A Bitstream-Level Proof-Carrying Hardware Technique for Information Flow Tracking

M. Keerthipati, A Bitstream-Level Proof-Carrying Hardware Technique for Information Flow Tracking, Universität Paderborn, 2019.

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Mastersthesis | English
Author
Keerthipati, Monica
Abstract
Secure hardware design is the most important aspect to be considered in addition to functional correctness. Achieving hardware security in today’s globalized Integrated Cir- cuit(IC) supply chain is a challenging task. One solution that is widely considered to help achieve secure hardware designs is Information Flow Tracking(IFT). It provides an ap- proach to verify that the systems adhere to security properties either by static verification during design phase or dynamic checking during runtime. Proof-Carrying Hardware(PCH) is an approach to verify a functional design prior to using it in hardware. It is a two-party verification approach, where the target party, the consumer requests new functionalities with pre-defined properties to the producer. In response, the producer designs the IP (Intellectual Property) cores with the requested functionalities that adhere to the consumer-defined properties. The producer provides the IP cores and a proof certificate combined into a proof-carrying bitstream to the consumer to verify it. If the verification is successful, the consumer can use the IP cores in his hardware. In essence, the consumer can only run verified IP cores. Correctly applied, PCH techniques can help consumers to defend against many unintentional modifications and malicious alterations of the modules they receive. There are numerous published examples of how to use PCH to detect any change in the functionality of a circuit, i.e., pairing a PCH approach with functional equivalence checking for combinational or sequential circuits. For non-functional properties, since opening new covert channels to leak secret information from secure circuits is a viable attack vector for hardware trojans, i.e., intentionally added malicious circuitry, IFT technique is employed to make sure that secret/untrusted information never reaches any unclassified/trusted outputs. This master thesis aims to explore the possibility of adapting Information Flow Tracking into a Proof-Carrying Hardware scenario. It aims to create a method that combines Infor- mation Flow Tracking(IFT) with a PCH approach at bitstream level enabling consumers to validate the trustworthiness of a module’s information flow without the computational costs of a complete flow analysis.
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Keerthipati M. A Bitstream-Level Proof-Carrying Hardware Technique for Information Flow Tracking. Universität Paderborn; 2019.
Keerthipati, M. (2019). A Bitstream-Level Proof-Carrying Hardware Technique for Information Flow Tracking. Universität Paderborn.
@book{Keerthipati_2019, title={A Bitstream-Level Proof-Carrying Hardware Technique for Information Flow Tracking}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Keerthipati, Monica}, year={2019} }
Keerthipati, Monica. A Bitstream-Level Proof-Carrying Hardware Technique for Information Flow Tracking. Universität Paderborn, 2019.
M. Keerthipati, A Bitstream-Level Proof-Carrying Hardware Technique for Information Flow Tracking. Universität Paderborn, 2019.
Keerthipati, Monica. A Bitstream-Level Proof-Carrying Hardware Technique for Information Flow Tracking. Universität Paderborn, 2019.

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