--- res: bibo_abstract: - "We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying\r\nthe standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).\r\nWe show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two\r\none-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution\r\nof the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of\r\nIndependence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type\r\nof decomposability. \ This result has significant implications for actual\r\nnegotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining\r\nproblem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world\r\nnegotiations.@eng" bibo_authorlist: - foaf_Person: foaf_givenName: Claus-Jochen foaf_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen foaf_surname: Haake foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=20801 - foaf_Person: foaf_givenName: Thorsten foaf_name: Upmann, Thorsten foaf_surname: Upmann - foaf_Person: foaf_givenName: Papatya foaf_name: Duman, Papatya foaf_surname: Duman foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=72752 bibo_doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518 bibo_issue: '2' bibo_volume: 125 dct_date: 2022^xs_gYear dct_isPartOf: - http://id.crossref.org/issn/0347-0520 dct_language: eng dct_publisher: Wiley@ dct_subject: - Labour market negotiations - efficient bargains - Nash bargaining solution - sequential bargaining - restricted bargaining games dct_title: 'Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining@' ...