Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences

C.-J. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, Economics Letters 170 (2018) 39.

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Journal Article | Published | English
Abstract
We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.
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Journal Title
Economics Letters
Volume
170
Page
39 - 41
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Haake C-J, Stroh-Maraun N. Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Economics Letters. 2018;170:39-41.
Haake, C.-J., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Economics Letters, 170, 39–41.
@article{Haake_Stroh-Maraun_2018, title={Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}, volume={170}, journal={Economics Letters}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, pages={39–41}}
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.” Economics Letters 170 (2018): 39–41.
C.-J. Haake and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences,” Economics Letters, vol. 170, pp. 39–41, 2018.
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.” Economics Letters 170 (2018): 39–41. Print.
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