Tax Avoidance and Social Control

M. Diller, J. Lorenz, D. Meier, in: J.S. Neufeld, U. Buscher, R. Lasch, D. Möst, J. Schönberger (Eds.), Operations Research Proceedings 2019, Springer, 2020, pp. 633–639.

Download
No fulltext has been uploaded.
Book Chapter | English
Author
; ;
Book Editor
; ; ; ;
Abstract
This study presents a model in which heterogenous, risk-averse agents can use either (legal) tax optimisation or (illegal) tax evasion to reduce their tax burden and thus increase their utility. In addition to introducing individual variables like risk aversion or income, we allow agents to observe the behaviour of their neighbours. Depending on the behaviour of their peer group’s members, the agents’ utilities may increase or decrease, respectively. Simulation results show that taxpayers favour illegal evasion over legal optimisation in most cases. We find that interactions between taxpayers and their social networks have a deep impact on aggregate behaviour. Parameter changes such as increasing audit rates affect the results, often being intensified by social interactions. The effect of such changes varies depending on whether or not a fraction of agents is considered inherently honest.
Publishing Year
Book Title
Operations Research Proceedings 2019
Page
633-639
LibreCat-ID

Cite this

Diller M, Lorenz J, Meier D. Tax Avoidance and Social Control. In: Neufeld JS, Buscher U, Lasch R, Möst D, Schönberger J, eds. Operations Research Proceedings 2019. Springer; 2020:633-639. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77
Diller, M., Lorenz, J., & Meier, D. (2020). Tax Avoidance and Social Control. In J. S. Neufeld, U. Buscher, R. Lasch, D. Möst, & J. Schönberger (Eds.), Operations Research Proceedings 2019 (pp. 633–639). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77
@inbook{Diller_Lorenz_Meier_2020, title={Tax Avoidance and Social Control}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77}, booktitle={ Operations Research Proceedings 2019}, publisher={Springer}, author={Diller, Markus and Lorenz, Johannes and Meier, David}, editor={Neufeld, Janis S. and Buscher, Udo and Lasch, Rainer and Möst, Dominik and Schönberger, JörnEditors}, year={2020}, pages={633–639} }
Diller, Markus, Johannes Lorenz, and David Meier. “Tax Avoidance and Social Control.” In Operations Research Proceedings 2019, edited by Janis S. Neufeld, Udo Buscher, Rainer Lasch, Dominik Möst, and Jörn Schönberger, 633–39. Springer, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77.
M. Diller, J. Lorenz, and D. Meier, “Tax Avoidance and Social Control,” in Operations Research Proceedings 2019, J. S. Neufeld, U. Buscher, R. Lasch, D. Möst, and J. Schönberger, Eds. Springer, 2020, pp. 633–639.
Diller, Markus, et al. “Tax Avoidance and Social Control.” Operations Research Proceedings 2019, edited by Janis S. Neufeld et al., Springer, 2020, pp. 633–39, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77.

Export

Marked Publications

Open Data LibreCat

Search this title in

Google Scholar
ISBN Search