Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service Künsemöller, Jörn Brangewitz, Sonja Karl, Holger Haake, Claus-Jochen ddc:004 This paper explores how cloud provider competition influences instance pricing in an IaaS (Infrastructure-as-a-Service) market. When reserved instance pricing includes an on-demand price component in addition to a reservation fee (two-part tariffs), different providers might offer different price combinations, where the client’s choice depends on its load profile. We investigate a duopoly of providers and analyze stable market prices in two-part tariffs. Further, we study offers that allow a specified amount of included usage (three-part tariffs). Neither two-part nor three-part tariffs produce an equilibrium market outcome other than a service pricing that equals production cost, i.e., complex price structures do not significantly affect the results from ordinary Bertrand competition. 2014 info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject doc-type:conferenceObject text http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794 https://ris.uni-paderborn.de/record/382 Künsemöller J, Brangewitz S, Karl H, Haake C-J. Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service. In: <i>Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC)</i>. ; 2014:203-210. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/SCC.2014.35">10.1109/SCC.2014.35</a> eng info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1109/SCC.2014.35 info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess