---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every
    resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset
    of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the
    utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the
    budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE)
    do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of
    singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for
    each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential
    function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which
    depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual
    player.@eng
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Maximilian
      foaf_name: Drees, Maximilian
      foaf_surname: Drees
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Matthias
      foaf_name: Feldotto, Matthias
      foaf_surname: Feldotto
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=14052
    orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Sören
      foaf_name: Riechers, Sören
      foaf_surname: Riechers
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Alexander
      foaf_name: Skopalik, Alexander
      foaf_surname: Skopalik
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=40384
  bibo_doi: 10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7
  dct_date: 2018^xs_gYear
  dct_isPartOf:
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/1382-6905
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/1573-2886
  dct_language: eng
  dct_publisher: Springer Nature@
  dct_title: Pure Nash equilibria in restricted budget games@
...