---
res:
bibo_abstract:
- In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying
a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy
and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be
decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product
of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional
problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution
concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual
negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem
into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining
problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor
markets and also in other environments.@eng
bibo_authorlist:
- foaf_Person:
foaf_givenName: Claus-Jochen
foaf_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
foaf_surname: Haake
foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=20801
- foaf_Person:
foaf_givenName: Thorsten
foaf_name: Upmann, Thorsten
foaf_surname: Upmann
- foaf_Person:
foaf_givenName: Papatya
foaf_name: Duman, Papatya
foaf_surname: Duman
foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=72752
bibo_volume: 128
dct_date: 2019^xs_gYear
dct_language: eng
dct_publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University@
dct_subject:
- Labor market negotiations
- Efficient bargains
- Nash bargaining solution
- Sequential bargaining
- Restricted bargaining games
dct_title: The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets@
...