{"title":"The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market","date_updated":"2023-04-20T17:15:48Z","user_id":"37339","type":"report","page":"43","author":[{"full_name":"Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede","last_name":"Endres-Fröhlich","first_name":"Angelika Elfriede","id":"48794"},{"full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","first_name":"Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","id":"37339"},{"first_name":"Joachim","last_name":"Heinzel","full_name":"Heinzel, Joachim"}],"status":"public","date_created":"2023-04-20T16:21:28Z","_id":"44091","jel":["D43","L13","L42"],"year":"2022","citation":{"bibtex":"@book{Endres-Fröhlich_Hehenkamp_Heinzel, title={The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market}, author={Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Heinzel, Joachim} }","mla":"Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede, et al. <i>The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market</i>.","chicago":"Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede, Burkhard Hehenkamp, and Joachim Heinzel. <i>The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market</i>, n.d.","short":"A.E. Endres-Fröhlich, B. Hehenkamp, J. Heinzel, The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market, n.d.","ieee":"A. E. Endres-Fröhlich, B. Hehenkamp, and J. Heinzel, <i>The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market</i>. .","apa":"Endres-Fröhlich, A. E., Hehenkamp, B., &#38; Heinzel, J. (n.d.). <i>The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market</i>.","ama":"Endres-Fröhlich AE, Hehenkamp B, Heinzel J. <i>The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market</i>."},"abstract":[{"text":"We study the effects of product differentiation on the bundling incentives of a two-product retailer. Two monopolistic manufacturers each produce a differentiated good. One sells it to both retailers, while the other only supplies a single retailer. Retailers compete in prices. Retail bundling is profitable when the goods are close substitutes. Only then is competition so intense that the retailer uses bundling to relax competition both within and across product markets, despite an aggravation of the double marginalization problem. Our asymmetric market structure arises endogenously for the case of close substitutes. In this case, bundling reduces social welfare.","lang":"eng"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"keyword":["Retail bundling","upstream market power","double marginalization","product differentiation"],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901: SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"publication_status":"draft"}