{"volume":162,"author":[{"id":"42447","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","last_name":"Hoyer","first_name":"Britta"},{"first_name":"Hans","full_name":"Haller, Hans","last_name":"Haller"}],"citation":{"ama":"Hoyer B, Haller H. The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>. 2019;162:146-163. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011\">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011</a>","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_Haller_2019, title={The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption}, volume={162}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011\">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011</a>}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}, year={2019}, pages={146–163} }","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption.” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i> 162 (2019): 146–63. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011</a>.","ieee":"B. Hoyer and H. Haller, “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption,” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, vol. 162, pp. 146–163, 2019.","apa":"Hoyer, B., &#38; Haller, H. (2019). The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, <i>162</i>, 146–163. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011</a>","short":"B. Hoyer, H. Haller, Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization 162 (2019) 146–163.","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption.” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior &#38; Organization</i>, vol. 162, 2019, pp. 146–63, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011\">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011</a>."},"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:55:36Z","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268119300824"}],"user_id":"477","date_created":"2018-04-06T07:59:01Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption","status":"public","publication_status":"published","abstract":[{"text":"Social psychology studies the \"common enemy effect\", the phenomenon\r\nthat members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario\r\nis the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider\r\nappears who aims to disrupt the information \r\nflow within the network\r\nby deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds\r\nto this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous\r\nconnections model of strategic network formation, with two-way \r\nflow of\r\ninformation and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage\r\ncosts, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive\r\ncommon enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage\r\ncosts, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient\r\nin the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi\fcient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy\r\neffect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the\r\nempty network are Nash for certain cost ranges.","lang":"eng"}],"year":"2019","page":"146-163","type":"journal_article","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011","_id":"2256","intvolume":"       162"}