---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - This paper studies the impact of personal and corporate income taxation on capital
    charge rates in a delegation setting with a risk-averse manager. If the investment
    level influences the riskiness of the investment project, the capital charge rate
    deviates from the firm's cost of capital and depends crucially on the manager's
    personal income tax rate. Contradicting conventional wisdom, we find that a higher
    personal income tax rate induces higher investment expenditures and, surprisingly,
    increases the capital charge rate. The countervailing effect that a higher capital
    charge rate induces higher and not lower investment expenditures persists for
    pre-tax and after-tax performance measures as well as when the tax deductibility
    of managerial compensation is limited. Corporate income tax causes a similar effect
    only in the case of limited tax deductibility of compensation. Our insights remain
    valid regardless of the financing structure and the risk attitude of the investors.@eng
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Thomas
      foaf_name: Bauer, Thomas
      foaf_surname: Bauer
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Thomas
      foaf_name: Kourouxous, Thomas
      foaf_surname: Kourouxous
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=66936
  bibo_doi: 10.1080/09638180.2016.1169938
  bibo_issue: '3'
  bibo_volume: 26
  dct_date: 2017^xs_gYear
  dct_isPartOf:
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/0963-8180
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/1468-4497
  dct_language: eng
  dct_publisher: Informa UK Limited@
  dct_title: Capital Charge Rates, Investment Incentives and Taxation@
...