{"publication":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:56:42Z","type":"journal_article","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"citation":{"short":"C.-J. Haake, U. Ervig, Journal of Mathematical Economics 41 (2005) 983–993.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., &#38; Ervig, U. (2005). Trading bargaining weights. <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i>, <i>41</i>(8), 983–993.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Ulrike Ervig. “Trading Bargaining Weights.” <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i> 41, no. 8 (2005): 983–93.","ama":"Haake C-J, Ervig U. Trading bargaining weights. <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i>. 2005;41(8):983-993.","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Ulrike Ervig. “Trading Bargaining Weights.” <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i>, vol. 41, no. 8, 2005, pp. 983–93.","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Ervig_2005, title={Trading bargaining weights}, volume={41}, number={8}, journal={Journal of Mathematical Economics}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Ervig, Ulrike}, year={2005}, pages={983–993} }","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and U. Ervig, “Trading bargaining weights,” <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i>, vol. 41, no. 8, pp. 983–993, 2005."},"user_id":"65453","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"Trading bargaining weights","_id":"2499","volume":41,"author":[{"first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"20801","last_name":"Haake"},{"last_name":"Ervig","full_name":"Ervig, Ulrike","first_name":"Ulrike"}],"intvolume":"        41","status":"public","year":"2005","file":[{"content_type":"application/pdf","access_level":"closed","relation":"main_file","date_created":"2018-10-31T08:45:14Z","date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:45:14Z","creator":"stela","file_size":205715,"success":1,"file_id":"5137","file_name":"Trading bargaining weights.pdf"}],"page":"983-993","issue":"8","ddc":["040"],"date_created":"2018-04-26T10:21:28Z","file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:45:14Z","abstract":[{"text":"We consider a model, in which two agents are engaged in two separate bargaining problems. We\r\nintroduce a notion of bargaining weights (bargaining power), which is basically given by asymmetric\r\nversions of the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution. Thereby, we view bargaining power as ordinary\r\ngoods that can be traded in an exchange economy.With equal initial endowment of bargaining power\r\nthere exists aWalrasian equilibrium in this exchange economy such that the utility allocation in equilibrium\r\ncoincides with the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution of the aggregate bargaining problem.\r\nEquilibrium prices are given by the primitives of the two bargaining problems.","lang":"eng"}],"has_accepted_license":"1","jel":["C78","C62","C51","C63"]}