{"publisher":"IEEE","citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Harks_Höfer_Schewior_Skopalik_2016, title={Routing Games With Progressive Filling}, DOI={10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571}, number={4}, journal={IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking}, publisher={IEEE}, author={Harks, Tobias and Höfer, Martin and Schewior, Kevin and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2016}, pages={2553–2562} }","ieee":"T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, and A. Skopalik, “Routing Games With Progressive Filling,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, no. 4, pp. 2553–2562, 2016.","chicago":"Harks, Tobias, Martin Höfer, Kevin Schewior, and Alexander Skopalik. “Routing Games With Progressive Filling.” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, no. 4 (2016): 2553–62. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571.","ama":"Harks T, Höfer M, Schewior K, Skopalik A. Routing Games With Progressive Filling. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking. 2016;(4):2553-2562. doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571","apa":"Harks, T., Höfer, M., Schewior, K., & Skopalik, A. (2016). Routing Games With Progressive Filling. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, (4), 2553–2562. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571","short":"T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, A. Skopalik, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (2016) 2553–2562.","mla":"Harks, Tobias, et al. “Routing Games With Progressive Filling.” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, no. 4, IEEE, 2016, pp. 2553–62, doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571."},"user_id":"477","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3","_id":"7"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"title":"Routing Games With Progressive Filling","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:40Z","has_accepted_license":"1","doi":"10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Abstract—Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approachto a fair allocation of bandwidth to each of the usersin a network. This allocation can be computed by uniformlyraising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacityconstraints. We consider an extension of these allocations byraising the bandwidth with arbitrary and not necessarily uniformtime-depending velocities (allocation rates). These allocationsare used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, whichwe formalize in progressive filling games (PFGs). We present avariety of results for equilibria in PFGs. We show that these gamespossess pure Nash and strong equilibria. While computation ingeneral is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time algorithms forprominent classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), includingthe case when all users have the same source-destination pair.We characterize prices of anarchy and stability for pure Nashand strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when players havedifferent or the same source-destination pairs. In addition, weshow that when a designer can adjust allocation rates, it is possibleto design games with optimal strong equilibria. Some initial resultson polynomial-time algorithms in this direction are also derived."}],"ddc":["040"],"file":[{"date_created":"2018-03-21T12:48:02Z","success":1,"access_level":"closed","file_id":"1547","relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","creator":"florida","file_name":"159-Harks-Hoefer-Schewior-Skopalik2016.pdf","date_updated":"2018-03-21T12:48:02Z","file_size":1655309}],"issue":"4","publication":"IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:23Z","type":"journal_article","page":"2553 - 2562","file_date_updated":"2018-03-21T12:48:02Z","_id":"159","year":"2016","status":"public","author":[{"first_name":"Tobias","last_name":"Harks","full_name":"Harks, Tobias"},{"full_name":"Höfer, Martin","last_name":"Höfer","first_name":"Martin"},{"full_name":"Schewior, Kevin","last_name":"Schewior","first_name":"Kevin"},{"full_name":"Skopalik, Alexander","last_name":"Skopalik","first_name":"Alexander","id":"40384"}]}