{"type":"working_paper","publication_identifier":{"issn":["1556-5068"]},"date_created":"2023-01-02T10:14:34Z","date_updated":"2023-01-12T09:03:18Z","publication_status":"published","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3564451","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"author":[{"last_name":"Ebert","full_name":"Ebert, Michael","first_name":"Michael","id":"42419"},{"first_name":"Joseph (Jay) B.","full_name":"Kadane, Joseph (Jay) B.","last_name":"Kadane"},{"last_name":"Simons","full_name":"Simons, Dirk","first_name":"Dirk"},{"first_name":"Jack Douglas","full_name":"Stecher, Jack Douglas","last_name":"Stecher"}],"status":"public","department":[{"_id":"186"},{"_id":"190"},{"_id":"635"}],"user_id":"42419","year":"2020","citation":{"apa":"Ebert, M., Kadane, J. (Jay) B., Simons, D., & Stecher, J. D. (2020). Information Design in Coordination Games with Risk Dominant Equilibrium Selection. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3564451","chicago":"Ebert, Michael, Joseph (Jay) B. Kadane, Dirk Simons, and Jack Douglas Stecher. Information Design in Coordination Games with Risk Dominant Equilibrium Selection, 2020. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3564451.","short":"M. Ebert, J. (Jay) B. Kadane, D. Simons, J.D. Stecher, Information Design in Coordination Games with Risk Dominant Equilibrium Selection, 2020.","ama":"Ebert M, Kadane J (Jay) B, Simons D, Stecher JD. Information Design in Coordination Games with Risk Dominant Equilibrium Selection.; 2020. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3564451","bibtex":"@book{Ebert_Kadane_Simons_Stecher_2020, title={Information Design in Coordination Games with Risk Dominant Equilibrium Selection}, DOI={10.2139/ssrn.3564451}, author={Ebert, Michael and Kadane, Joseph (Jay) B. and Simons, Dirk and Stecher, Jack Douglas}, year={2020} }","ieee":"M. Ebert, J. (Jay) B. Kadane, D. Simons, and J. D. Stecher, Information Design in Coordination Games with Risk Dominant Equilibrium Selection. 2020.","mla":"Ebert, Michael, et al. Information Design in Coordination Games with Risk Dominant Equilibrium Selection. 2020, doi:10.2139/ssrn.3564451."},"title":"Information Design in Coordination Games with Risk Dominant Equilibrium Selection","_id":"35089"}