--- res: bibo_abstract: - We experimentally compare the consequences for group cooperation of two decision mechanisms involving the extension of group membership. We analyze an exogenous decision (random draw) and an endogenous decision (made by a particular group member) mechanism to extend a temporary agent’s group membership. Our results reveal that the prospect of group membership extension affects not only the temporary but also the permanent group members’ contributions with an endogenous mechanism.@eng bibo_authorlist: - foaf_Person: foaf_givenName: Christian foaf_name: Grund, Christian foaf_surname: Grund - foaf_Person: foaf_givenName: Christine foaf_name: Harbring, Christine foaf_surname: Harbring - foaf_Person: foaf_givenName: Kirsten foaf_name: Thommes, Kirsten foaf_surname: Thommes foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=72497 - foaf_Person: foaf_givenName: Katja Rebecca foaf_name: Tilkes, Katja Rebecca foaf_surname: Tilkes bibo_doi: 10.3390/g11040061 dct_date: 2020^xs_gYear dct_isPartOf: - http://id.crossref.org/issn/2073-4336 dct_language: eng dct_title: Decisions on Extending Group Membership—Evidence from a Public Good Experiment@ ...