---
res:
bibo_abstract:
- " In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to\r\n determine
an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the\r\n upstream
division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)\r\n revenues
are supposed to be private information, we formally consider\r\n cooperative
bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means\r\n that the two
divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by\r\n mechanisms
that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive\r\n compatibility and/or
ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for\r\n buyer and seller each,
we first establish that the bargaining problem is\r\n regular, regardless whether
or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints\r\n are imposed. This allows us
to apply the generalized Nash bargaining\r\n solution to determine fair transfer
payments and transfer\r\n quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining
solution tries to\r\n balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints
are still in\r\n place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore,
by\r\n means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution\r\n
\ for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with\r\n
\ the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a\r\n tradeoff
between ex post efficiency and fairness.\r\n@eng"
bibo_authorlist:
- foaf_Person:
foaf_givenName: Claus-Jochen
foaf_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
foaf_surname: Haake
foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=20801
- foaf_Person:
foaf_givenName: Sonja
foaf_name: Recker, Sonja
foaf_surname: Recker
bibo_doi: 10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
bibo_issue: '6'
bibo_volume: 27
dct_date: 2018^xs_gYear
dct_language: eng
dct_publisher: Springer@
dct_title: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations
under Incomplete Information@
...