---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - 'In many scientific approaches, especially in those that try to foster explainability
    of Artificial Intelligences, a narrow conception of explaining prevails. This
    narrow conception implies that explaining is a one-directional action in which
    knowledge is transferred from the explainer to an addressee. By studying the amount
    of agency in metaphors for explaining in scientific texts, we want to find out
    – or at least to contribute a partial answer to the question – why this narrow
    conception is so dominant. For our analysis, we use a linguistic conception of
    agency, transitivity. This concept allows to specify the degree of agency or effectiveness
    of the action in a verbalised event. It is defined by several component parts.
    We detail and discuss both the parameters of and global transitivity. Overall,
    transitivity of explaining metaphors has a rather common pattern across metaphors.
    Agency is not high and reduced in characteristic aspects: The metaphors imply
    that the object of explaining is static, i.e., is not changed within the explanation,
    and that explaining is the activity of one person only. This pattern may account
    for the narrow conception of explaining. It contrasts strongly with current co-constructive
    or sociotechnical approaches to explainability.@eng'
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Ingrid
      foaf_name: Scharlau, Ingrid
      foaf_surname: Scharlau
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=451
    orcid: 0000-0003-2364-9489
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Katharina J.
      foaf_name: Rohlfing, Katharina J.
      foaf_surname: Rohlfing
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=50352
    orcid: 0000-0002-5676-8233
  dct_date: 2025^xs_gYear
  dct_language: eng
  dct_publisher: Center for Open Science@
  dct_title: 'Agency in metaphors of explaining: An analysis of scientific texts@'
...