@article{56420,
  abstract     = {{There are a number of school choice problems in which students are heterogeneous according to the number of seats they occupy at the school they are assigned to. We propose a weighted school choice problem by assigning each student a so-called weight and formulate the weighted top trading cycles algorithm (WTTC) to find a matching. The WTTC is strategy-proof and results in a Pareto efficient matching. While the WTTC is a robust extension of the TTC when weights are introduced, it is no longer guaranteed that each student gets a seat at a school even if the overall capacity exceeds the sum of weights. Additionally, the WTTC introduces a trade-off between weights and priorities as a student with a higher weight has a disadvantage to be matched to a particular school compared to a student with the same schools’ priorities but a smaller weight.}},
  author       = {{Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}},
  issn         = {{0165-4896}},
  journal      = {{Mathematical Social Sciences}},
  keywords     = {{Matching, School choice, College admission problems, Top trading cycles, Pareto efficiency, Strategy-proofness}},
  pages        = {{49--56}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier BV}},
  title        = {{{Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001}},
  volume       = {{132}},
  year         = {{2024}},
}