TY - CONF
AB - We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibriain social context congestion games. For any given set of allowed costfunctions F, we provide a threshold value μ(F), and show that for theclass of social context congestion games with cost functions from F, α-Nash dynamics are guaranteed to converge to α-approximate pure Nashequilibrium if and only if α > μ(F).Interestingly, μ(F) is related and always upper bounded by Roughgarden’sanarchy value [19].
AU - Gairing, Martin
AU - Kotsialou, Grammateia
AU - Skopalik, Alexander
ID - 456
T2 - Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)
TI - Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games
ER -