Approximate Equilibria in Games with Few Players

P. Briest, P.W. Goldberg, H. Roeglin, Approximate Equilibria in Games with Few Players, 2008.

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We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria (epsilon-Nash equilibria) in normal form games, where the number of players is a small constant. We consider the approach of looking for solutions with constant support size. It is known from recent work that in the 2-player case, a 1/2-Nash equilibrium can be easily found, but in general one cannot achieve a smaller value of epsilon than 1/2. In this paper we extend those results to the k-player case, and find that epsilon = 1-1/k is feasible, but cannot be improved upon. We show how stronger results for the 2-player case may be used in order to slightly improve upon the epsilon = 1-1/k obtained in the k-player case.
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Briest P, Goldberg PW, Roeglin H. Approximate Equilibria in Games with Few Players.; 2008.
Briest, P., Goldberg, P. W., & Roeglin, H. (2008). Approximate Equilibria in Games with Few Players.
@book{Briest_Goldberg_Roeglin_2008, title={Approximate Equilibria in Games with Few Players}, author={Briest, Patrick and Goldberg, Paul W. and Roeglin, Heiko}, year={2008} }
Briest, Patrick, Paul W. Goldberg, and Heiko Roeglin. Approximate Equilibria in Games with Few Players, 2008.
P. Briest, P. W. Goldberg, and H. Roeglin, Approximate Equilibria in Games with Few Players. 2008.
Briest, Patrick, et al. Approximate Equilibria in Games with Few Players. 2008.

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arXiv 0804.4524

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