---
_id: '578'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'This paper analyzes the stability of capital tax harmonization agreements
in a stylized model where countries have formed coalitions which set a common
tax rate in order to avoid the inefficient fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
In particular, for a given coalition structure we study to what extend the stability
of tax agreements is affected by the coalitions that have formed. In our set-up,
countries are symmetric, but coalitions can be of arbitrary size. We analyze stability
by means of a repeated game setting employing simple trigger strategies and we
allow a sub-coalition to deviate from the coalitional equilibrium. For a given
form of punishment we are able to rank the stability of different coalition structures
as long as the size of the largest coalition does not change. Our main results
are: (1) singleton regions have the largest incentives to deviate, (2) the stability
of cooperation depends on the degree of cooperative behavior ex-ante.'
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Sarah
full_name: Brockhoff, Sarah
last_name: Brockhoff
citation:
ama: Brangewitz S, Brockhoff S. Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within Repeated
Tax Competition. Universität Paderborn; 2012.
apa: Brangewitz, S., & Brockhoff, S. (2012). Stability of Coalitional Equilibria
within Repeated Tax Competition. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Brangewitz_Brockhoff_2012, title={Stability of Coalitional Equilibria
within Repeated Tax Competition}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Brangewitz,
Sonja and Brockhoff, Sarah}, year={2012} }'
chicago: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Sarah Brockhoff. Stability of Coalitional Equilibria
within Repeated Tax Competition. Universität Paderborn, 2012.
ieee: S. Brangewitz and S. Brockhoff, Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within
Repeated Tax Competition. Universität Paderborn, 2012.
mla: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Sarah Brockhoff. Stability of Coalitional Equilibria
within Repeated Tax Competition. Universität Paderborn, 2012.
short: S. Brangewitz, S. Brockhoff, Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within Repeated
Tax Competition, Universität Paderborn, 2012.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:44Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:40Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-15T09:08:24Z
date_updated: 2018-03-15T09:08:24Z
file_id: '1267'
file_name: 578-WP48Brangewitz.pdf
file_size: 876927
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-15T09:08:24Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within Repeated Tax Competition
type: report
user_id: '477'
year: '2012'
...