{"issue":"11","publication_status":"published","ddc":["330"],"funded_apc":"1","file":[{"file_name":"Maintaining_vs_Milking.pdf","file_id":"5542","success":1,"file_size":1107189,"creator":"cjhaake","date_created":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","date_updated":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","relation":"main_file","access_level":"closed","content_type":"application/pdf"}],"doi":"10.1371/journal.pone.0207172","article_number":"e0207172","abstract":[{"text":"In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously.\r\nTo prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to\r\nreduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this\r\nstudy we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries\r\nwhen customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,\r\na service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to\r\nevaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is\r\nnot able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous\r\nrating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three\r\nsales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality\r\ndecisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of\r\nreceiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service\r\nprovider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation\r\nbuilding process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental\r\ndesign we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates\r\nfrom optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation\r\nprofile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking\r\nstrategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price\r\nis high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then\r\nhigh quality is chosen until the price increases again.","lang":"eng"}],"has_accepted_license":"1","project":[{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4","_id":"8"},{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"date_created":"2018-11-03T11:51:48Z","file_date_updated":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"publication":"PLoS ONE","type":"journal_article","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:50Z","article_type":"review","author":[{"orcid":"0000-0002-6271-5912","first_name":"Behnud","full_name":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud","last_name":"Mir Djawadi","id":"26032"},{"last_name":"Fahr","id":"111","full_name":"Fahr, Rene","first_name":"Rene"},{"last_name":"Haake","id":"20801","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen"},{"last_name":"Recker","full_name":"Recker, Sonja","first_name":"Sonja"}],"publisher":"Public Library of Science","year":"2018","intvolume":"        13","status":"public","citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Mir Djawadi_Fahr_Haake_Recker_2018, title={Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}, volume={13}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172\">10.1371/journal.pone.0207172</a>}, number={11e0207172}, journal={PLoS ONE}, publisher={Public Library of Science}, author={Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018} }","chicago":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud, Rene Fahr, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Sonja Recker. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” <i>PLoS ONE</i> 13, no. 11 (2018). <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172\">https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172</a>.","short":"B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE 13 (2018).","ama":"Mir Djawadi B, Fahr R, Haake C-J, Recker S. Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. <i>PLoS ONE</i>. 2018;13(11). doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172\">10.1371/journal.pone.0207172</a>","mla":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud, et al. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” <i>PLoS ONE</i>, vol. 13, no. 11, e0207172, Public Library of Science, 2018, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172\">10.1371/journal.pone.0207172</a>.","ieee":"B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, and S. Recker, “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate,” <i>PLoS ONE</i>, vol. 13, no. 11, 2018.","apa":"Mir Djawadi, B., Fahr, R., Haake, C.-J., &#38; Recker, S. (2018). Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. <i>PLoS ONE</i>, <i>13</i>(11). <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172\">https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172</a>"},"user_id":"477","volume":13,"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"publication_identifier":{"eissn":["1932-6203"]},"title":"Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate","_id":"5330"}