{"publisher":"Cambridge University Press (CUP)","volume":88,"keyword":["History and Philosophy of Science","Philosophy","History"],"type":"journal_article","citation":{"short":"A. Wells, Philosophy of Science 88 (2021) 1137–1148.","bibtex":"@article{Wells_2021, title={Du Châtelet on the Need for Mathematics in Physics}, volume={88}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1086/714874\">10.1086/714874</a>}, number={5}, journal={Philosophy of Science}, publisher={Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, author={Wells, Aaron}, year={2021}, pages={1137–1148} }","ieee":"A. Wells, “Du Châtelet on the Need for Mathematics in Physics,” <i>Philosophy of Science</i>, vol. 88, no. 5, pp. 1137–1148, 2021, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1086/714874\">10.1086/714874</a>.","ama":"Wells A. Du Châtelet on the Need for Mathematics in Physics. <i>Philosophy of Science</i>. 2021;88(5):1137-1148. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1086/714874\">10.1086/714874</a>","mla":"Wells, Aaron. “Du Châtelet on the Need for Mathematics in Physics.” <i>Philosophy of Science</i>, vol. 88, no. 5, Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2021, pp. 1137–48, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1086/714874\">10.1086/714874</a>.","chicago":"Wells, Aaron. “Du Châtelet on the Need for Mathematics in Physics.” <i>Philosophy of Science</i> 88, no. 5 (2021): 1137–48. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1086/714874\">https://doi.org/10.1086/714874</a>.","apa":"Wells, A. (2021). Du Châtelet on the Need for Mathematics in Physics. <i>Philosophy of Science</i>, <i>88</i>(5), 1137–1148. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1086/714874\">https://doi.org/10.1086/714874</a>"},"doi":"10.1086/714874","date_created":"2024-01-29T16:25:15Z","publication_status":"published","_id":"51003","status":"public","author":[{"last_name":"Wells","full_name":"Wells, Aaron","first_name":"Aaron"}],"year":"2021","user_id":"89005","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0031-8248","1539-767X"]},"title":"Du Châtelet on the Need for Mathematics in Physics","publication":"Philosophy of Science","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"<jats:p>There is a tension in Emilie Du Châtelet’s thought on mathematics. The objects of mathematics are ideal or fictional entities; nevertheless, mathematics is presented as indispensable for an account of the physical world. After outlining Du Châtelet’s position, and showing how she departs from Christian Wolff’s pessimism about Newtonian mathematical physics, I show that the tension in her position is only apparent. Du Châtelet has a worked-out defense of the explanatory and epistemic need for mathematical objects, consistent with their metaphysical nonfundamentality. I conclude by sketching how Du Châtelet’s conception of mathematical indispensability differs interestingly from many contemporary approaches.</jats:p>"}],"intvolume":"        88","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"issue":"5","page":"1137-1148","date_updated":"2024-01-29T16:29:18Z"}