[{"user_id":"477","citation":{"short":"S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.","ama":"Brangewitz S, Haake C-J. <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information</i>. Vol 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2013.","mla":"Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information</i>. Vol. 64, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.","apa":"Brangewitz, S., &#38; Haake, C.-J. (2013). <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information</i> (Vol. 64). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","ieee":"S. Brangewitz and C.-J. Haake, <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information</i>, vol. 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.","bibtex":"@book{Brangewitz_Haake_2013, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={64}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2013}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","chicago":"Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information</i>. Vol. 64. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013."},"status":"public","type":"working_paper","year":"2013","accept":"1","keyword":["Transfer Pricing","Negotiation","Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution","Incomplete Information"],"volume":64,"abstract":[{"text":"In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division’s (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine transfer payments and transfer probabilities. Furthermore, we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the existing literature for negotiated transfer pricing under incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the models presented in Wagenhofer (1994).","lang":"eng"}],"date_created":"2018-10-31T09:20:15Z","_id":"5146","intvolume":"        64","ddc":["040"],"file":[{"relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"5148","open_access":1,"creator":"stela","date_updated":"2018-10-31T09:22:19Z","file_name":"WP - Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.pdf","success":1,"file_size":430826,"access_level":"closed","date_created":"2018-10-31T09:22:19Z"}],"author":[{"first_name":"Sonja","last_name":"Brangewitz","full_name":"Brangewitz, Sonja"},{"id":"20801","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"}],"date_updated":"2019-04-11T10:12:50Z","series_title":"Working Papers CIE","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T09:22:19Z","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"title":"Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information"}]