Too Complex to Cooperate? Tax Complexity and Cooperative Compliance
A. Schipp, Too Complex to Cooperate? Tax Complexity and Cooperative Compliance, 2024.
Download (ext.)
Working Paper
| English
Author
Abstract
This study investigates whether, how, and under what conditions the expected positive association between cooperative compliance programs and tax compliance is attenuated by tax complexity. Many countries have implemented cooperative compliance programs to improve compliance, however, the effectiveness of these programs varies across countries. I expect and find that the complexity of a country's tax system might impair the compliance-enhancing impact of cooperative compliance programs. Using cross-country data of 57 countries, I find that cooperative compliance programs generally promote compliance, except in countries with highly complex tax codes. Moreover, these programs are positively associated with tax compliance even if tax procedures, such as tax filing and payment or tax audits, are highly complex. My findings suggest that cooperative compliance programs can compensate for mistrust caused by complex tax procedures and enhance compliance. However, they may not be effective tools to enhance compliance in complex tax codes.
Publishing Year
Series Title / Volume
TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 152
LibreCat-ID
Cite this
Schipp A. Too Complex to Cooperate? Tax Complexity and Cooperative Compliance.; 2024. doi:https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4934559
Schipp, A. (2024). Too Complex to Cooperate? Tax Complexity and Cooperative Compliance. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4934559
@book{Schipp_2024, series={TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 152}, title={Too Complex to Cooperate? Tax Complexity and Cooperative Compliance}, DOI={https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4934559}, author={Schipp, Adrian}, year={2024}, collection={TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 152} }
Schipp, Adrian. Too Complex to Cooperate? Tax Complexity and Cooperative Compliance. TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 152, 2024. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4934559.
A. Schipp, Too Complex to Cooperate? Tax Complexity and Cooperative Compliance. 2024.
Schipp, Adrian. Too Complex to Cooperate? Tax Complexity and Cooperative Compliance. 2024, doi:https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4934559.
All files available under the following license(s):
Copyright Statement:
This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. [...]
Link(s) to Main File(s)
Access Level
Closed Access