{"author":[{"first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake"},{"first_name":"Nadja","full_name":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja","last_name":"Stroh-Maraun"}],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","year":"2018","status":"public","intvolume":"       111","user_id":"65453","citation":{"short":"C.-J. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. <i>A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences</i>. Vol. 111. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","bibtex":"@book{Haake_Stroh-Maraun_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}, volume={111}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","apa":"Haake, C.-J., &#38; Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). <i>A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences</i> (Vol. 111). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and N. Stroh-Maraun, <i>A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences</i>, vol. 111. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. <i>A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences</i>. Vol. 111, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","ama":"Haake C-J, Stroh-Maraun N. <i>A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences</i>. Vol 111. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2018."},"volume":111,"_id":"15206","title":"A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:17Z","type":"working_paper","series_title":"Working Papers CIE","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior."}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"has_accepted_license":"1","date_created":"2019-11-28T10:03:40Z","file_date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:07:24Z","ddc":["040"],"file":[{"success":1,"file_id":"15209","file_name":"WP - A Note on Manipulability in Scho ol Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.pdf","access_level":"closed","content_type":"application/pdf","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:07:24Z","date_created":"2019-11-28T10:07:24Z","creator":"stela","file_size":328319}]}