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<titleInfo><title>Information Flow Certificates</title></titleInfo>


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<name type="personal">
  <namePart type="given">Manuel</namePart>
  <namePart type="family">Töws</namePart>
  <role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm> </role><identifier type="local">11315</identifier></name>
<name type="personal">
  <namePart type="given">Heike</namePart>
  <namePart type="family">Wehrheim</namePart>
  <role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm> </role><identifier type="local">573</identifier></name>







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  <namePart>SFB 901</namePart>
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<name type="corporate">
  <namePart>SFB 901 - Project Area B</namePart>
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  <namePart>SFB 901 - Subproject B4</namePart>
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<abstract lang="eng">Information flow analysis investigates the flow of data in applications, checking in particular for flows from private sources to public sinks. Flow- and path-sensitive analyses are, however, often too costly to be performed every time a security-critical application is run. In this paper, we propose a variant of proof carrying code for information flow security. To this end, we develop information flow (IF) certificates which get attached to programs as well as a method for IF certificate validation. We prove soundness of our technique, i.e., show it to be tamper-free. The technique is implemented within the program analysis tool CPAchecker. Our experiments confirm that the use of certificates pays off for costly analysis runs.</abstract>

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<originInfo><publisher>Springer International Publishing</publisher><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2018</dateIssued>
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<relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2018</title></titleInfo>
  <identifier type="issn">0302-9743</identifier>
  <identifier type="issn">1611-3349</identifier>
  <identifier type="isbn">9783030025076</identifier>
  <identifier type="isbn">9783030025083</identifier><identifier type="doi">10.1007/978-3-030-02508-3_23</identifier>
<part><extent unit="pages">435-454</extent>
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<chicago>Töws, Manuel, and Heike Wehrheim. “Information Flow Certificates.” In &lt;i&gt;Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2018&lt;/i&gt;, 435–54. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. &lt;a href=&quot;https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02508-3_23&quot;&gt;https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02508-3_23&lt;/a&gt;.</chicago>
<short>M. Töws, H. Wehrheim, in: Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2018, Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2018, pp. 435–454.</short>
<ama>Töws M, Wehrheim H. Information Flow Certificates. In: &lt;i&gt;Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2018&lt;/i&gt;. Cham: Springer International Publishing; 2018:435-454. doi:&lt;a href=&quot;https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02508-3_23&quot;&gt;10.1007/978-3-030-02508-3_23&lt;/a&gt;</ama>
<bibtex>@inproceedings{Töws_Wehrheim_2018, place={Cham}, title={Information Flow Certificates}, DOI={&lt;a href=&quot;https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02508-3_23&quot;&gt;10.1007/978-3-030-02508-3_23&lt;/a&gt;}, booktitle={Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2018}, publisher={Springer International Publishing}, author={Töws, Manuel and Wehrheim, Heike}, year={2018}, pages={435–454} }</bibtex>
<apa>Töws, M., &amp;#38; Wehrheim, H. (2018). Information Flow Certificates. In &lt;i&gt;Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2018&lt;/i&gt; (pp. 435–454). Cham: Springer International Publishing. &lt;a href=&quot;https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02508-3_23&quot;&gt;https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02508-3_23&lt;/a&gt;</apa>
<mla>Töws, Manuel, and Heike Wehrheim. “Information Flow Certificates.” &lt;i&gt;Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2018&lt;/i&gt;, Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 435–54, doi:&lt;a href=&quot;https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02508-3_23&quot;&gt;10.1007/978-3-030-02508-3_23&lt;/a&gt;.</mla>
<ieee>M. Töws and H. Wehrheim, “Information Flow Certificates,” in &lt;i&gt;Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2018&lt;/i&gt;, 2018, pp. 435–454.</ieee>
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