---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - "In this paper, we investigate the use of trusted execution environments (TEEs,
    such as Intel's SGX) for an anonymous communication infrastructure over untrusted
    networks.\r\nFor this, we present the general idea of exploiting trusted execution
    environments for the purpose of anonymous communication, including a continuous-time
    security framework that models strong anonymity guarantees in the presence of
    an adversary that observes all network traffic and can adaptively corrupt a constant
    fraction of participating nodes.\r\nIn our framework, a participating node can
    generate a number of unlinkable pseudonyms. Messages are sent from and to pseudonyms,
    allowing both senders and receivers of messages to remain anonymous. We introduce
    a concrete construction, which shows viability of our TEE-based approach to anonymous
    communication. The construction draws from techniques from cryptography and overlay
    networks. \r\nOur techniques are very general and can be used as a basis for future
    constructions with similar goals.@eng"
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Johannes
      foaf_name: Blömer, Johannes
      foaf_surname: Blömer
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=23
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Jan
      foaf_name: Bobolz, Jan
      foaf_surname: Bobolz
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=27207
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Christian
      foaf_name: Scheideler, Christian
      foaf_surname: Scheideler
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=20792
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Alexander
      foaf_name: Setzer, Alexander
      foaf_surname: Setzer
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=11108
  dct_date: 2018^xs_gYear
  dct_language: eng
  dct_title: Provably Anonymous Communication Based on Trusted Execution Environments@
...