{"user_id":"65453","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_created":"2018-04-26T10:10:58Z","has_accepted_license":"1","file":[{"content_type":"application/pdf","relation":"main_file","file_name":"Bidding_for_Envy_Freeness.pdf","date_updated":"2018-11-07T12:09:41Z","access_level":"closed","file_id":"5412","file_size":199847,"creator":"stela","success":1,"date_created":"2018-11-07T12:09:41Z"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:56:42Z","publication":"Social Choice and Welfare","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"volume":19,"author":[{"last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"20801","first_name":"Claus-Jochen"},{"full_name":"Raith, Matthias","last_name":"Raith","first_name":"Matthias"},{"last_name":"Su","full_name":"Su, Francis Edward","first_name":"Francis Edward"}],"citation":{"mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “Bidding for Envy-Freeness: A Procedural Approach to n-Player Fair-Division Problems.” Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19, no. 4, Springer, 2002, pp. 723–49.","short":"C.-J. Haake, M. Raith, F.E. Su, Social Choice and Welfare 19 (2002) 723–749.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., Raith, M., & Su, F. E. (2002). Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems. Social Choice and Welfare, 19(4), 723–749.","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Raith_Su_2002, title={Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems}, volume={19}, number={4}, journal={Social Choice and Welfare}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Raith, Matthias and Su, Francis Edward}, year={2002}, pages={723–749} }","ama":"Haake C-J, Raith M, Su FE. Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems. Social Choice and Welfare. 2002;19(4):723-749.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake, M. Raith, and F. E. Su, “Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems,” Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 723–749, 2002.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, Matthias Raith, and Francis Edward Su. “Bidding for Envy-Freeness: A Procedural Approach to n-Player Fair-Division Problems.” Social Choice and Welfare 19, no. 4 (2002): 723–49."},"_id":"2497","ddc":["040"],"intvolume":" 19","year":"2002","page":"723-749","type":"journal_article","issue":"4","file_date_updated":"2018-11-07T12:09:41Z","publisher":"Springer","abstract":[{"text":"We develop a procedure for implementing an efficient and envy-free\r\nallocation of m objects among n individuals with the possibility of monetary\r\nside-payments,assuming that players have quasi–linear utility functions. The\r\nprocedure eliminates envy by compensating envious players. It is fully descriptive\r\nand says explicitly which compensations should be made,and in what\r\norder. Moreover,it is simple enough to be carried out without computer support.\r\nWe formally characterize the properties of the procedure,show how it\r\nestablishes envy-freeness with minimal resources,and demonstrate its application\r\nto a wide class of fair-division problems.","lang":"eng"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0176-1714","1432-217X"]},"title":"Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems","status":"public"}