{"date_created":"2018-10-10T11:46:19Z","ddc":["330"],"status":"public","page":"1366-1370","user_id":"18949","intvolume":"        27","has_accepted_license":"1","department":[{"_id":"183"}],"title":"Ancillary market signaling: A two-stage model of economic reputation on ancillary market success","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:15Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"8","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4"},{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"}],"publication":"Applied Economics Letters","volume":27,"file_date_updated":"2018-11-08T10:18:19Z","type":"journal_article","_id":"4627","doi":"10.1080/13504851.2019.1683136","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"author":[{"id":"18949","full_name":"Kaimann, Daniel","last_name":"Kaimann","first_name":"Daniel"}],"year":"2020","issue":"16","citation":{"ieee":"D. Kaimann, “Ancillary market signaling: A two-stage model of economic reputation on ancillary market success,” <i>Applied Economics Letters</i>, vol. 27, no. 16, pp. 1366–1370, 2020.","mla":"Kaimann, Daniel. “Ancillary Market Signaling: A Two-Stage Model of Economic Reputation on Ancillary Market Success.” <i>Applied Economics Letters</i>, vol. 27, no. 16, 2020, pp. 1366–70, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2019.1683136\">10.1080/13504851.2019.1683136</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Kaimann_2020, title={Ancillary market signaling: A two-stage model of economic reputation on ancillary market success}, volume={27}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2019.1683136\">10.1080/13504851.2019.1683136</a>}, number={16}, journal={Applied Economics Letters}, author={Kaimann, Daniel}, year={2020}, pages={1366–1370} }","apa":"Kaimann, D. (2020). Ancillary market signaling: A two-stage model of economic reputation on ancillary market success. <i>Applied Economics Letters</i>, <i>27</i>(16), 1366–1370. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2019.1683136\">https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2019.1683136</a>","short":"D. Kaimann, Applied Economics Letters 27 (2020) 1366–1370.","ama":"Kaimann D. Ancillary market signaling: A two-stage model of economic reputation on ancillary market success. <i>Applied Economics Letters</i>. 2020;27(16):1366-1370. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2019.1683136\">10.1080/13504851.2019.1683136</a>","chicago":"Kaimann, Daniel. “Ancillary Market Signaling: A Two-Stage Model of Economic Reputation on Ancillary Market Success.” <i>Applied Economics Letters</i> 27, no. 16 (2020): 1366–70. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2019.1683136\">https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2019.1683136</a>."},"file":[{"file_id":"5429","file_name":"AEL_2018_Kaimann.pdf","content_type":"application/pdf","access_level":"closed","file_size":163015,"date_updated":"2018-11-08T10:18:19Z","creator":"dkaimann","relation":"main_file","success":1,"date_created":"2018-11-08T10:18:19Z"}]}