@techreport{59518,
  abstract     = {{The two-step norm elicitation procedure describes a commonly used tool for measuring normative
expectations in an incentivized way. This study tests some of its design features to determine whether
elicited beliefs and related behaviours vary depending on i) the time of elicitation (before vs after the
decision), ii) incentivizing vs not incentivizing a question about normative expectations, and iii)
questioning subjects on their beliefs about the action of interest alone or combined with an alternative
action. An online experiment is conducted via Prolific comprising a dictator game and the elicitation of
fairness beliefs. A pretest reveals that applying role uncertainty does not alter beliefs and behaviours
compared to a baseline treatment without it. Subsequently, three treatments are implemented. Contrary
to previous studies, results indicate that varying the time of elicitation does not significantly alter the
money-share decision. However, incentivizing the question about normative expectations significantly
increases the fit with the actual majority norm. Finally, asking about a fair share and an unfair share
instead of only about fair sharing does not alter personal normative beliefs or normative expectations,
but it increases the empirical expectations that other dictators have provided a fair share.}},
  author       = {{Plaß, Sabrina}},
  keywords     = {{Social Norms, Normative Expectations, Elicitation, Economic Experiment}},
  title        = {{{Variations in the Two-Step Norm Elicitation Procedure}}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}