Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules in international climate negotiations: an empirical analysis

M. Kesternich, A. Löschel, A. Ziegler, Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 23 (2020) 309–331.

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Journal Article | Published | English
Author
Kesternich, MartinLibreCat; Löschel, Andreas; Ziegler, Andreas
Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>We have collected data from a world-wide survey among COP delegates to empirically investigate preferences for certain burden sharing rules among key groups in a setting that reflects the possibility of observing concessions from negotiating partners. In our survey, the participants had the opportunity to select and combine up to eight (pre-defined) burden sharing rules and to assign relative weights to the selected rules in their preferred bundle. We examine whether such a mechanism helps to overcome the currently strictly (self-interested) strategic claims on equity in the negotiation process. We observe that delegates from different groups of countries show a general willingness for concessions. However, the degree to which different burden sharing rules are taken into consideration partly differs between countries. As a key insight we report that the individual assessment of the polluter-pays rule based on current emissions does not only stress the persistence of the traditional Annex-B/Non-Annex-B division but also suggests tendencies for a more fragmented grouping with different positions between, for example, delegates from developing countries (i.e. G77 members) and emerging countries (i.e. BASIC). At the same time, we observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.</jats:p>
Publishing Year
Journal Title
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies
Volume
23
Issue
2
Page
309-331
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Kesternich M, Löschel A, Ziegler A. Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules in international climate negotiations: an empirical analysis. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies. 2020;23(2):309-331. doi:10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0
Kesternich, M., Löschel, A., & Ziegler, A. (2020). Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules in international climate negotiations: an empirical analysis. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 23(2), 309–331. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0
@article{Kesternich_Löschel_Ziegler_2020, title={Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules in international climate negotiations: an empirical analysis}, volume={23}, DOI={10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0}, number={2}, journal={Environmental Economics and Policy Studies}, publisher={Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, author={Kesternich, Martin and Löschel, Andreas and Ziegler, Andreas}, year={2020}, pages={309–331} }
Kesternich, Martin, Andreas Löschel, and Andreas Ziegler. “Negotiating Weights for Burden Sharing Rules in International Climate Negotiations: An Empirical Analysis.” Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 23, no. 2 (2020): 309–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0.
M. Kesternich, A. Löschel, and A. Ziegler, “Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules in international climate negotiations: an empirical analysis,” Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 309–331, 2020, doi: 10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0.
Kesternich, Martin, et al. “Negotiating Weights for Burden Sharing Rules in International Climate Negotiations: An Empirical Analysis.” Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, vol. 23, no. 2, Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2020, pp. 309–31, doi:10.1007/s10018-020-00289-0.

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