{"_id":"29316","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2021","author":[{"full_name":"Hippert, Benjamin","last_name":"Hippert","first_name":"Benjamin"},{"id":"36049","first_name":"André","orcid":"https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8058-8857","last_name":"Uhde","full_name":"Uhde, André"},{"full_name":"Wengerek, Sascha Tobias","last_name":"Wengerek","first_name":"Sascha Tobias"}],"status":"public","date_updated":"2024-04-17T13:36:05Z","title":"Risk allocation through securitization - Evidence from non-performing loans","date_created":"2022-01-13T11:19:28Z","type":"working_paper","jel":["G21","G28","G32"],"citation":{"mla":"Hippert, Benjamin, et al. <i>Risk Allocation through Securitization - Evidence from Non-Performing Loans</i>. 2021.","apa":"Hippert, B., Uhde, A., &#38; Wengerek, S. T. (2021). <i>Risk allocation through securitization - Evidence from non-performing loans</i>.","ieee":"B. Hippert, A. Uhde, and S. T. Wengerek, <i>Risk allocation through securitization - Evidence from non-performing loans</i>. 2021.","short":"B. Hippert, A. Uhde, S.T. Wengerek, Risk Allocation through Securitization - Evidence from Non-Performing Loans, 2021.","chicago":"Hippert, Benjamin, André Uhde, and Sascha Tobias Wengerek. <i>Risk Allocation through Securitization - Evidence from Non-Performing Loans</i>, 2021.","bibtex":"@book{Hippert_Uhde_Wengerek_2021, title={Risk allocation through securitization - Evidence from non-performing loans}, author={Hippert, Benjamin and Uhde, André and Wengerek, Sascha Tobias}, year={2021} }","ama":"Hippert B, Uhde A, Wengerek ST. <i>Risk Allocation through Securitization - Evidence from Non-Performing Loans</i>.; 2021."},"user_id":"36049","department":[{"_id":"186"}],"keyword":["European Banking","Non-performing Loans","Risk Allocation","Securitization"],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Employing a unique and hand-collected dataset of securitization transactions by European banks, this paper analyzes the relationship between true sale loan securitization and the issuing banks’ non-performing loans to total assets ratios (NPLRs). We provide evidence for an NPLR-reducing effect during the boom phase of securitizations suggesting that banks (partly) securitized NPLs as the most risky junior tranche. In contrast, we find the reverse effect during the crises period indicating that issuing banks demonstrated `skin in the game'. A variety of sensitivity analyses provides further important implications for the vital debate on reducing NPL exposures and regulating securitization markets."}]}