The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician's Prescription Decision - An Experiment Hilleringmann, Vanessa Corruption Reciprocity Physician-Patient Relationship Focusing on a physician's relationship to a briber and a patient, this experiment analyzes the influence of a bribe on a physician's treatment decision. We conduct a partner treatment, in which briber and physician play together for the whole experiment and a stranger treament, where briber and physician are re-matched every period. With the help of the two treatments, we vary the relative reciprocity between the physician and the two other actors, briber and patient. Additionally we use a follow up questionnaire to measure the behavioral motivation of the participants. We find that reciprocity leads to bribery relationships: In the partner treatment physicians act corruptly more often. Just the variation of the relative reciprocity between the treatments shows differences in the behavior of the subjects. Differences in the participants' preferences deliver no explanation for their behavior in our experiment. CIE Working Paper Series 2018 info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper doc-type:workingPaper text http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 https://ris.uni-paderborn.de/record/3101 Hilleringmann V. <i>The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment</i>. CIE Working Paper Series; 2018. info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess