{"place":"Cham","user_id":"477","ddc":["000"],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"publication":"Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2018","_id":"5774","title":"Information Flow Certificates","author":[{"full_name":"Töws, Manuel","last_name":"Töws","first_name":"Manuel","id":"11315"},{"first_name":"Heike","id":"573","last_name":"Wehrheim","full_name":"Wehrheim, Heike"}],"has_accepted_license":"1","citation":{"apa":"Töws, M., & Wehrheim, H. (2018). Information Flow Certificates. In Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2018 (pp. 435–454). Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02508-3_23","mla":"Töws, Manuel, and Heike Wehrheim. “Information Flow Certificates.” Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2018, Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 435–54, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-02508-3_23.","ieee":"M. Töws and H. Wehrheim, “Information Flow Certificates,” in Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2018, 2018, pp. 435–454.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Töws_Wehrheim_2018, place={Cham}, title={Information Flow Certificates}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-030-02508-3_23}, booktitle={Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2018}, publisher={Springer International Publishing}, author={Töws, Manuel and Wehrheim, Heike}, year={2018}, pages={435–454} }","chicago":"Töws, Manuel, and Heike Wehrheim. “Information Flow Certificates.” In Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2018, 435–54. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02508-3_23.","ama":"Töws M, Wehrheim H. Information Flow Certificates. In: Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2018. Cham: Springer International Publishing; 2018:435-454. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-02508-3_23","short":"M. Töws, H. Wehrheim, in: Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2018, Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2018, pp. 435–454."},"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:02:40Z","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0302-9743","1611-3349"],"isbn":["9783030025076","9783030025083"]},"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Information flow analysis investigates the flow of data in applications, checking in particular for flows from private sources to public sinks. Flow- and path-sensitive analyses are, however, often too costly to be performed every time a security-critical application is run. In this paper, we propose a variant of proof carrying code for information flow security. To this end, we develop information flow (IF) certificates which get attached to programs as well as a method for IF certificate validation. We prove soundness of our technique, i.e., show it to be tamper-free. The technique is implemented within the program analysis tool CPAchecker. Our experiments confirm that the use of certificates pays off for costly analysis runs."}],"date_created":"2018-11-21T09:51:37Z","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-02508-3_23","department":[{"_id":"77"}],"file_date_updated":"2018-11-26T15:11:32Z","publisher":"Springer International Publishing","file":[{"date_created":"2018-11-26T15:11:32Z","file_id":"5837","success":1,"relation":"main_file","creator":"mtoews","date_updated":"2018-11-26T15:11:32Z","file_name":"Töws-Wehrheim2018_Chapter_InformationFlowCertificates.pdf","content_type":"application/pdf","file_size":518016,"access_level":"closed"}],"year":"2018","page":"435-454","publication_status":"published","status":"public","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area B","_id":"3"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject B4","_id":"12"}],"type":"conference"}