{"date_updated":"2025-04-01T11:49:32Z","oa":"1","_id":"59096","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.5186857","year":"2025","series_title":"TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 186","title":"Corporate Tax Planning and Enforcement","type":"working_paper","citation":{"ieee":"D. Dyck, <i>Corporate Tax Planning and Enforcement</i>. 2025.","ama":"Dyck D. <i>Corporate Tax Planning and Enforcement</i>.; 2025. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5186857\">10.2139/ssrn.5186857</a>","mla":"Dyck, Daniel. <i>Corporate Tax Planning and Enforcement</i>. 2025, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5186857\">10.2139/ssrn.5186857</a>.","apa":"Dyck, D. (2025). <i>Corporate Tax Planning and Enforcement</i>. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5186857\">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5186857</a>","chicago":"Dyck, Daniel. <i>Corporate Tax Planning and Enforcement</i>. TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 186, 2025. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5186857\">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5186857</a>.","bibtex":"@book{Dyck_2025, series={TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 186}, title={Corporate Tax Planning and Enforcement}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5186857\">10.2139/ssrn.5186857</a>}, author={Dyck, Daniel}, year={2025}, collection={TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 186} }","short":"D. Dyck, Corporate Tax Planning and Enforcement, 2025."},"status":"public","department":[{"_id":"187"}],"date_created":"2025-03-25T08:51:57Z","author":[{"full_name":"Dyck, Daniel","id":"83379","first_name":"Daniel","last_name":"Dyck"}],"user_id":"74000","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"main_file_link":[{"open_access":"1"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"This study investigates how strategic interactions between corporate tax planning and tax enforcement are affected by two policy instruments: strengthening tax enforcement by increasing the number of specialized enforcement staff and improving tax audit technologies. I employ an economic model with a board of director's investment in a Tax Control Framework (TCF) and a tax manager's tax planning effort jointly shaping corporate tax planning and a tax auditor's technology-based audit decision. I show that the board only invests in the TCF when the enforcement environment is sufficiently strict, because it trades-off the costs and benefits of tax planning. Since strengthening tax enforcement decreases tax planning effort, the result can be less investment in a TCF in a strict enforcement environment, implying that TCF investment and enforcement can be strategic substitutes. Strikingly, I identify conditions under which improvements in tax audit technology increase corporate tax planning and impair tax audit efficiency, due to a crowding-out of audit incentives. This result contradicts the view that improving audit technologies is universally effective, particularly in tax authorities with adequate staffing."}]}