[{"date_created":"2018-04-26T11:08:41Z","publication_status":"published","user_id":"65453","date_updated":"2019-01-03T13:13:20Z","intvolume":"        11","file":[{"file_id":"5409","file_name":"Dividing by demanding Object division through market procedures.pdf","file_size":300474,"creator":"stela","success":1,"date_created":"2018-11-07T10:42:15Z","relation":"main_file","access_level":"closed","date_updated":"2018-11-07T10:42:15Z","open_access":1,"content_type":"application/pdf"}],"file_date_updated":"2018-11-07T10:42:15Z","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"citation":{"ama":"Haake C-J. DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES. <i>International Game Theory Review</i>. 2009;11(01):15-32. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121\">10.1142/s0219198909002121</a>","apa":"Haake, C.-J. (2009). DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES. <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, <i>11</i>(01), 15–32. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121\">https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121</a>","bibtex":"@article{Haake_2009, title={DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES}, volume={11}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121\">10.1142/s0219198909002121</a>}, number={01}, journal={International Game Theory Review}, publisher={World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2009}, pages={15–32} }","ieee":"C.-J. Haake, “DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES,” <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, vol. 11, no. 01, pp. 15–32, 2009.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen. “DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES.” <i>International Game Theory Review</i> 11, no. 01 (2009): 15–32. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121\">https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121</a>.","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen. “DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES.” <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, vol. 11, no. 01, World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt, 2009, pp. 15–32, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121\">10.1142/s0219198909002121</a>.","short":"C.-J. Haake, International Game Theory Review 11 (2009) 15–32."},"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"status":"public","doi":"10.1142/s0219198909002121","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among\r\nthemselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the\r\nspecifications, this procedure serves to achieve bargaining solutions such as the discrete\r\nRaiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The\r\nlatter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is\r\nreadily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential."}],"volume":11,"publication":"International Game Theory Review","title":"DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES","issue":"01","ddc":["040"],"_id":"2531","accept":"1","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0219-1989","1793-6675"]},"year":"2009","publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","page":"15-32","type":"journal_article","author":[{"first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"}],"jel":["C73","C62","D51","D63"]}]