overturn this adverse revenue effect. At the same time, improved technology lowers unnecessary audits once the strength of tax enforcement exceeds a minimum level. Therefore, sufficiently large technology improvements improve tax audit efficiency once this minimum level is exceeded. The results have important policy and empirical implications in an environment of constrained fiscal budgets and rapidly advancing audit technologies.}},
  author       = {{Dyck, Daniel}},
  title        = {{{Corporate Tax Planning and Technology-Based Enforcement}}},
  doi          = {{10.2139/ssrn.5186857}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}

@article{63580,
  author       = {{Dyck, Daniel and Hechtner, Frank and Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  journal      = {{Steuer und Wirtschaft}},
  number       = {{Sonderheft NeSt}},
  pages        = {{26--44}},
  title        = {{{Abschreibungen als Mittel der Investitionsförderung in Deutschland - Möglichkeiten, Grenzen und Perspektiven evidenzbasierter Analysen}}},
  volume       = {{102}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}

@article{49548,
  author       = {{Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren and Dyck, Daniel and Heinemann-Heile, Vanessa}},
  journal      = {{Schmalenbach IMPULSE}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{1 -- 6}},
  title        = {{{GBP-Monitor Q3/2023: Das Wachstumschancengesetz – ein Investitionsimpuls?}}},
  doi          = {{10.54585/BCGK4022}},
  volume       = {{3}},
  year         = {{2023}},
}

@techreport{48979,
  author       = {{Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren and Dyck, Daniel and Heinemann-Heile, Vanessa}},
  publisher    = {{TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency}},
  title        = {{{GBP-Monitor: Betriebswirtschaftliche Einschätzungen und Erwartungen von Unternehmen in Deutschland. Unternehmenstrends im November 2023}}},
  doi          = {{10.52569/DURP4114}},
  year         = {{2023}},
}

@article{46049,
  author       = {{Dyck, Daniel}},
  journal      = {{Junior Management Science}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{100--148}},
  title        = {{{Der Einfluss der Besteuerung auf Managementanreize und die Nutzung von Bonusbanken}}},
  volume       = {{6}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}