---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - "Social psychology studies the \"common enemy effect\", the phenomenon\r\nthat
    members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise
    have little in common. An interesting scenario\r\nis the formation of an information
    network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris
    paribus, an outsider\r\nappears who aims to disrupt the information \r\nflow within
    the network\r\nby deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds\r\nto
    this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous\r\nconnections
    model of strategic network formation, with two-way \r\nflow of\r\ninformation
    and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage\r\ncosts, the external
    threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive\r\ncommon enemy effect.
    For very high but not prohibitively high linkage\r\ncosts, the equilibrium network
    can be minimally connected and efficient\r\nin the absence of the external threat
    whereas it is always empty and ineffi\fcient in the presence of the external threat,
    a negative common enemy\r\neffect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected
    networks and the\r\nempty network are Nash for certain cost ranges.@eng"
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Britta
      foaf_name: Hoyer, Britta
      foaf_surname: Hoyer
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=42447
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Hans
      foaf_name: Haller, Hans
      foaf_surname: Haller
  bibo_doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011
  bibo_volume: 162
  dct_date: 2019^xs_gYear
  dct_language: eng
  dct_title: The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption@
...