@phdthesis{586, abstract = {{FPGAs, systems on chip and embedded systems are nowadays irreplaceable. They combine the computational power of application specific hardware with software-like flexibility. At runtime, they can adjust their functionality by downloading new hardware modules and integrating their functionality. Due to their growing capabilities, the demands made to reconfigurable hardware grow. Their deployment in increasingly security critical scenarios requires new ways of enforcing security since a failure in security has severe consequences. Aside from financial losses, a loss of human life and risks to national security are possible. With this work I present the novel and groundbreaking concept of proof-carrying hardware. It is a method for the verification of properties of hardware modules to guarantee security for a target platform at runtime. The producer of a hardware module delivers based on the consumer's safety policy a safety proof in combination with the reconfiguration bitstream. The extensive computation of a proof is a contrast to the comparatively undemanding checking of the proof. I present a prototype based on open-source tools and an abstract FPGA architecture and bitstream format. The proof of the usability of proof-carrying hardware provides the evaluation of the prototype with the exemplary application of securing combinational and bounded sequential equivalence of reference monitor modules for memory safety.}}, author = {{Drzevitzky, Stephanie}}, pages = {{114}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Proof-Carrying Hardware: A Novel Approach to Reconfigurable Hardware Security}}}, year = {{2012}}, }