{"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:53:23Z","status":"public","author":[{"first_name":"Stephan","full_name":"Alberternst, Stephan","last_name":"Alberternst"},{"full_name":"Sureth-Sloane, Caren","last_name":"Sureth-Sloane","id":"530","first_name":"Caren"}],"year":"2015","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"17951","type":"working_paper","date_created":"2020-08-14T07:48:03Z","title":"The Effect of Taxes on Corporate Financing Decisions - Evidence from the German Interest Barrier","department":[{"_id":"635"}],"user_id":"61801","citation":{"apa":"Alberternst, S., &#38; Sureth-Sloane, C. (2015). <i>The Effect of Taxes on Corporate Financing Decisions - Evidence from the German Interest Barrier</i>.","ieee":"S. Alberternst and C. Sureth-Sloane, <i>The Effect of Taxes on Corporate Financing Decisions - Evidence from the German Interest Barrier</i>. 2015.","mla":"Alberternst, Stephan, and Caren Sureth-Sloane. <i>The Effect of Taxes on Corporate Financing Decisions - Evidence from the German Interest Barrier</i>. 2015.","ama":"Alberternst S, Sureth-Sloane C. <i>The Effect of Taxes on Corporate Financing Decisions - Evidence from the German Interest Barrier</i>.; 2015.","bibtex":"@book{Alberternst_Sureth-Sloane_2015, series={TAF Working Paper No. 8}, title={The Effect of Taxes on Corporate Financing Decisions - Evidence from the German Interest Barrier}, author={Alberternst, Stephan and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}, year={2015}, collection={TAF Working Paper No. 8} }","chicago":"Alberternst, Stephan, and Caren Sureth-Sloane. <i>The Effect of Taxes on Corporate Financing Decisions - Evidence from the German Interest Barrier</i>. TAF Working Paper No. 8, 2015.","short":"S. Alberternst, C. Sureth-Sloane, The Effect of Taxes on Corporate Financing Decisions - Evidence from the German Interest Barrier, 2015."},"series_title":"TAF Working Paper No. 8","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://en.wiwi.uni-paderborn.de/fileadmin/cetar/TAF_Working_Paper_Series/TAF_WP_008_AlberternstSureth_2015.pdf"}],"abstract":[{"text":"The literature suggests that when taking tax effects into account, debt ought to be prefer-able to equity. Thus, with all else being equal, levered firms are expected to show higher firm values.However, there are no uniform predictions of the size of this tax benefit from interest deductibility nor on the effect of changes in interest deductibility.  We believe that the German corporate tax re-form in 2008, which introduced an interest barrier, can serve as a promising “quasi-experiment” to investigate the effects from a reform of interest deductibility.  A study of this reform on the basis of German financial statement data is of general interest because, first, similar interest barriers have been introduced in several countries and proposed by the OECD to fight BEPS. Second, the major characteristics of the German tax system can be regarded as representative for most European and major Asian countries.  Third, single entity financial statements for German companies allows us to capture tax and capital structure details that have not been available in most prior studies.  With significance at the 5% level, we find evidence that the companies that are affected by the interest barrier reduce their leverage by 4.7 percentage points more than companies that are not affected by the interest barrier.  We are the first to employ a detailed matching approach to the underlying rich dataset, which enables us to overcome several limitations of previous studies. Our results imply that capital structure reactions most likely have been underestimated in previous studies.","lang":"eng"}]}