---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - In this work, we present the first scalable distributed information system, that
    is, a system with low storage overhead, that is provably robust against denial-of-service
    (DoS) attacks by a current insider. We allow a current insider to have complete
    knowledge about the information system and to have the power to block any ϵ-fraction
    of its servers by a DoS attack, where ϵ can be chosen up to a constant. The task
    of the system is to serve any collection of lookup requests with at most one per
    nonblocked server in an efficient way despite this attack. Previously, scalable
    solutions were only known for DoS attacks of past insiders, where a past insider
    only has complete knowledge about some past time point t0 of the information system.
    Scheideler et al. [Awerbuch and Scheideler 2007; Baumgart et al. 2009] showed
    that in this case, it is possible to design an information system so that any
    information that was inserted or last updated after t0 is safe against a DoS attack.
    But their constructions would not work at all for a current insider. The key idea
    behind our IRIS system is to make extensive use of coding. More precisely, we
    present two alternative distributed coding strategies with an at most logarithmic
    storage overhead that can handle up to a constant fraction of blocked servers.@eng
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Martina
      foaf_name: Eikel, Martina
      foaf_surname: Eikel
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Christian
      foaf_name: Scheideler, Christian
      foaf_surname: Scheideler
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=20792
  bibo_doi: 10.1145/2809806
  bibo_issue: '3'
  dct_date: 2015^xs_gYear
  dct_publisher: ACM@
  dct_title: 'IRIS: A Robust Information System Against Insider DoS Attacks@'
...