{"ddc":["330"],"user_id":"477","volume":118,"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series","_id":"7630","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","jel":["D82","I11","L15"],"place":"Paderborn University","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"report_number":"2019-01","file_date_updated":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","citation":{"bibtex":"@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, series={CIE Working Paper Series}, title={Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}, volume={118}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019}, collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }","ama":"Heinzel JMJ. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i>. Vol 118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.","mla":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i>. Vol. 118, CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","short":"J.M.J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","chicago":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i>. Vol. 118. CIE Working Paper Series. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","ieee":"J. M. J. Heinzel, <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i>, vol. 118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","apa":"Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). <i>Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts</i> (Vol. 118). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series."},"series_title":"CIE Working Paper Series","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:03:42Z","intvolume":"       118","year":"2019","title":"Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts","author":[{"id":"53445","last_name":"Heinzel","first_name":"Joachim Maria Josef","full_name":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef"}],"type":"report","keyword":["credence goods","treatment efficiency","heterogeneous experts","overcharging"],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"file":[{"date_created":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","creator":"jheinzel","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"7631","access_level":"closed","file_size":286367,"file_name":"WP118.pdf","date_updated":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","relation":"main_file"}],"date_created":"2019-02-12T08:18:02Z","abstract":[{"text":"In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud.","lang":"eng"}]}